SECURE AND RESILIENT
A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SCOTLAND
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A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SCOTLAND
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Leadership, Partnership and successful Outcomes are the key pillars in ensuring that the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) in Scotland is ‘Secure and Resilient’.

Scottish Government has a key role within the UK Government arrangements in ensuring CNI sites in Scotland are secure and resilient. Leadership in this vital area of work is essential, if we are to achieve our vision of an ‘all risks’ approach to CNI protection and resilience.

Working with our partners, Scottish Government has within the framework of the devolution settlement, a unique opportunity to bring together a whole range of stakeholders engaged in CNI activity in Scotland, in order to enhance the security and resilience of CNI sites in Scotland. We will do this by working in Partnership right across the spectrum of UK and Scottish Government, Industry and local responders, such as the emergency services and the local authorities who are responsible for the delivery of local response arrangements.

In order to realise successful Outcomes, we will underpin the strategy with a performance framework aimed at prioritising the key security and resilience issues affecting the devolved CNI Sectors in Scotland. In addition, we will work closely with UK Government to ensure effective collaboration in relation to the reserved CNI Sectors in Scotland. Addressing risks such as; flooding, pandemic influenza, extreme weather and terrorist attack, in a holistic way is not an easy task. By working together however, we will achieve this goal and in doing so, achieve our wider vision of ‘sustainable economic growth and realise a Scotland where our people are safer and feel safer’.

Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Sustainable Growth
STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Introduction

The national infrastructure includes those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the country and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in the UK depends. Within the complex web of infrastructure there are certain critical assets, the loss or compromise of which would have a major detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or even loss of life. These are classed as ‘CNI’ or Critical National Infrastructure because of the severity of their loss to the UK. There are CNI assets located across the UK including in Scotland. The security and resilience of CNI in Scotland, is vital in achieving long term Scottish Government vision of ‘sustainable economic development and realising a Scotland where our people are safer and feel safer’.

The purpose of this document is to provide clear guidance and a strategic framework within which Scottish Government and key public and private sector Stakeholders in Scotland, can contribute positively within the devolution framework to the overall UK Government arrangements for infrastructure protection and resilience, specifically on CNI. (See Annex B – Vision and Value Map). This strategy sits under and meshes with the UK National Security Strategy,1 the UK CONTEST Strategy2 and the UK CNI Protection Framework.3 It is intended to describe in more detail the Scottish Government contribution to these UK strategies including aims, responsibilities and delivery arrangements. It also clarifies areas where Scottish Government leads (on devolved matters) and areas which are reserved where Scottish Government aims to work closely in support of Whitehall departments.

It is important to note that ‘Secure and Resilient’ seeks to take an ‘all risks’ approach to CNI security and resilience by addressing identified risks effectively through an agreed partnership framework, as explained in this document (See Section 4 – ‘Threat and Risk Ownership’ and Annex A – Scotland CNI Partnership Framework for a detailed explanation of the links between the strategy and the National Risk Assessment [NRA]).

Scope

This strategy focuses on Scotland’s contribution to infrastructure security and resilience with a specific focus on CNI assets. In the short term, the focus of the strategy is to enhance the security and resilience of the Critical National Infrastructure assets in Scotland. In the medium term to longer term, the strategy will extend to other infrastructure which may be of local or Scottish significance but not critical on the UK scale.

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1 National Security Strategy – A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty – published October 2010
3 CPNI publication – CNI Protection in the United Kingdom, September 2008 (endorsed by CSWG)
Reserved and Devolved Issues

CNI Security & Protection

Counter-Terrorism is a reserved issue for the UK Parliament. Overall policy for this area is the responsibility of the Home Office. In addition, policy responsibility for delivery of essential services is reserved in certain sectors and sub-sectors. The Scotland Act 1998 identifies those areas which are reserved and devolved – these are outlined below. The principle of sector sponsor Department responsibility underpins CNI Protection activity. Sector sponsor departments (SSDs) set the strategic approach to CNI protection to be taken in their area. The Scottish Government fulfils the role of the SSD in Scotland for those sectors or sub-sectors, which have been devolved. The devolved sectors are:

- Emergency Services (with the exception of MCA Security, British Transport Police and the Security Service)
- Food
- Devolved Scottish Government Services
- Health
- Water
- Road Transport.

In areas which are reserved, UK Government departments lead and perform the role of the sector sponsor department. These include:

- Communications (BIS lead)
- Energy (DECC lead)
- Finance (HMT lead)
- Transport (DfT lead – with the exception of Roads as highlighted above)
- UK Government Services.

Sector sponsor department responsibility includes identifying what infrastructure in a sector may be considered critical, and leading on setting the essential service impact criteria for that sector. SSDs are a key part of the ‘tripartite relationship’ which is another important element of the UK approach to infrastructure protection. This is the three-way relationship between the SSDs, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) (as the security advice specialist), and the infrastructure owners and operators. Under these arrangements, the precise role of the Scottish Government varies from sector to sector.

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4 CPNI publication – CNI Protection in the United Kingdom, September 2008 (endorsed by CSWG)
5 CPNI publication – CNI Protection in the United Kingdom, September 2008 (endorsed by CSWG)
6 CPNI publication – CNI Protection in the United Kingdom, September 2008 (endorsed by CSWG)
In relation to the devolved Sectors, Scottish Government is responsible for policy and strategic direction on security and protection activity.\(^7\) To achieve this, Scottish Government works in partnership with CPNI and Site Operators in order to deliver effective arrangements at site level. In sectors which are reserved, the Scottish Government works closely in support of UK Government SSDs to ensure effective protective security arrangements at CNI sites located in Scotland. In these areas Scottish Government works in collaboration with the UK Government SSDs.

**CNI Resilience**

‘Resilience’ is a more complex concept, which requires clear definition within the context of CNI planning and response to incidents should they occur. This is an area which is still evolving. In the short term, the strategy will focus on the priority risks outlined in the UK Government National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) – (which focuses on all major disruptive risks to our national interest) and the National Risk Assessment (NRA) – (which focuses on domestic civil emergencies). See Section 4 – ‘Threat and Risk Ownership’ for helpful definitions of ‘resilience’ and ‘Consequence Management.’

In addition to protecting CNI sites from malicious attack through protective security measures, it is also important to ensure CNI assets are resilient in the event of accidents or natural hazards and able to recover quickly. The Cabinet Office co-ordinate work to improve resilience of CNI assets and the wider infrastructure community through the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Programme Board (CIRP), which includes enhanced business continuity. Sector sponsor departments however, retain policy responsibility for the resilience of CNI assets in their sector, which in effect means that UK Government departments lead in reserved areas and Scottish Government in devolved. In relation to resilience, the Scottish Government CNI Resilience Team will work closely with relevant colleagues from within Scottish Government, the Cabinet Office and CNI Site Operators, in order to ensure effective and appropriate resilience arrangements are in place across the devolved sectors in Scotland.

**Emergency Planning & Response**

Together with local Responders, Scottish Government is responsible for the consequence management issues arising from incidents in Scotland, including those which involve CNI sites. In view of this, it is important that Scottish Government continues to work closely with reserved CNI SSDs in order to influence the development of policy and ensure relevant information is shared to enable an effective response in the event of a crisis.

\(^7\) Within UK strategic boundaries (e.g. CONTEST) where appropriate.
UK National Security Strategy

The UK National Security Strategy (NSS) – ‘A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty’, which was published in October 2010, highlights the need for a broader view on national security. The NSS includes threats to individual citizens and to our way of life, as well as to the integrity and interests of the State. The strategy seeks to adopt an ‘all risks’ approach, which considers natural hazards and other civil emergencies such as Pandemic Influenza, Flooding and Extreme Weather alongside malicious threats such as Terrorism.

In relation to CNI security and resilience, the UK National Security Strategy sets out the core objective - ‘to ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and way of life from all major risks that can affect us directly’.

‘Secure and Resilient’ seeks to implement the UK National Security in relation to Critical National Infrastructure in Scotland.

Contest

The aim of CONTEST (an abbreviation of COUNTER TERRORIST STRATEGY) is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

There has been considerable success in operations to disrupt terrorist attacks in the UK, but this threat is always changing. As terrorists seek to exploit new technologies and tactics, the UK is adapting and strengthening its response.

UK Government has revised the counter terrorism strategy to build on the experience gained and the lessons learnt tackling international terrorism since the strategy was first established in 2003. The current version of the strategy was published in March 2009. UK Government has recently announced its intention to review CONTEST with a view to publication in April 2011.

The CONTEST approach needs to be local, national and international, involving a wider range of people and greater resources than ever before. Police and security and intelligence officers, emergency services, local authorities, businesses, voluntary and community organisations, other governments: all are working together to address the threat.

The strategy is organised around four work streams: Pursue, to stop terrorist attacks; Prevent, to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; Protect, to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack; and Prepare, where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact.

There are a number of national groups working on a variety of CNI related issues under CONTEST. These include; ACPO TAM (UK wide police body looking at terrorist related matters),
Police Counter Terrorist Intelligence Units (CTIUs), Police Regional Guardian Groups and the National Counter Terrorist Security Office (NaCTSO), Scottish Government is actively engaged with all these groups on an ongoing basis. All have contributed positively towards the content of this strategy. There is scope for Scotland’s CNI Strategy to include all four aspects of CONTEST, with the main focus on Protect and Prepare.

Preparing Scotland

Preparing Scotland provides strategic guidance on preparing for, responding to and recovering from emergencies in Scotland. Preparing Scotland is set out as a hub and spokes model – the hub, including philosophy, principles, governance structures and regulatory guidance and the spokes a range of detailed guidance on specific matters such as caring for people, mass Fatalities and Communicating with the Public.

‘Secure and Resilient’ is one of the PS spokes, available publically in summary form and, reflecting its security status, available in full to relevant responders and organisations involved in the operation, protection and resilience of critical infrastructure.
DEFINING CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CNI)

When approaching infrastructure security and resilience work, it is important to have clarity of terminology. This section sets out what is meant by the terms ‘national infrastructure’ and ‘critical national infrastructure’ (CNI) and describes in more detail the different national infrastructure ‘sectors’.

**National Infrastructure**

The national infrastructure includes those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the country and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in the UK depends. Essential services are the fundamental services that underpin daily life and ensure the country continues to function socially and economically. They include: The supply of Energy, Food, Water, Transportation Services and Communications services, Emergency Services, Health Care, Financial services and Government Services. There are nine national infrastructure sectors which deliver essential services. The UK’s infrastructure protection effort is organised into these nine sector streams. Activity may also be driven forward on cross-cutting themes such as ‘space’ wherein there may be infrastructure which supports the delivery of essential services across a number of sectors, or ‘personnel security’ which will be important to improving security across all of the sectors, but these are not recognised as national infrastructure sectors in their own right.

Fig.1.
The nine national infrastructure sectors are broken down into the following sub-sectors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Infrastructure Sector</th>
<th>Sub-sector</th>
<th>Whitehall Sector Sponsor Dept</th>
<th>Lead in Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>-Telecommunications</td>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>BIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Postal Services</td>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>BIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Broadcast</td>
<td>DCMS</td>
<td>DCMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Services</td>
<td>-Ambulance</td>
<td>DH</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Fire &amp; Rescue</td>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Marine</td>
<td>DfT</td>
<td>DfT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Police</td>
<td>HO</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>-Electricity</td>
<td>DECC</td>
<td>DECC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Gas</td>
<td>DECC</td>
<td>DECC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Fuel</td>
<td>DECC</td>
<td>DECC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>-Payment, Clearing &amp; Settlement Systems</td>
<td>HMT</td>
<td>HMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Markets &amp; Exchanges</td>
<td>HMT</td>
<td>HMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Public Finances</td>
<td>HMT</td>
<td>HMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>-Production</td>
<td>DEFRA &amp; FSA</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Processing</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Import</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Distribution</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Retail</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>-Central government(^8)</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Devolved Administrations/ Functions; Regional &amp; Local government; Parliament</td>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Palace of Westminster Authorities(^9)</td>
<td>Scottish Parliament Corporate Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>-Health &amp; Social Care</td>
<td>DH</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^8\) And reserved functions thereof such as Defence and National Security.  
\(^9\) Although not a Whitehall government department, these authorities lead on the security of Parliament.
Critical National Infrastructure

Not everything within a national infrastructure sector is ‘critical’. Within the sectors there are certain ‘critical’ elements of infrastructure, the loss or compromise of which would have a major detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life. These ‘critical’ assets make up the nation’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)\(^ {10} \) and are referred to individually as ‘infrastructure assets’. Infrastructure assets may be physical (e.g. sites, installations, pieces of equipment) or logical (e.g. information networks, systems).

\(^{10}\) The formal definition of CNI is: “Those infrastructure assets (physical or electronic) that are vital to the continued delivery and integrity of the essential services upon which the UK relies, the loss or compromise of which would lead to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Infrastructure Sector</th>
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<th>Whitehall Sector Sponsor Dept</th>
<th>Lead in Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>-Aviation</td>
<td>DfT</td>
<td>DfT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Maritime</td>
<td>DfT</td>
<td>DfT</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Rail</td>
<td>DfT</td>
<td>DfT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Road</td>
<td>DfT, Scottish Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>-Potable Water Supply</td>
<td>DEFRA (for England and Wales)</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Waste Water Services</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Dams</td>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THREAT AND RISK OWNERSHIP

Threat
The key issues regarding threat to the UK from Terrorism are well documented within the UK National Security Strategy and the CONTEST Strategy. Scottish Government and ACPOS have outlined the terrorist threat as follows:

“The most serious threat we face is from international terrorists linked to, or influenced by, Al Qaeda, who wrongly use religion to justify their actions. They deliberately target innocent people, regardless of faith, race or background and attack without warning. They aim to inflict mass casualties and are motivated by a violent extremist ideology.

The current threat level is Severe. This threat level is set independently by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. It means an attack is Highly Likely. Scotland is not immune from this threat – as the 2007 attack on Glasgow Airport demonstrated.”

In addition, the National Security Strategy highlights the threats posed by natural hazards and civil emergencies. The flooding in England and Wales during the Summer of 2007, was a timely reminder of the importance of risk mitigation and enhancing resilience in terms of contingency planning and responding to emergencies.

‘Secure and resilient’ supports the ‘all risks approach’ outlined in the National Security Strategy. In doing so, the strategy aims to address and support UK Government Strategies in tackling the priority risks outlined in the UK Government National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) and National Risk Assessment (NRA) which have a direct bearing on the CNI – Terrorism, Cyber Attack, Major Accidents and Natural Hazards (including human pandemic disease and flooding). In addition, the strategy will seek to address other identified risks specific to Scotland, which threaten disruption to the essential services in Scotland.

Risk Ownership – Protective Security
Risk ownership relating to the security and protection of UK CNI (from national security threats, particularly terrorism) falls broadly at the following levels:

- At asset level
  Primary ownership of security risk lies with the owner or operator of the asset who bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring effective security plans and measures are in place, which reflect advice and direction from government (Whitehall departments, agencies, or devolved administrations) and any legislative requirements placed on them, while also supporting commercial operations.

11 Scottish Government/ACPOS Communications Guidance – 8 December 2009 – Section 2.1
12 CPNI publication – CNI Protection in the United Kingdom, September 2008 (endorsed by CSWG)
At Government level

The Sector Sponsor Department or Scottish Government, where sectors or sub-sectors are devolved, is responsible for the strategic approach to security to be taken in their sectors and bear risk in relation to this.

The SSD’s (Reserved CNI Sectors or sub-sectors) or Scottish Government (Devolved CNI Sectors or sub sectors) is responsible for directing the security approach at a strategic level; for identifying priorities and determining security programmes; for ensuring an appropriate balance between enabling and securing service delivery; and for assuring themselves that appropriate and proportionate security measures are in place across the sector - taking action where necessary through legislation, ministerial direction or influence to achieve higher levels of security assurance. For the most high risk sites SSD’s/DA’s may even become involved at a tactical level in determining the appropriate security measures to be applied.

The Home Office also bears risk at Government level arising from its responsibility for UK national security and counter terrorism policy, including CNI protection (from national security threats).

Similarly, CPNI provides advice but is not responsible for security at a site. CPNI may however, bear some residual risk arising from its role as the lead security agency in the tripartite relationship [in the majority of sectors] with a duty to raise concerns about security assurance to Sector Sponsor Departments (SDD’s), including Scottish Government, where the sector is devolved, and our CNI Sector Lead Officers, and to work with them to resolve vulnerabilities.

At Local level

Local Police (including CTSAs) are not responsible for and do not own risk relating to the security of a site. They may however, bear some residual risk relating to effective performance of the core responsibilities placed on them, including ensuring appropriate police response plans for an incident at a site are in place and raising any local security concerns to CPNI.

Similarly, local Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCG’s) in Scotland have a responsibility to identify key risks and to maintain local Community Risk Registers for their respective area. In doing so, the SCG is responsible for ensuring effective multi agency response plans are in place for responding to incidents at CNI Assets in the SCG area.
Risk Ownership – Resilience and Consequence Management

Risk ownership relating to the resilience of and the consequence management issues arising from incidents at CNI Assets in Scotland is more complex and falls broadly at the following levels:

- **At Asset level**
  - Primary ownership of risk in relation to ensuring the resilience of supply or delivery of the core function of the CNI Asset lies with the owner or operator of the asset who bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring effective mitigation measures and Business Continuity Plans (BCPs) are in place, which reflect advice and direction from government (UK Government Departments, agencies, or devolved administrations) and any legislative requirements placed on them, while also supporting commercial operations.

- **At Government level**
  - Sector Sponsor Departments (or Scottish Government, where sectors or sub-sectors are devolved), have ownership of the strategic approach to resilience to be taken in their sectors and bear risk in relation to this. They are responsible for directing the approach to resilience at a strategic level; for identifying priorities and determining resilience programmes; for ensuring an appropriate balance between enabling and ensuring the resilience of service delivery; and for assuring themselves that appropriate and proportionate resilience measures are in place across the sector - taking action where necessary through legislation, ministerial direction or influence to achieve higher levels of resilience assurance. For the most high risk sites SSD’s/DA’s may even become involved at a tactical level in determining the appropriate resilience measures to be applied.

  - Scottish Government is also responsible for coordinating the multi-agency response to consequence management issues arising from any incident at any of the CNI Assets in Scotland.

  - The Cabinet Office also bears risk at Government level arising from its responsibility for UK Resilience policy, including CNI Resilience from Natural Hazards.

- **At Local level**
  - Local Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs) in Scotland have a responsibility to identify key risks and to maintain local Community Risk Registers for their respective area. In doing so, the SCG and the Category 1 Responders who make up the SCG in terms of the Civil Contingencies Act, are responsible for ensuring effective multi agency response plans are in place for responding to incidents at CNI Assets in the SCG area.
**Definition of Resilience in relation to CNI**

Resilience, including consequence management and lead responsibility, is a very complex issue, which will no doubt evolve as the CNI agenda develops and matures. For the purpose of this strategy however, the following explanation will assist in clarifying roles and responsibilities:

Resilience is defined as “the capacity of an individual, community or system to adapt in order to sustain an acceptable level of function, structure and identity.” This comprises two key components:

- The strength and robustness of the CNI Asset and/or the wider infrastructure Sector.
- The Consequence Management response arrangements.

**Resilience (Strength and Robustness)**

This includes resilience of the Sector itself. This includes resilience of supplies and services, together with the implementation of prevention strategies. This is the responsibility of the relevant SSD, CNI Asset and other Operators.

**Resilience (Consequence Management)**

Consequence Management is defined as ‘Managing the impacts resulting from the occurrence of a particular hazard or threat, measured in terms of the numbers of lives lost, people injured, the scale of damage to property and the disruption to essential services and commodities.’

This comprises three key components:

- Government and Industry Sector Response Plans - For example, at a UK level - the UK National Emergency Plan for Fuel and at a Scottish level - the Scottish Water Emergency Plan. Again responsibility lies with the relevant SSD.
- Resilience Guidance - For example, ‘Preparing Scotland’, which is the responsibility of Scottish Government.
- Local Response Plans, such as the SCG Response Plans, which are the responsibility of local Category 1 Responders.

The ‘holistic’ approach to infrastructure Resilience encompasses both preventative and emergency response activity. Any programme to improve resilience within the UK’s critical infrastructure will need to encompass both elements. Options for ensuring continuity of supply might therefore include defensive measures (e.g. permanent or temporary flood defences) aimed at preventing disruption arising in the first place and increasing the resilience of the service or asset, by having effective business continuity plans or by building additional network connections.

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13 Charles Edwards; Resilient Nation; Demos; 2009
14 Preparing Scotland, Section 7
THE STRATEGY FOR CNI IN SCOTLAND

Strategic Aims
The Strategy for CNI in Scotland seeks to provide guidance and direction for all stakeholders involved in CNI protection or resilience, both at a local and Scottish level. By working together to achieve the following five Strategic Objectives, we will ensure that CNI sites in Scotland remain ‘Secure and Resilient.’

- Lead the way in Reducing the vulnerability of CNI in the Devolved Sectors in Scotland by ensuring that appropriate protective security and resilience arrangements are in place.
- Support UK Government in their efforts to reduce the vulnerability of the CNI in Reserved Sectors and sub-sectors (e.g. Energy, Finance) through enhanced protective security & resilience.
- Minimise disruption to the Scottish public and business community by ensuring that relevant Consequence Management response plans are in place and Scotland is able to deal with a civil emergency (e.g. Preparing Scotland hub and spoke model).
- Develop a Scotland CNI partnership framework to ensure shared understanding and ownership of CNI issues in Scotland.
- Adopt a robust, proactive approach to all aspects of CNI planning and protection in Scotland, in line with the UK Government National Security Strategy mindful of the distinction between devolved and reserved areas.

The key elements of this strategy are set out in the Vision and Value Map attached in Annex B. This shows how the aims and objectives of what we wish to achieve in Scotland align behind a clear vision and measurable set of tactical actions for the next year.

The key strategic objectives are explained in detail as follows:

Strategic Objectives
The UK Counter Terrorist Strategy CONTEST, provides an excellent model by which we can plan local and national activity to assist in the delivery of our Strategic Objectives. In consultation with key stakeholders, the following Strategic Objectives have been endorsed for delivery in terms of the overall CNI Strategy for Scotland.

Pursue
- Enhance local intelligence gathering opportunities and capability in the vicinity of CNI sites; 
- Increase awareness and enhance quality of intelligence submissions.

15 Where appropriate. This should reflect the protection arrangements that have been agreed for the site taking into account its anonymity and the wishes of other relevant stakeholders.
Prevent

- Develop Community Engagement strategies, where appropriate and agreed (subject to further consultation) which are relevant to the needs of the communities living in the vicinity of certain CNI sites;
- Develop Community Impact Assessments, where appropriate and agreed (subject to further consultation) which will assist in the implementation of new protective security and resilience projects.

Protect

- Lead the way to reduce the vulnerability of the CNI in Devolved Sectors in Scotland by ensuring that appropriate protective security and resilience arrangements are in place;
- Support UK Government in reducing the vulnerability of CNI sites in the Reserved Sectors in Scotland;
- Work in partnership with CPNI, SSDs and others to develop protective security arrangements on the approach to CNI sites where appropriate, which are realistic and proportionate based on current threat and risk assessments;
- Monitor the development of site specific incident response plans;
- Monitor the development of Generic Counter Terrorist incident response Plans;
- Where appropriate, and in Reserved Sectors in consultation with the SSD, encourage infrastructure sectors to protect critical assets to avoid disruption to services from natural hazards.

Prepare

- Develop a detailed understanding of the interdependencies and impact of loss issues for Scotland as a whole and for each of the SCG areas;
- Develop local planning arrangements, which seek to integrate emergency planning and counter terrorist planning teams, with the aim of providing realistic and effective contingency plans for all CNI sites;
- Policies to adapt to increasing threat from climate change;
- Support information sharing on infrastructure to improve emergency planning and response arrangements for natural hazards;
- Promote policies to ensure location, layout and design of new infrastructure considers risks from natural hazards;
- Work with infrastructure sectors to improve the resilience of networks and systems providing essential services.

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16 HMIC (Eng/Wales) Recommendation following review of Armed Policing Sites in 2009. These are Police Community Engagement Strategies.
17 HMIC (Eng/Wales) Recommendation following review of Armed Policing Sites in 2009. These are Police Community Impact Assessments.
Close partnership working with Whitehall Departments will be a vital part of delivering this strategy. This is particularly true under PROTECT, where sectors are reserved. Scottish Government will work in support of the Whitehall Sector Sponsor Departments (SSDs).
Introduction
Delivering positive change across such a complex area as CNI, where sectors are either reserved or devolved, is clearly not easy. In order to achieve this, ‘Secure and Resilient’ aims to enhance coordination and collaboration at all levels of CNI planning and response through what has become known as the ‘Scotland CNI Partnership Framework’. The following section provides clarity as to what we mean by the ‘Partnership Framework’. A visual explanation can also be found at Annex A.

UK Governance Arrangements
In order to ensure efficient and effective delivery of our national defence and security priorities, the UK Government has established the National Security Council, supported by the National Security Advisor and National Security Secretariat. The National Security Council, which is chaired by the Prime Minister, meets on a weekly basis, providing prompt, coherent and a coordinated approach to decision making on all aspects of our national security.

Terrorism and the policy for protecting CNI from terrorism are reserved issues for UK Government. The lead policy department in Government on these issues is the Home Office. The cross-government effort is co-ordinated by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) within the Home Office, through the UK CONTEST Board (Scottish Government is represented on this group) and associated structures.

Under PROTECT, the Director CPNI is appointed as the Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) within UK Government for the CNI protection work stream, with responsibility for monitoring and overseeing progress across the different sectors and providing assurance/reporting upwards to the CONTEST board. CPNI is also the lead security agency within government for providing protective security advice to the CNI (although CESG/GCHQ and Transec also play a part).

The UK Cross Sector Working Group on CNI (CSWG) is a Sub-Committee of the CONTEST Protect sub-Board. The CSWG is responsible for agreeing policy and setting the strategic direction for UK CNI protection. Scottish Government is represented on this group.

The CSWG is underpinned by several CNI Sector specific Working Groups or issue groups, all of which involve representation from relevant Scottish Government Officials. These groups are responsible for delivering the strategic direction provided by the CSWG and the CONTEST Board.

Under PREPARE, the lead policy department in Government is the Cabinet Office. The cross-government effort is co-ordinated by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) within the Cabinet Office, through the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Programme Board (CIRPB). Scottish Government is represented on this group and associated structures.
Scottish Governance Arrangements

In relation to devolved functions in Scotland, delivery of the UK National Security Strategy and CONTEST is coordinated in terms of policy, by the CONTEST Board for Scotland and in terms of the operational policing response, by the ACPOS Guardian Group.

Under Protect and Prepare, the Scottish Government lead policy department for CNI is the Energy Directorate. The cross-government effort is coordinated within the directorate by the CNI Resilience Team, who share both the wider resilience and protect agenda with the Justice Department.

Working in partnership with UK Government, CPNI, Site Operators, ACPOS and local responders, the Scottish Government CNI Resilience Team will coordinate the delivery of the CNI Strategy and Action Plan for Scotland.

‘Secure and Resilient’ seeks to take a holistic approach to CNI planning and response, with greater integration between the Protect and the Prepare work streams in Scotland. With more streamlined coordination of effort, the strategy aims to deliver a more effective outcome for all stakeholders. This will involve coordinated consideration with UK departments and agencies as appropriate, of all the risks impacting on CNI sites in Scotland.

The Scottish Government Critical National Infrastructure Group (SG-CNIG) has been established to oversee the delivery of this holistic approach to CNI planning and response. UK Government has agreed that SG-CNIG is the appropriate mechanism for progressing Scottish devolved issues and issues on the interface between devolved and reserved matters as part of the wider UK arrangements on CNI.

Within SG-CNIG, Lead Scottish Government Officials have been appointed for each of the nine CNI Sectors. These representatives attend UK Sector Working Group meetings to ensure devolved issues are reflected in the development and delivery of strategy and policy at a UK level. Through a range of Devolved Sector CNI Working Groups, the relevant Lead Officers are also responsible for overseeing the security and resilience issues relating to their sectors in Scotland. Similarly, the Lead Official will work closely in support of the UK Sector Sponsor Department where the sector is reserved.

SG-CNIG has developed a 3 Year Business Plan, which seeks to put in place the building blocks that are required in order to support the implementation and delivery of ‘Secure and Resilient’ both within Scottish Government and at a more local level, in partnership with Local CNI Groups where instigated, and individual CNI Asset owners from the devolved sectors. The SG-CNIG 3 Year Business Plan can be found at Annex C.
Local Arrangements

The UK CSWG and the Contest Board for Scotland has endorsed the establishment of Local CNI Working Groups in Scotland. Following the success of a national pilot, CPNI have issued guidance on the establishment and remit of Local Protection Working Groups. This guidance is available direct from CPNI. The local groups will only be established where they are required by the local agencies and CNI Sector Operators. These groups are intended to add local value through increased coordination of activity and resolution of practical local issues.

At date of publication, local CNI groups have been established in three Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) areas in Scotland – Grampian, Strathclyde and Lothian and Borders. These groups, while still embryonic, have already demonstrated clear business benefit to local responder agencies and CNI operators alike. The three groups are also represented on SG-CNIG in order to ensure local – national coordination of activity.

Industry Perspective

‘Secure and Resilient’ must be relevant, realistic and achievable in terms of its strategic vision and tactical policy. Experience has shown us that the best way to ensure that there is no ‘policy-practice gap’ is to keep close liaison and dialogue with our industry partners. To enable this dialogue to take place in a coordinated and integrated way and at a cross-sector level across Scotland, we will also be establishing a Critical Infrastructure and Utilities Group. The group will be led by the Scottish Government as part of the CNI Partnership Framework and operate under the auspices of the Scottish Government CNI Group (SG-CNIG). Its main remit will be to identify and develop a ‘solutions based approach’ to utility and infrastructure disruptions, such as those experienced in the recent winter weather events in December 2010.
CONCLUSION

The importance of the CNI cannot be over emphasised. This Strategy is required in order to bring the relevant Partners together in a Coordinated way, in order to deliver the necessary Action to ensure CNI located in Scotland remains secure and resilient to all threats. In turn, this will help deliver the aim of CONTEST which is ‘to allow people to live normally free from fear’ and assist us in reaching our Scottish Government vision where we can ‘create sustainable economic growth and realise a Scotland where our people are safer and feel safer’.

The CNI Strategy is supported by a three year Business Plan, which will be subject to ongoing monitoring and review by the CNI Programme Manager and SG-CNIG. In addition, the CONTEST Board for Scotland will monitor the progress of key objectives within the CNI Business Plan, with the submission of quarterly Highlight Reports. Similarly, this work will be carried out in tandem with the Measuring Preparedness work stream within Scottish Resilience.

Success in this vital area of work can only be achieved through Partnership, Coordination and Action involving...

- **Engagement** of Scottish Government at a UK level on the CONTEST Board, the CSWG and the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Programme Board. Not just as a silent partner, but as a fully engaged stakeholder, taking a proactive and key role in influencing national policy on CNI security and resilience issues.

- **Ethos of shared ownership** in Scotland through the work of the SG-CNI Group, where all relevant Scottish Government Directorates, ACPOS, CFOA, CPNI, DECC and Scottish Government’s Resilience Division, provide clear leadership on the development of Scotland’s CNI Strategy and Action Plan.

- **Endorsement** and support of the UK CSWG, the CONTEST Board for Scotland, the SG-CNI Group and the ACPOS Guardian Group. Without this strategic endorsement, delivery of the strategy at an operational level will not be possible.

- **Integration** between CTSAs and Emergency Planning Officers at local Police Force level is essential to the success of this strategy. Many of the strategic outcomes will be coordinated and delivered at a local level. Similarly, local issues and barriers to progress need to be brought to the attention of SG-CNIG and the relevant SSD by operational people who are able to contribute valuable and intimate local knowledge.

CNI in Scotland is both critical to Scotland and the wider UK. This strategy puts in place the building blocks for developing a secure and resilient future for CNI in Scotland within the wider UK Government arrangements.
**The Scottish Government**

**PURPOSE**
Safeguarding Critical National Infrastructure in Scotland through Security and Resilience in order to create sustainable economic growth and realise a Scotland where people are safer and feel safer

**VISION**
‘By 2013, we will have established a CNI Partnership Framework between Government and those responsible for CNI assets which works in a co-ordinated and effective manner in order to minimise disruption to any part of that infrastructure or to any of our communities living and working across Scotland.’

**PRINCIPLES**

- **OBJECTIVE 1 – LEADERSHIP**
  - Clarify roles and responsibilities in relation to Devolved and Reserved CNI issues
  - Provide clear guidance to stakeholders in close liaison with CPNI and UK Government

- **OBJECTIVE 2 – PARTNERSHIP**
  - Identify disparities in the implementation of CNI planning across Scotland
  - Define an appropriate planning framework that builds on progress to date
  - Agree reporting mechanisms

- **OBJECTIVE 3 – OUTCOMES**
  - Agree measurable outcomes against which progress can be monitored
  - Establish clear lines of accountability and governance

**STRATEGIES To 2013**

- **TACTICS 4/10-4/11**
  - Raise awareness with CNI Asset Owners
  - Deliver wider programme of CNI Awareness Raising briefings to support implementation of strategy
  - Align with CC Adaptation

  - Develop effective CNI Partnership Framework
  - Establish CNI Sector Working Groups
  - Facilitate Local CNI Working Groups in Scotland

  - Develop Performance Metrics for each Sector
  - Report progress on key actions to CONTEST Board for Scotland and UK CSWG
  - Sector Reports to SG-CNIG
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<tr>
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<th>2011-12</th>
<th>2012-13</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<td>Provide guidance and direction on CNI Security and Resilience in Scotland</td>
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<td>Develop Strategy for CNI in Scotland</td>
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<td>Develop CNI Communications Strategy</td>
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<td>Deliver CNI briefings to Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs)</td>
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<td>Develop CNI Sector Resilience Assessments</td>
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<td>Deliver CNI awareness raising briefings</td>
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<td>Review Strategy for CNI in Scotland</td>
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<td>Deliver CNI Conference in Scotland</td>
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<td>Develop partnership arrangements to enable delivery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop effective Scottish Partnership Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish CNI Sector Working Groups in Devolved sectors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitate Local CNI Working Groups where requested by owners/operators and/or local police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop Scottish CNI Partnership with CPNI and PSNI in Northern Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish Scottish CNI Champions Group (Industry/Site Operators)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review Scottish Government structure for delivery of CNI strategy in Scotland</td>
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<th>2011-12</th>
<th>2012-13</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<td>Monitor and review performance/progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop effective Performance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report progress on key actions to CONTEST Board for Scotland/UK CSWG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hold CNI Seminar (follow up to 2010 event)</td>
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<td>Develop Devolved CNI Sector Tactical Action Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review Devolved CNI Sector Tactical Action Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report progress to CONTEST Board for Scotland/UK CSWG</td>
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Terms of Reference for Scottish Government CNI Group (SG-CNIG)

Aim:
- To improve the resilience & protective security of CNI located in Scotland.
- Oversee and progress CNI issues where the sector responsibilities are devolved.

Objectives
The group will within the parameters of the division between reserved and devolved matters in the Scotland Act:
- Develop and maintain a strategy/core brief for progressing Security and CNI issues in Scotland.
- Receive reports from and provide strategic direction to (where appropriate) local security/CNI Working Groups.
- Work together with the Sector Sponsor Department (SSD) and CPNI, to ensure the successful implementation of UK CNI arrangements.
- Develop and progress Tactical Action Plans for each of the devolved CNI Sectors in Scotland.
- And work with reserved SSDs in the completion of their action plans.
- Establish links with UK Government policy counterparts and seek to attend/represent Scottish interests on UK sector working groups.
- Consider how key interdependencies in Scotland can be identified and better understood.
- Consider how protective security and resilience policy/arrangements can be better joined up.
- Consider the opportunity for greater engagement and ‘awareness raising’ of CNI issues with the aim of promoting resilience ‘best practice’ in key devolved sectors.
- Receive intelligence updates from CPNI.
- Consider the development of a ‘lessons learned’ cycle for CNI exercises and actual incidents.
- Review and consider designation of CNI located in Scotland where the responsibilities are devolved.
- Liaise closely with other CONTEST work streams to avoid duplication and ensure a joined up Scottish approach.
- Work with UK Government and CPNI to increase understanding of the interdependencies and impact issues affecting Scotland and each of the SCG areas in Scotland.
- Work closely with UK Government and CPNI to consider the benefits/need for mapping of all CNI Assets in Scotland.
- Identify and agree issues to be progressed via SG-CNIG (i.e. Devolved issues) or the UK Cross Sector Working Group (i.e. Reserved issues).
- Review TOR for SG-CNIG on an annual basis.
Proposed Membership
Scottish Government (Energy and Telecoms) - chair
Transport Scotland
Transec
CPNI
Scottish Government (Scottish Resilience, CT policy)
Scottish Government (Food)
Scottish Government (Health)
Scottish Government (Financial Services)
Scottish Government (Water)
Scottish Government (Scottish Resilience, Emergency Services)
Scottish Government (Scottish Resilience, Communications/Media)
Scottish CTSA Co-ordinator
ACPOS Resilience/Emergency Planning Representative
Chairs from Local CNI Working Groups
Scottish CPNI Liaison
Department for Energy and Climate Change (Sector Sponsor Department for Energy)
Department for Transport
Department of Business Innovation and Skills (sector sponsor department on communications)
HM Treasury (sector sponsor department for Finance)
Scotland Office

Administration
The group will be chaired and the secretariat provided by the Energy and Telecoms Resilience Unit of the Scottish Government. The Group will meet twice a year in close alignment with the meetings of the local Security and CNI working groups.

* UK Government operates a 5 stage approach to the protective security of the CNI. The 5 stages are: designation; planning; delivery; implementation; and monitoring and review. The group will support sector sponsor departments and CPNI in step 4 of this approach (i.e. implementation) in Scotland.
## ANNEX E

### GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACPOS</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPO TAM</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers – Terrorism and Allied Matters (UK Police Strategic Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCPs</td>
<td>Business Continuity Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEED</td>
<td>Scottish Government Business, Energy and Enterprise Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (Reserved SSD for Communications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRPB</td>
<td>Critical Infrastructure Resilience Programme Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNI</td>
<td>Critical National Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONTEST</td>
<td>UK Governments Counter Terrorist Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPNI</td>
<td>Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSWG</td>
<td>Cross Sector Working Group on CNI Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTSA</td>
<td>Counter Terrorist Security Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTIU(S)</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Intelligence Unit Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Devolved Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>DECC</td>
<td>Department of Energy and Climate Change (Reserved Sector SSD for Energy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfT</td>
<td>Department for Transport (Reserved SSD for Transport)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETR</td>
<td>Scottish Government Energy and Telecoms Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMT</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Treasury (Reserved SSD for Finance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Maritime Coastguard Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NaCTSO</td>
<td>National Counter Terrorism Security Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCCT</td>
<td>Office for Security and Counter Terrorism based within the Home Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Strategic Coordinating Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG-CNIG</td>
<td>Scottish Government Critical National Infrastructure Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSD</td>
<td>Sector Sponsor Department</td>
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SECURE AND RESILIENT
A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SCOTLAND