Delivering Better Places in Scotland
A guide to learning from broader experience
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Section 1
About the study and this guide

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background:

The Scottish Centre for Regeneration (SCR) in the Scottish Government, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) Scotland and Architecture + Design Scotland (A+DS), have worked with the University of Glasgow to deliver this good practice Guide as a way of helping different stakeholders identify good practice and improve their understanding of related issues in delivering better places.

We were interested in what experience there was outside of Scotland and what we might be able to learn for adaption and/or applying here. Of particular interest to us was to understand the practical interventions and related issues involved in creating successful places. We wanted to understand better how different public bodies elsewhere had gone about the task of making places – and markets – work better, what kind of relationships they had developed with private sector interests and how they had engaged those living in or who would come to live in the places being developed or regenerated.

SCR is charged with improving knowledge and understanding by connecting people to evidence, expertise and excellence. Together with RICS and A+DS, it is working to create opportunities for learning and sharing best practice through its Mixed and Sustainable Communities Learning Network.

1.2 The authors

The Guide was written by David Adams, Steve Tiesdell and George Weeks from the Department of Urban Studies at the University of Glasgow who wish to acknowledge the extensive help they received in undertaking this study from all those in the eight case study locations who contributed time, advice and information to bringing each story alive. They are also grateful for the extensive comments received on earlier drafts from a broader expert group, comprising Chris Watts Associates, David Hogg from Turner & Townsend, David Murdoch from Drivers-Jonas, Hugh Bruce Watt from Pinsent Masons, Ricardo Marini from Edinburgh Council and Stuart Gulliver from Glasgow University, together with those provided by Steven Tolson of RICS Scotland and Diarmaid Lawlor of A+DS who constituted the smaller client group.
1.3 This guide

This Guide is one of a number of products published by SCR and its partners. It is intended primarily as an on-line resource for a variety of public, private and community stakeholders who have an interest in creating better places. We have structured it to enable the reader to make optimum use of hyperlinks between the main lessons set out in the summary, the core messages from the study undertaken by the authors and the ‘stories’ from each of the eight case study areas.

Over time, we will add to the core content by providing other case studies, making available links to other related research, publications and drawing too on practitioners’ experience of delivering placemaking in Scotland.

We will also be organising a programme of events in conjunction with the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) and Architecture and Design Scotland (A+DS) to engage with a variety of policy and practitioner interests to share the lessons and discuss their applicability to Scotland. During the Autumn of 2010 we envisage this including:

* Re-convening the expert group to provide further critiques and produce think pieces on specific issues highlighted in the guide.
* Helping different groups draw out lessons for their particular profession or sector.
* Engaging with specific geographic areas and initiatives who are delivering regeneration and seeking to create better places
* Engaging with key Scottish Government colleagues to consider any policy implications and how government might respond to some of the messages.

Further information about these activities can be found at the SCR’s Mixed and Sustainable Communities Learning Network.
Section 2

Delivering Better Places In Scotland – Learning From Broader Experience

Ensure Good leadership
Co-ordinate delivery
Control the spatial development framework
Achieve fast and co-ordinated regulatory approvals
Exercise ownership power
Attract funding for advance infrastructure provision
Secure design quality through procurement strategies
Thereafter: continue to invest and provide stewardship over time
Summary of key lessons for Scotland

The eight case studies together provide valuable lessons about the process of delivering better places and can provide a framework for action in Scotland. They demonstrate how critical the following elements are:

Ensure Good leadership

- Good leadership matters because it drives forward action, breeds confidence, provides certainty for development partners, reduces risk for all involved and widens participation by architects and builders in the delivery. Without such leadership, place delivery relies on rules and regulations.

- Quality places have an effective place promoter – often a dynamic individual working in a supportive organisational context. In Vauban it was Wulf Daseking, the Chief Planner in Freiburg City Council, who has championed sustainability for the last 20 years. In Newhall it was the Moen brothers who owned the land and wanted something much better than previous average standard developments they had seen.

- The primary task of the place promoter is to nurture a compelling vision of what a place will be like, inspire action and galvanise support, and ensure effective delivery.

- The place promoter must foster a place-making culture. This means encouraging organisations to act holistically and work in a joined-up fashion with others to achieve a quality place rather than think and act in silos to suit their own professional interests. The European examples all had stronger place-making cultures than those in the UK and were characterised by a willingness to invest in the front end vision to achieve quality places. Their success has been recognised by others across Europe. For example, Freiburg City (where Vauban is located) was awarded the 2010 European City of the year by the Academy for Urbanism. And Stockholm (where Hammarby is located) was awarded the European Green Capital 2010 by the EU Commission.
Co-ordinate delivery

The more the place promoter can manage and integrate five key tasks, then the greater the chance of creating better places:

- Control the spatial development framework
- Achieve fast and co-ordinated regulatory approvals
- Exercise ownership power
- Attract funding for advance infrastructure provision
- Secure design quality through procurement strategies

Taken together, these actions are as much about making markets as making places, since over time successful places become self-sustaining and attractive in market terms. IJburg in Amsterdam set out to create a completely new neighbourhood of 45,000 people and was a meticulously planned project with physical and social infrastructure developed in advance of building development. Hammarby in Stockholm demonstrates how a wholesale commitment to design excellence can produce a very successful place and the benefits of early installation of public transport infrastructure.

Control the spatial development framework

A robust and imaginative spatial development framework or ‘masterplan’ is essential to creating somewhere that functions as an integrated place. The place promoter should oversee the process, making full use of the client brief to control its commission and ensure that what is proposed can be delivered on the ground. Adamstown is an example of how special planning designations can make it possible to deliver new more effective delivery structures.

The spatial framework must specify how infrastructure (streets, spaces, utilities, community facilities) and components (blocks, plots, buildings) relate to each other and how together they will deliver the vision.

The place leader must take overall responsibility for both generating and delivering the masterplan. The place leader should not delegate delivery to another party as they may deal with implementation difficulties in ways which compromise what was originally intended.
Achieve fast and co-ordinated regulatory approvals

- Conflicting requirements of different agencies can significantly delay projects. Local planning authorities therefore need to take an active role in accelerating and co-ordinating the approval process by integrating regulatory demands without compromising quality. In Hammarby design coding, controlled by the City Council, was critical in translating the strategic vision to a more local scale though a two stage “Detailed Plans” and “Quality Programmes” process.

- Design codes if adopted as Planning Guidance can speed up development. In Allerton, these provided developers with certainty and ensured faster public sector decision making on individual projects. Design codes can also secure consistency in design quality between different developers and be enforced by planners (as in Adamstown and Vauban) or by landowners (as in Newhall).

Exercise ownership power

- In the European case studies the public sector led the implementation either by acquiring or historically owning the land. And the case studies demonstrate how quality development would not have happened without the willingness and determination of landowners to develop a high quality place on their land.

- Effective place delivery often involves consolidating multiple land ownership to ensure subsequent co-ordinated development. It also allows operational flexibility in selling/leasing land – in size, location and the conditions applied.

- Achieving ownership control produces clarity and confidence in the market and ensures development happens at the time, location and quality desired. In this context, land consolidation and disposal, as described above, should be seen as place-shaping and creating sustainable value. Allerton, on a brownfield site in what had been the village colliery, would not have seen development without public sector investment and its designation as a Millennium Community. By way of contrast, Castlefield shows what an enlightened developer, with a long-term development strategy based upon enhancing overall place value, can achieve through well judged interventions and building projects.
Attract funding for advance infrastructure provision

- Quality places work well because the necessary physical and social infrastructure is planned and provided as an integral part of the overall development programme. In Ijburg, utilities were installed alongside other physical infrastructure, and co-ordinated through its “red carpet” system (the name given by the Ijburg projectbureau to the project co-ordinating the construction of bridges, cables and pipes), to ensure continuing dialogue between the City’s “Projectbureau” and the multitude of utility companies.

- This kind of approach requires an effective place investment model which enables initial costs of infrastructure provision to be borne by the place provider, but subsequently recovered from developers and investors.

Secure design quality through procurement strategies

- Even when land ownership is consolidated at the start, the place promoter should encourage a range of developers to participate to ensure variety, creativity and innovation in the built form. Smaller projects, implemented over different time frames by different developers using various designers, can encourage a range of styles and a diversity of owners. In Vauban land was released in small plots and favoured transfer to “Baugruppen” (self develop, owner co-operatives) rather than corporate housebuilders.

- This requires procurement strategies that reconcile potential conflicts between financial bids and intended design quality. Smaller land parcels are more prevalent in the mainland European case studies and demonstrate how land sub division and release strategies address the longer term needs of the place and not just shorter term development implementation issues.

Thereafter: continue to invest and provide stewardship over time

- Delivering better places takes time and demands long-term commitment to place quality, rather than short-term conventional speculative development.

- Once development is completed, places need to be cultivated over time to ensure continued positive reputation and attractiveness. Proactive after-care ensures that place quality is maintained and enhanced and that property values increase. At Upton, English Partnerships set aside money to establish the Upton Management Company which will charge every unit a management fee to cover the maintenance of the area. And Stockholm City council has taken on direct responsibility for after care at Hammarby.
Key lessons, challenges and the way ahead

* Delivering better places demands leadership, particularly from the public sector to create certainty, reduce developer risk and in turn encourage developers to become more innovative and more strongly committed to place quality. Bringing innovative Planning and Placemaking approaches more into the mainstream of wider Community Planning in Scotland may offer new insights and rewards for all the partner agencies and for local communities.

* Public-sector commitment, expertise and investment can be recouped in the long term. It can also help deliver development at a faster rate than the private sector could do alone. In Scotland, new delivery models such as Local Asset Based Vehicles and Deferred Receipt Mechanisms are being examined and may provide solutions to this challenge.

* If we want to create better places in Scotland more often than we have in the past, policymakers and those charged with delivery need to engage with both making markets and place shaping strategies - especially by rethinking public sector commitment to and investment in place quality. Better connections between "Place" interventions such as those described above and "People" interventions, particularly where "Total Place" type initiatives are being put in place may produce better and more sustainable outcomes for places in Scotland whether they are in growth, transformation or regeneration contexts.

* SCR, RICS and A+DS are exploring all of these ideas as we carry out a dissemination programme during late 2010 and into 2011. This will provide opportunities for a wide variety of stakeholders to discuss the lessons summarised here and examine whether they have relevance, merit and applicability in Scotland. SCR’s Mixed and Sustainable Communities Learning Network will provide detailed information about this work as it progresses and offer a variety of events and activities for participants to engage in and contribute their perspectives and views.
Section 3

Background to the study and the Guide

3.1 Introduction and background – why this study was undertaken
3.2 How this study was undertaken
3.3 How the Guide is structured
3.1 Introduction and background – why this study was undertaken

In the past decade or so, the importance of place has returned to stake its claim to making Scotland wealthier and fairer, healthier, safer and stronger, smarter and greener.

The Government’s National Performance Framework identifies national outcomes one of which is particularly relevant to this Guide:

“We live in well-designed, sustainable places where we are able to access the amenities and services we need.”

The Government acknowledges that the development of well-designed, sustainable places will only happen through effective partnerships – between central and local government, and between the public, private and third sectors, and most crucially with the individuals who live in those places. It accepts too that “Government must create the right environment for investment and increased housing supply; taking targeted action in the most disadvantaged communities and devolving power to the local level so that communities can have more influence and ownership.”

In 2008 the Scottish Government’s Council of Economic Advisers, commented in its first annual report that “Too much development in Scotland is a missed opportunity and of mediocre or indifferent quality. There are a few examples of new or regenerated places which are well thought out, some fine new buildings and smaller projects that are to be welcomed but they are the exception rather than the rule. The ultimate test of an effective planning system is the maintenance and creation of places where people want to be. We need to rise to that challenge.”

In its response in early 2009, the Scottish Government pointed to the extensive programme of planning reform which in recent years has focused on improved outcomes, especially in relation to the sustainable use of land, good design and the protection and enhancement of the built and natural environment. Attention was also drawn to the Scottish Sustainable Communities Initiative, which has ensured that recent Scottish achievements in the creation of successful sustainable places and the delivery of quality development are better known. There has indeed been a determined attempt over the past decade to improve place quality though the policy emphasis, for example, on mixed communities, urban regeneration and the low carbon economy.
From a regeneration perspective, some places have suffered by having greater concentrations of deprivation and comprising mainly social housing. Better place design, particularly through creating greater diversity in choice of housing and improving access to other services, can provide opportunities for people to remain within their communities as their circumstances change over time. It can also help improve internal and external perceptions of a place to encourage greater public and private investment in extending and improving its resources and services.

The Government’s ‘Firm Foundations’ policy recognises this and commits to “...build on the success of high quality mixed tenure developments.......look at ways of increasing variety and choice in housing and tenure.......encourage approaches that enable people of different ages, lifestyles and incomes to meet their needs in neighbourhoods that are safe, attractive and sustainable and ........ensure that our funding and regulatory regimes support and encourage this behaviour.”

Other Scottish policy documents have focused on the importance of making sustainable places that combine distinct identity, safe and pleasant spaces, walkable neighbourhoods, a sense-of-welcome, robustness, and sustainability. At the same time, Architecture + Design Scotland has championed the Scottish place-making agendas since its formation in 2005, especially through research, good practice guidance and design review.

Reflecting the importance of better quality places to the Scottish economy, Scottish Enterprise has argued that in a competitive global economy, Scotland must succeed in the ‘place race’ by ensuring that the quality of its built environment is good enough to create opportunities both to grow value and re-invest it socially, culturally and economically. Strategically, Scottish Enterprise has also drawn its attention to the importance of well-designed sustainable places in helping Scotland do business in Europe and beyond. In short, it is now widely understood that attractive, well-designed towns and cities, lively neighbourhoods and well-connected streets create an environment in which people prefer to live, work and relax and in which businesses are more likely to invest.

The nature of Scotland’s debate about the quality of its built environment has therefore fundamentally shifted over the past decade or so. There is now much more shared understanding of why places matters at a time when economic, social and environmental sustainability is seen as increasingly central to public debate. And there is far greater knowledge of the kind of features that make for quality towns and cities. The real impediment to achieving better places in Scotland is thus no longer a dispute about their value or ignorance about their qualities, but rather concern about the actual practicalities of their delivery. This study is intended to address that concern directly by investigating recent exemplar projects elsewhere in Europe to see what Scotland can learn and apply from this broader experience.
3.2 How this study was undertaken

The specific aims of this study were:

* To provide a focused review of key issues in the planning and delivery of better places.
* To develop a set of schematic approaches to the delivery of better places which would, amongst other things, provide a menu of options for specific places.
* To provide a systematic and cross-cutting review and evaluation of the experience of delivering better places in a range of locations with relevance to the Scottish context.

The study was therefore intended as a scoping exercise to provide a systematic and cross-cutting review of experience in delivering better places in a range of locations relevant to Scotland. The Scottish Centre for Regeneration (SCR) in the Scottish Government, in conjunction with RICS Scotland and Architecture + Design Scotland (A+DS), commissioned the Department of Urban Studies at the University of Glasgow to carry out a scoping exercise to identify good practice and related issues for the Guide. SCR is charged with improving knowledge and understanding by connecting people to evidence, expertise and excellence. Together with RICS and A+DS, it is working to create opportunities for learning and sharing best practice through its Mixed and Sustainable Communities Learning Network.

The study consisted of four main elements:

* A review of key issues involved in delivering ‘better’ places.
* Identification of eight exemplar case studies across Europe, each of which involved significant real estate development in creating a ‘new’ place. The case studies varied in scale, approach and complexity, but they were each considered relevant to the challenges Scotland faces in regenerating or expanding its towns and cities.
* A systematic appraisal and cross-cutting review of the case studies, drawing on both documentary evidence and first-hand site visits.
* The drawing of conclusions and the identification of lessons for good practice.
The eight projects chosen for study were:
- Adamstown, Dublin, Ireland
- Allerton Bywater, Leeds, England
- Castlefield (Britannia Basin), Manchester, England
- Hammarby-Sjöstad, Stockholm, Sweden
- IJburg, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Newhall, Harlow, England
- Upton, Northampton, England
- Vauban, Freiburg, Germany

Each project was visited by a member of the study team, documentary evidence obtained, and interviews conducted with key players. The lessons from each project were compared and set against the broader review of key issues involved in delivering ‘better’ places, which had been undertaken prior to the visits. In this kind of work ‘hard facts’ are relatively few in number and often do not reveal much. The really important lessons derive from interpretations of what happened in each project, offered by those interviewed or pieced together by the study team. Evidence of this nature can be highly insightful, but also open to challenge. The study team therefore valued the contributions of a broader expert group and a smaller client group in testing emerging conclusions and helping to firm up the main cross-cutting lessons to be drawn from the experience of these eight projects.

3.3 How the Guide is structured

This Guide is structured in eleven main sections, plus appendices. A summary of the main lessons for Scotland is provided in the “Learning Point” in section 3. The introduction provides information on the background to the study. Section 4 provides a brief one-page summary of each of the eight case studies. Section 5 explains the processes by which development normally happens and considers why this tends to produce standard products and often mundane places. Sections 6 to 9 draw extensively on the experience from the eight case studies to identify what matters most in delivering better places.
The Guide contends that what really makes delivery organisations effective in creating better places is the extent to which they are able to control the spatial development framework, achieve regulatory approvals, exercise ownership power, enable advance infrastructure to be provided by attracting investment funding and secure design quality through their procurement strategies. The more delivery organisations can manage and integrate these five aspects of the development process, the greater their chance of creating better places. To a greater or lesser extent, these actions are as much about making markets as making places – since over time, successful places become self-sustaining and attractive in market terms. Section 7 therefore examines all these practical aspects of delivery in some detail.

Section 9 considers the importance of stewardship and sustainability over time, arguing that proactive management and general care is essential to ensure that the place is nurtured, and enhanced so as to establish a positive reputation that will transmit confidence and increase activity. With these ingredients the place economy should grow along with its property values. Section 10 of the Guide then highlights the main conclusions and links back to the main lessons in the Learning Point that Scotland can learn from the broader experiences reviewed.

Section 11 provides a more detailed account of each case study and serves as important reference points for the main sections in the guide.
Section 4
Case study summary profiles

Profile 1: Adamstown Dublin, Ireland
Profile 2: Allerton Bywater, Leeds, England
Profile 3: Britannia Basin, Castlefield, Manchester, England
Profile 4: Hammarby-Sjöstad, Stockholm, Sweden
Profile 5: IJburg Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Profile 6: Newhall, Harlow, England
Profile 7: Upton Northampton, England
Profile 8: Vauban Freiburg, Germany
Scotland faces significant challenges in delivering better places, since the urgent need for more concerted regeneration of existing towns and cities needs to be balanced against intense pressures in particular parts of Scotland for the peripheral expansion of existing settlements or the development of wholly new ones.

As Table 1 shows, the case studies were therefore chosen as development exemplars at both greenfield and brownfield locations.

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<th>Case Studies</th>
<th>Greenfield context</th>
<th>Brownfield context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adamstown</td>
<td>Allerton-Bywater</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IJburg</td>
<td>Castlefield (Britannia Basin)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Newhall</td>
<td>Hammarby-Sjöstad</td>
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<td>Upton</td>
<td>Vauban</td>
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<td>Land ownership</td>
<td>Land is either in a single or a small number of ownerships.</td>
<td>Given history of urbanisation, land</td>
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<td>ownership is usually fragmented.</td>
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<td>Contamination</td>
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<td>may be necessary. This is likely to increase</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>production costs relative to greenfield</td>
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<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>New infrastructure to support development is likely to be necessary. Building</td>
<td>Infrastructure to support development</td>
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<td>a new school is likely to be seen as a positive feature of the new development but</td>
<td>may already be in place, but may require</td>
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<td>will significantly increase development costs.</td>
<td>modernisation or replacement. Existing/</td>
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<td>obsolete infrastructure may need to be</td>
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<td>affect the design of development. This is</td>
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<td>likely to increase production costs</td>
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<td>relative to greenfield development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning policy</td>
<td>Planning policy frameworks may not support greenfield development.</td>
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<td>practice, planning policy frameworks</td>
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<td>typically support brownfield development.</td>
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Each of the chosen case studies involved significant real estate development in creating a ‘new’ place. Although selected as exemplars, and often containing unusual or distinctive architecture, their main impression to a visitor is one of normality in the sense that the designs of streets, spaces, etc, are typically of a ‘good ordinary’ standard. When visiting IJburg, for example, it does not seem like an artificial island in the IJmeer, but rather a regular Amsterdam suburb – albeit one with more contemporary architecture.

The case studies were also superior to their more conventional neighbours. This was particularly apparent at Castlefield (Britannia Basin) Newhall and Adamstown – all of which have neighbours built at the same time (or slightly earlier), that have no real sense of place, could be regarded as ‘anywhere developments’ of noticeably lower quality.

A short standard profile of each case study now follows, with more detailed report provided in section 11.
Profile 1: Adamstown
Dublin, Ireland

The Adamstown site was assembled by private interests who anticipated the area becoming ripe for development.

In collaboration with the local authority (South Dublin County Council), Adamstown was designated as a Strategic Development Zone (SDZ) in 2001. A planning scheme for the designated land had to be produced within two years of designation. The SDZ is a partnership between public and private sectors, which requires the public sector to support private development with a simplified planning regime, with greater coordination of the public sector agencies and by ensuring the delivery of necessary elements of social infrastructure, such as schools and community facilities. The Planning Scheme specifies that public infrastructure must be delivered for each of the project’s 15 phases.

A development plan was produced to deliver a demonstrable, best practice mixed-use, medium-density alternative to prevailing car-based suburbia. Development consists of terraced houses, flats and maisonettes, based around a permeable grid of streets and boulevards. There are also three schools and a brand new railway station.

Adamstown’s status as an SDZ affords it the privilege of having a specified Delivery Body (SDCC), a Planning Scheme and a simplified planning permission process – these factors all reduce uncertainty.

The project shows how the delivery of quality development does not need a special delivery organisation if the local authority takes responsibility for liaising with all other public bodies and a private sector partner takes on a similar umbrella role with private firms.
Profile 1: ADAMSTOWN
Dublin, Ireland

LOCATION: South of Lucan, 16 km west of Dublin; linked to the N4 expressway and also readily accessible by train from Dublin.

PROJECT CONTEXT: Suburban, urban extension, greenfield

PROJECT TYPE: Growth

RATIONALE: Using new planning instruments to create a high quality major urban extension to Lucan

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: The project aims to create a new town of around 10,000 homes, along with schools and other social infrastructure and 125,000 m² of commercial space on a 224 hectare site.

PLACE PROMOTER: South Dublin County Council, working alongside Castlethorn Construction

LAND OWNERSHIP: Privately owned. Majority of site banked by Castlethorn Construction, with minority stakes by Maplewood Homes and Tiera Ltd

DELIVERY METHOD: The project is controlled by the SDZ planning scheme and a detailed masterplan. The main infrastructure is funded upfront by a joint venture between two housebuilders. The housebuilders expect to recoup the cost of infrastructure from serviced land parcel sales which were sub-divided into 15 phases.

The public sector provides the social infrastructure in advance of development in accordance with the agreed planning scheme. Design control is exercised in accordance with the planning scheme by SDCC.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: The site was zoned for development in the Local Area Plan in 1998. SDZ status was granted mid 2001. The first houses were completed in 2006. Development is progressing more slowly than expected, owing to Ireland’s ongoing recession.
Profile 2: Allerton-Bywater Millennium Community, Leeds, England

Following closure of Allerton Colliery in 1992, English Partnerships inherited the site from other public agencies and was charged with redevelopment of the site.

In 1998 Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, announced Allerton as the second Millennium Community project – committing the Government to ensuring the development project happened.

A developer-designer masterplan competition was held in 1998 and an exclusive development agreement was made with two housebuilders, but, for various reasons, subsequent progress was slow.

In 2002-3, English Partnerships also took a more hands-on role in the project. Subsequently, following a series of EDAW-run workshops, a design code was developed and development began in 2005. The first two phases are well established and it had become a popular place to buy. A third phase is presently on site and is substantially complete.

The place delivery process at Allerton is relevant to Scotland in terms of being a brownfield site in less favoured development market areas. Allerton shows how a public land developer can reduce project risk, make development more feasible and catalyse interest from developers.

It also shows how the construction of an attractive (but realistically-priced) place in a previously-declining area can draw people back to live there and help reverse decline.
Profile 2: Allerton-Bywater Millennium Community, Leeds, England

LOCATION: Six miles south east of Leeds, near Castleford, West Yorkshire.

PROJECT CONTEXT: Extension of village/brownfield

PROJECT TYPE: Transformation

RATIONALE: ‘Something better’ than conventional suburban development – design practice and environmental exemplar.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: The project comprises approximately 520 residential units, plus 25,000 m2 of commercial space, on a 23-ha site.

PLACE PROMOTER: English Partnerships (HCA).


DELIVERY METHOD: Advance infrastructure and land release in parcels based on a masterplan, with development undertaken by multiple developers in accordance with a detailed design code.

English Partnerships is the land developer and has provided advanced primary physical infrastructure and is selling serviced land parcels to housebuilders, who must comply with the requirements of a design code. Land release is controlled to ensure coherent development.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: The first development was completed in 2005. The first two phases are complete; the third one is presently on site and is nearing completion. The project is about 45% complete, but continuing development has been affected by the recent recession.
Profile 3:
Britannia Basin, Castlefield, Manchester, England

Throughout the 1980s, Central Manchester Development Corporation had invested heavily in developing the Castlefield Urban Heritage Park as a place to live and visit. To the immediate south-west across the Mancunian Way, lay Britannia Basin – a series of derelict canal-side factories and warehouses, surrounded by car breakers.

Britannia Basin was not an appealing place, but in the mid-1990s Urban Splash saw that Britannia Basin was well-located and had significant development potential, showing how regeneration in adjacent areas (i.e. Hulme and ‘original’ Castlefield) can increase a previously undesirable area’s development value.

Urban Splash bought the Britannia Mills buildings and redeveloped them as loft-style flats. These (and others) sold well and encouraged Urban Splash to commit to developing most of the rest of the area, in line with a non-statutory masterplan drawn up with Peel Holdings (the other major local landowner) by EDAW. Six Urban Splash phases have been completed to date. Dandara (2) and Mayfair Developments have also completed major projects in the area.

Castlefield/Britannia Mills shows how place-making as a core element of a developer’s business model can enhance place quality, and how landowners’ interest in maintaining the value of their investment through ensuring subsequent developments continue to be built to high standards.

It also shows how a pro-development local authority committed to high quality design standards can contribute to place quality without itself playing a major role in the delivery process.

This example of developer-led place delivery corresponds to potential regeneration projects in fringe areas of Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee, Aberdeen and perhaps also Stirling and Perth city centres, where a design-minded landowner-developer with an interest in the long-term value of the land could use a similar model to deliver a quality place.
Profile 3: Britannia Basin, Castlefield, Manchester, England

LOCATION: In central Manchester, sited to immediate south-west of Castlefield Urban Heritage Park, and within walking distance of the city centre.

PROJECT CONTEXT: Urban/brownfield

PROJECT TYPE: Intensification/transformation

RATIONALE: Pioneering and cultivation of a new neighbourhood as an investment opportunity.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: There is no formal project. The area’s development is essentially developer-led. In combination, the projects will produce about 500 residential units, plus retail and office space. Has new-build and refurbished components and retains space for future expansion.

PLACE PROMOTER: Urban Splash, assisted by the local planning authority’s pro-development approach, which is also committed to design standards. The project was mainly driven by the entrepreneurial vision of Tom Bloxham of Urban Splash, who provided day-to-day leadership on the project. Urban Splash were greatly assisted by the pro-development ethos prevailing in Manchester, largely attributed to its Chief Executive, Sir Howard Bernstein.

LAND OWNERSHIP: Land ownership is fragmented. Acquisition of development sites has been by private purchase. Former industrial land and buildings gradually acquired by Urban Splash from the mid-1990s onwards. Urban Splash also hold options held on many adjacent undeveloped sites/buildings.
**Profile 3:** Britannia Basin, Castlefield, Manchester, England

**DEVELOPMENT METHOD:** Enlightened developer adopting a long-term development strategy based upon enhancing overall place-value through a series of well-judged interventions and building projects.

The developer is seeking to pioneer the development of a place. Each project is designed to contribute positively to the greater whole. The Britannia Mills building was bought and redeveloped as loft-style flats in 2000.

Planning permission given on a ‘per building’ basis, allowing the Council to retain some control over area’s future development. First two phases designed in-house; subsequent phases relied on external architects, in line with changing policy at Urban Splash.

Public investment in the area limited: English Partnerships provided £2.1m towards Britannia Mills; subsequent phases financed by Urban Splash.

**DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME:** Emerging since the late 1990s. There is no formal programme, and it is effectively a series of projects within a limited area. Project was conceived in mid 1990s. Britannia Mills, as the first phase commenced on site in March 1998 and was complete by summer 2000.

Subsequent phases followed in 2002 (2 and 3), 2004 (4) 2005, (5) and 2009 for the sixth (and so far final) phase.
Profile 4: Hammarby-Sjöstad, Stockholm, Sweden

Hammarby-Sjöstad provides an example of a meticulously planned and executed sustainable urban extension, aiming to create the character, feel and amenity of the city’s more established neighbourhoods.

For decades a place of low-rent industry and scrapyards, Hammarby’s fortunes were transformed in 1994 when it was chosen for Stockholm’s 2004 Olympic bid. Despite losing the bid to Athens, the momentum remained for a comprehensive, environmentally-responsible redevelopment of the site.

The Olympic masterplan was skilfully adapted by Stockholm’s City Planning Bureau. A detailed design code was produced to ensure the dense nature of the development did not cause problems.

Hammarby-Sjöstad shows how a combination of a strong vision, high levels of consensus and wholesale commitment to design excellence can produce a very successful place. Successful collaboration also promotes certainty.

It also demonstrates the benefits of early installation of public transport infrastructure and how outstanding levels of energy efficiency and waste recovery can be achieved.
Location: Hammarby Sjöstad is located to the south of Stockholm’s Södermalm district, on the opposite shore of Hammarby Sjö. It is linked by a tram to the T-Bana metro system and is adjacent to Stockholm’s southern ring motorway. It is connected via multiple bridges to a ski slope and nature reserve.


Project Type: Growth and transformation. Stockholm needed to expand its housing provision and the site was in low quality use with very little amenity value.

Rationale: Extend urban Stockholm to the southern shores of Hammarby Sjö, while building to the highest environmental standards possible.

Project Description: Mixed use 200 hectare waterside development of 10,800 apartments for 20-25,000 people (around 7,000 completed at present), 200,000m² of commercial space (around 140,000m² completed at present), plus schools, libraries, ski slopes, parks and open space and tram lines.

Energy waste and water systems all integrated via the highly-efficient ‘Hammarby Model’.

Place Promoter: Stockholm City Planning Department, who provided almost all the public money (around €500m). Much of the place vision created by the late Jan Inge-Hagström, Stockholm’s city planner who had developed original masterplan for Olympic bid in the early 1990s.

Land Ownership: Built on former industrial land, largely consolidated by Stockholm City Council, though some private parcels remained.
Profile 4: Hammarby-Sjöstad, Stockholm, Sweden

**DELIVERY METHOD:** Initial 1990s masterplan for 2004 Olympic bid was skilfully adapted by the City Planning Bureau in collaboration with private sector architects, planners and urban designers.

The City acted as land developer installing physical and social infrastructure, notably a tram extension. Apartments and commercial space were delivered by developers; public infrastructure was delivered by the respective public bodies. Developers must comply with the requirements of site-specific and area-specific design codes.

**DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME:** First conceived in 1990; the first elements were completed in 2000. The project has 15 phases; 11 of which have been completed, with a very rapid build-out (approximately 600-700 units per year). This is a substantially quicker sales and production performance than achieved in Scotland or other parts of the UK. So far 7,000 residential units have been built; the final number will be 10,800 units. So far 140,000 m² office space has been completed; with a final planned total of 200,000 m².
Profile 5:
IJburg, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Built on a series of artificial islands, IJburg is a meticulously planned and executed sustainable urban extension to Amsterdam, aiming to create the character, feel and amenity of the city’s more established neighbourhoods.

First considered as a site for extension in the 1960s, the contemporary project dates from the early 1990s.

Having been identified as a VINEX location in 1994, Projectbureau IJburg was created within the Amsterdam DRO, who consulted on and designed the masterplan.

Construction of the islands began in 1999. Road and building construction started in 2001. Three islands are complete and (largely) developed to date. Buildings on Havenelend (by far the biggest island) were delivered by three consortia encompassing more than 20 developers creating rapid development and variety.

IJburg (unsurprisingly) required many bridges; these link it in to the surrounding suburbs and nature reserves, making the new neighbourhood accessible.
Profile 5: IJburg, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

**LOCATION:** East of Amsterdam; readily accessible from Amsterdam Centraal by express tram (journey time is 15-20 minutes).

**PROJECT CONTEXT:** Urban edge/greenfield though actually created on artificial island.

**PROJECT TYPE:** Growth, on artificial islands on the edge of the City.

**RATIONALE:** Planned urban extension, emulating characteristic urban form and neighbourhoods of central Amsterdam.

**PROJECT DESCRIPTION:** Aim is to create a complete neighbourhood for 45,000 people, with everything that would be expected in an established neighbourhood – library, parks, activities, sports activities/centres, schools etc.

Phase 1 of project consists of 9,000 residential units, built at twice the density of average Vinex location. On a further four new islands, Phase II will comprise a further 11,000 residential units.

**PLACE PROMOTER:** Municipality of Amsterdam’s City Planning Department (DRO).

**LAND OWNERSHIP:** Land created by construction of artificial islands. Land had to be transferred from a national public body to a local public body.
Profile 5: IJburg, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

DELIVERY METHOD: Masterplan developed by the DRO in collaboration with private sector architects, planners and urban designers. The City acted as land developer installing physical and social infrastructure, notably a tram extension.

The infrastructure was funded upfront by the City, but costs were recovered from selling serviced development plots to developers. Developers must comply with the requirements of site-specific and area-specific design codes.

The City also introduced a quality team process, which includes the appointment of a ‘block coach’ to coordinate the designs of architects working on individual buildings and street blocks within an identified area.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: A meticulously planned project with physical and social infrastructure being developed in advance of building development – that is, infrastructure-led development.

Project was conceived in the mid-1990s, with building construction commencing in 2001. Phase I is approximately 75% complete.
Profile 6: Newhall, Harlow, England

Newhall demonstrates how committed place promoters, supported by an accomplished professional and with the wherewithal and intent, can create a place of quality.

Following its inclusion in the Harlow Local Plan in the early 1990s, Roger Evans Associates were engaged by the landowners to create a masterplan and design codes and to ensure developments happened on the place promoter’s terms.

Key delivery factors include the long-term commitment of enlightened landowners; a masterplan and design codes delivering exceptional streets; and subdivisions into small land parcels, with multiple developers and architects.

In relation to Scotland, Newhall directly corresponds with the large, landed estates close to urban areas that are being sold for residential development or becoming ‘ripe’ for residential development. There are also valuable lessons for local authorities owning larger greenfield land parcels or anticipating urban extensions on greenfield land.

On a socioeconomic basis, it is relevant to potential expansion of commuter settlements around Aberdeen, Glasgow and Edinburgh, such as Falkirk and Linlithgow.
Profile 6: Newhall, Harlow, England

LOCATION: To the immediate east of Harlow, Essex, near to the A414. Very limited access by local bus services.


PROJECT TYPE: Growth. Harlow is a popular commuter location for London with a strong local housing market; there is pressure for more places to live.

RATIONALE: ‘Something better’ than conventional suburban development – especially something better than development on the place promoter’s previous land holding at Church Langley.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: Residential development of 550 units (80% complete at present) on approximately 100 ha site. It forms the first phase of a much larger development comprising 2,500 units; the whole development will form a rounded neighbourhood, focused on a primary school, and including shops, facilities and employment space.

PLACE PROMOTER: Jon and William Moen, enlightened landowners, aided by consultant Roger Evans Associates as a supportive professional.

LAND OWNERSHIP: Family land ownership of agricultural land adjacent to Harlow and becoming ripe for development in the early 1990s.
Profile 6: Newhall, Harlow, England

**DELIVERY METHOD:** Separation of land developer, with sales of semi-serviced plots to developers within constraints of an overall masterplan and a series of design codes. Land parcels were deliberately kept small, and landowner exercised significant control over design and over the selection of the designer. Phase 1 consists of six sub-phases, each featuring a different developer and different architects, with some sub-phases featuring more than one architect.

**DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME:** Project conceived in early 1990s and design and approvals work was progressed through the 1990s. First sub-phase was completed in 2004 and about 80% of Phase I is now complete. Planning work on a second phase is well advanced and, depending on market conditions, construction work should begin shortly.
Profile 7: Upton, Northampton, England

Upton is a sustainable urban extension intended to demonstrate good design and development practices for housebuilders.

A combination of factors in the late 1990s created a desire for exemplar residential development. These included housing demand in south-east England; concern about the quality of speculative housebuilding product; increasing interest in environmental sustainability; influence of New Urbanism and in design codes in particular; and a new government.

The south-west of Northampton provided an opportune location for such an exemplar project, particularly since the land was in public ownership.

With The Prince’s Foundation and EDAW, the place promoter (English Partnerships) developed the project through two Enquiry-by-Design events, and then led development through the provision of advance infrastructure with close control of development through a design code.

Upton has been particularly innovative in terms of engagement through Enquiry-by-Design charettes, the large scale use of a design code and the implementation of a sustainable urban drainage system (SUDS). It also combines traditional urbanist principles with advanced sustainability principles, with all new homes achieving EcoHomes “Excellent” standard.

The key place delivery lessons from Upton relate to the use of a combination of instruments and actions, including: Enquiry-by-Design charettes, a masterplan, a design code, intelligent land sub-division and parcelling, innovative roads, and the provision of advance infrastructure.

The Upton experience is particularly applicable to greenfield development sites in Scotland with the prospect of establishing good property and land values.
Profile 7: Upton, Northampton, England

LOCATION: Immediately to the south-west of Northampton, in England’s south-east Midlands. Accessible by local bus services.

PROJECT CONTEXT: Urban extension/greenfield.

PROJECT TYPE: Growth.

RATIONALE: Better practice and environmental exemplar project intended to do ‘something better’ than conventional suburban development.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: The project consists of approximately 1,350 units on a 43 ha site (approximately 50% complete), styled as a neighbourhood rather than an estate. At Upton’s centre is a primary school; new shops and retail opportunities will be provided on the edge of the neighbourhood. Upton forms part of the larger south-west extension of Northampton.

PLACE PROMOTER: English Partnerships, supported by the Prince’s Foundation and EDAW.

Profile 7: Upton, Northampton, England

**DELIVERY METHOD:** Enquiry-by-Design, a masterplan and a design code were used to engineer a shift away from standard developer/road engineer development.

English Partnerships acted as land developer and sold serviced plots to housebuilders – all within a co-ordinating masterplan. Housebuilders buying land parcels had to comply with the requirements of the design code.

**DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME:** Project was conceived in late 1990s, with design and approvals work being progressed in the first part of the twenty-first century. First developments were completed by 2004.

Delivery is through the release of eight land parcels to developers. Land parcels are multi-block parcels and relatively large (150-300 units each). Housebuilders are building them out in phases, so development is not as coherent or joined-up as would be desired. The first two land parcels are complete; four are on site; two are currently being marketed.
Profile 8: Vauban, Freiburg, Germany

Windfall site, former army barracks, bought by Freiburg City Council and developed in association with a community group, Forum Vauban, as an ecological, low-energy, low-traffic, and low-car neighbourhood – a ‘Model Sustainable District’.

Planning approach involved an extended participation exercise, informed by a philosophy of ‘learning while planning’.

Development consists of the refurbishment of former barrack buildings, plus new build phases – approximately 80% of which is by self-develop, owner-co-ops (Baugruppen).

As a new neighbourhood, it displays innovative ideas in low-energy housing and in car-free/parking-free living, and provides an example of what can be done.
Profile 8: Vauban, Freiburg, Germany

LOCATION: Vauban lies 3 kilometres to the south of Freiburg city centre – a small university city (population 225,000) in south-west Germany, near Switzerland and France. It is readily accessible by tram from Freiburg city centre (15 minute journey).

PROJECT CONTEXT: Urban edge/brownfield.

PROJECT TYPE: Growth.

RATIONALE: Environmental exemplar: self-styled as a ‘sustainable model district’.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: A mixed use neighbourhood – a ‘district-of-short-distances’, housing 5,000 people in approximately 1,800-units (plus 600 units of student accommodation) and providing some 600 jobs.

Facilities include a primary school, kindergartens, shops, supermarkets, community centre, market square, child play spaces, sports field, various local services, plus some cafes and restaurants. Neighbourhood is served by a tram running along the main avenue.

PLACE PROMOTER: Development was driven by the City Council (especially by chief planner Wulf Daseking) and by citizen’s group, Forum Vauban.

LAND OWNERSHIP: Site was a former military base and was effectively a windfall site, which the City Council bought and through which it could control its planning and development, allowing land release as small plots and favouring transfer to Baugruppen (self-develop, owner-co-ops) rather than corporate housebuilders.
Profile 8: Vauban, Freiburg, Germany

DELIVERY METHOD: Masterplan in the form of a B-Plan – a prescriptive design code and regulating plan, which set out a clear set of rules for development. The State acted as land developer and installed extensive public infrastructure, and sold serviced plots to developers – most developers in Vauban were Baugruppen.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: Project conceived in mid 1990s; new build development began on site in 1998 and was completed by 2002; other phases of development are continuing; tram was operational by 2006.
Section 5

How places come about

5.1 Anticipation and initiation of development
5.2 Place design and implementation
5.3 Stewardship and after-care
Existing places change and new places come about primarily as a result of real estate development responding to economic, social and political activity. As a conceptual framework for investigating the case studies, the study developed a five-stage event-sequence model of the development process through which an existing place is transformed into a new place. This is shown in Figure 1.

5.1 Anticipation and initiation of development

As Figure 1 shows, demographic, economic, social, technological, cultural and environmental change all drive the development process forward. Successful real estate developers learn to anticipate these factors and turn them to their advantage as opportunities arise to initiate development at particular sites and locations. Sometimes, such developers are interested in creating better places, but more often than not, their motives are more narrowly focused on achieving financial returns.

What is crucial to place quality at this stage in the development process is the extent to which place-making is ingrained within the strategic thinking of those in positions of leadership and influence at the local level. Localities with a strong commitment to place-making are evident through innovative people and organisations in public life who themselves anticipate and seek to influence the external forces of...
changes that drive development forward. When opportunities arise, they are pro-active (often alongside developers) rather than simply reactive to the initiatives of others. So the extent to which the mindset of real estate developers is influenced at this early stage by local leaders who anticipate and even initiate development can make an important difference to the prospects of achieving place quality.

5.2 Place design and implementation

The design and implementation of any development depends on effective working relations between many different people and organisations, spanning public and private sectors. These relations are crucial to assessing the feasibility and viability of the development, which involve reconciling issues of control (in relation to both planning approval and land ownerships), funding and design.

To a greater or lesser extent, these crucial aspects of the development process are framed by the public sector. At one end of the spectrum, it may be largely market-driven, but taking place within a regulated statutory framework managed by the public sector. At the other end, the public sector may intervene extensively at important points during the production of the built environment, for example by making available, helping to assemble development land, promoting development through contractual arrangements, or providing supporting finance.

In Scotland and the UK, the planning system has operated as the prime means of intervention in the development process. By itself, the planning system cannot create better places, although it can work alongside other policy mechanisms to facilitate their creation and certainly has the power to prevent the development of worse places.

The normal real estate development process, even when regulated by a planning framework, usually creates standard development products and often mundane places. In contrast, the case studies reported here were all superior to their more conventional neighbours. To understand why this happened, the study investigated the role played by the public sector in creating markets as much as in making places.

5.3 Stewardship and after-care

As Figure 1 indicates, place-making does not finish with the completion of the real estate development process since any newly-developed place needs to be well managed and maintained, if it is to retain quality and enhance value. How this is best achieved raises important issues which are explored in more detail in section 9.
Section 6
Creating better places: leadership and commitment

6.1 The importance of leadership
6.2 The role of the place promoter
6.3 The importance of a place-shaping culture
6.4 The essential need for place vision
6.5 Linking vision to delivery
6.6 Public- and private-sector leadership
6.7 Political commitment to place-shaping
6.1 The importance of leadership

Good leadership matters because it drives forward action, breeds confidence, reduces risk and widens participation. Without such leadership, place delivery relies on rules and regulations that may achieve a minimum standard, but fail to create a place of any quality. This section explains how a ‘place promoter’ with necessary leadership qualities can take a visionary place from the drawing board to completed project.

Leadership in place promotion requires the necessary skills and talents to:

* Articulate the long-term vision and direction for creating a place of real quality.
* Motivate, inspire and persuade people to sign up to that vision.
* Listen to, and communicate with, people across and beyond the delivery organisation.
* Recruit the right team for the project, including consultants and contractors.
* Cope with change and handle crises decisively.
* Remain focused on the vision and avoid the temptation to be distracted, even derailed, by short-term concerns for quantitative outputs or pressure from vested, sectional interests.
* Maintain the vision through taxing processes and regulations.
* Drive project delivery and stick to a timetable.

6.2 The role of the place promoter

An effective place promoter is a dynamic individual working within a supportive organisational context. The organisation empowers and enables individual action by granting that individual a measure of freedom combined with necessary power, resources and authority. Crucially, if a particular individual moves on elsewhere, the organisation provides the mechanism by which someone else can be recruited to replace the individual who has left.

Sometimes that individual may be a professional employee of a local authority, in other cases, they might be a politician elected to a local authority. They may also be an entrepreneur who operates through a private-sector company that provides a legal framework for the activity of place-shaping. At its most effective, the place promoter provides the critical spark to turn a ‘vague’ aspiration into a concrete project. When this passionate driver disappears, then the emphasis and clarity often changes too.
All the case studies have a championing individual – a high-level, influential person who sees the project through from inception to completion. Even large, collaborative projects like Hammarby-Sjöstad were initially the vision of a single individual – in this case City Architect, Jan Inge-Haugstrom. Similarly, the Allerton place promoter was Ian Charlesworth, Senior Regeneration Manager at English Partnerships.

### 6.3 The importance of a place-shaping culture

One of the place promoter’s wider tasks is to set the tone by fostering a place-making culture. This matters because it requires thinking and action that is holistic and joined-up rather than fragmented into silos and professional territories; that is proactive and place-shaping – focused on long-term place quality and resilience. As the case studies show, a place-making culture encourages organisations to nurture opportunities for place development and act when an opportunity presents itself. It helps ensure that good places are delivered effectively, economically and on time. The European examples studied generally had a stronger place-making culture, developed over a longer period of time, than the English ones. This is largely due to more focus and investment on developing and debating the front end vision to attain place quality. However, the evidence suggests that once that vision is established the European examples are delivered substantially quicker. Therefore the lesson is to take time to plan and get support which will then help development move quicker through the implementation stage.

### 6.4 The essential need for place vision

The place promoter’s primary task is to nurture a compelling place vision that can inspire action and galvanise support, while also being capable of effective delivery.

The IJburg place vision was one of an urban area that would feel like the ‘real’ Amsterdam, yet with the benefit of easy access to water and nature. The intention was that as well as just being part of Amsterdam, the new district should also add something to Amsterdam. The design was intended to be ecologically sensitive – a ‘guest-in-the-water’. Involving extensive earthworks on the edge of a nature reserve, the IJburg project was controversial. Its proponents argued that the negative effects could be mitigated by a sympathetic approach to nature. The idea was also to have nature closely intertwined with the development; water and open space now feature prominently in IJburg.

This approach requires a clear vision of how a quality place can be created, typically starting as a set of conceptual sketches and ideas, which is then allied to the capacity to inspire, motivate and provoke others into making that vision a reality.
6.5 Linking vision to delivery

As one key interviewee at Allerton Bywater commented, “Every successful place has had a champion... prepared to stick their neck out, fight for what they think is right, keep dialogue going between all the organisations, support the collaboration and maintain the vision.” As this implies, to take a project from vision to delivery, means that the place promoter needs to be able to kick start, cajole, provoke and otherwise force the ‘powers-that-be’ to think about place-making and demonstrate their commitment to it.

Proactive place-shaping thus involves initiation skills (the ability to communicate place potential) and orchestration skills (the political and operational acumen to enthuse and bring together a variety of other people and organisations). Both require a well-developed knowledge and information base to ensure that place vision derives from substantive social, economic and environmental analysis.

6.6 Public- and private-sector leadership

Generally, the public sector must provide the necessary place leadership in order both to attract interest from the private sector and transform its thinking and products. At Vauban, for example, Freiburg City Council responded to the availability of a large windfall site – an army base that had became surplus to requirements due to the end of the Cold War – to develop a ‘Model Sustainable District’. This built on the experience of an earlier sustainable neighbourhood at Rieselfeld.

In rare cases, place leadership comes wholly from the private sector. Newhall, for example, was delivered by the Moen brothers who owned the land site and had a vision of what they were trying to achieve, as well as the resources to finance it. They preferred development quality to development speed. Their vision involved streets, not roads; contemporary architecture and a strong sense-of-place, creating a pleasant place to live in that would become superior to Church Langley (a neighbouring speculative development). Without the Moens’ vision and tenacity at this stage, Newhall would not have been built. The obstacles in delivering such an unconventional scheme (including nervous public bodies and sceptical investors) were many and would have deferred less committed place promoters.
6.7 Political commitment to place-shaping

Effective public sector leadership involves both high-level political and professional commitment over time and requires political leaders and their senior professional advisers to enjoy close working relationships with each other. This cannot easily be achieved by regular change in political or professional leadership: the knowledge, experience and relationships needed to create quality places take time to nurture.

In the European examples such as Vauban, professional expertise in place-making was accorded a central role in the way the local authority was structured. Too often in British cities, such expertise is limited and has been relegated to lower tiers of the organisation, to the detriment of place quality. Moreover, at a political level, local authorities in the UK have suffered from greater residualisation, compared to their Northern European equivalents. In England, this has meant that government agencies such as English Partnerships (now the Homes and Communities Agency – HCA) have provided the organisational context and support for place promotion. It could be argued that, due to the greater institutional fragmentation and congestion of many different governmental bodies operating at the local level in the UK, it is more critical and vital for place promotion to see a re-emergence of municipal leadership.

Above all, effective public sector leadership at the urban level needs to see its purpose as helping to create better places for future generations, as well as providing efficient services for current generations. Reinforcing this point, the Lyons Inquiry into Local Government in England, published in 2007, promoted place-shaping as the principal role for local authorities.

Successful places have economies where business investment, labour markets, public infrastructure and services reflect a shared set of objectives that seek to maximise benefit, economically, socially and environmentally. Local leadership, especially local political leadership with its democratic mandate, is considered crucial to the economic, social and physical fabric of a locality. Local authorities can deliver leadership by providing a framework of support and co-ordination for an area’s public and private sector organisations.

Successful public-sector leaders are able to articulate and communicate the vision of delivering a more efficient, equitable and sustainable place through radical interventions in the development process. Leadership of this nature requires a particular brand of public sector thinking, which looks for opportunities to create better places by transforming (and even sometimes discovering) emerging development opportunities. In other words, creating better places demands a pro-active rather than reactive style of strategic urban leadership supplemented with an entrepreneurial spirit.
Section 7

Creating better places: effective delivery capacity

7.1 Types of delivery organisation
7.2 European contrasts in delivery
7.3 The support coalition
7.4 The role of professional consultants
7.5 Stakeholder engagement
7.1 Types of delivery organisation

Strategic political and professional leadership is not enough to create better places. It needs to be matched by the necessary operational capacity to deliver change on the ground. This normally involves a committed delivery organisation (whether integrated within well-established structures or created specifically for the purpose) with access to state-of-the-art professional and technical advice.

Formation of a dedicated delivery organisation signals commitment to the project and to a place. It might be a team within an existing organisation (e.g. a municipality), or a more autonomous, external body created especially for the task.

Delivery organisations can take a variety of forms, as shown in Table 2.

Whatever the model adopted, effective place delivery crucially depends on the development of trust and engagement between all those responsible for implementation. In every case study, good working relations were established between delivery parties across the private and public sectors, often marked by daily/very regular dialogue. This coming-together, which has been referred to as ‘stitching-the-silos’, happened especially at the three larger case studies: Adamstown, IJburg and Hammarby-Sjöstad.

These three large projects all described themselves as being the products of ‘integrated planning’, which involved all parties (especially public sector bodies such as education authorities) from the very start of the planning process. Case study respondents frequently stressed the importance of having a process of dialogue whereby issues could be raised, debated and resolved over time, so producing genuine trust and commitment.

Adamstown illustrates this approach of ‘stitching-the-silos’. South Dublin City Council dedicated a small team of four in-house staff as the delivery agency for Adamstown, who engaged in extensive dialogue with all of the relevant public agencies and the lead developer. This approach ensured all public bodies had a common interface with a clearly-identified point of contact that was also in constant dialogue with the developers.
## Table 2: Types of place delivery organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type One</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Case study examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type Two</td>
<td>Local authority with no particular land ownership in project area, where land ownership is typically fragmented – reliant on ‘normal’ planning (and other) controls.</td>
<td>Adamstown</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Routine’ Municipality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hammerby-Sjöstad</td>
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<td>IJburg</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Vauban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type Two</td>
<td>Local authority with particular land ownership in project area, operating through ‘normal’ planning and additionally through powers of land ownership. A special project team is often established to lead and coordinate delivery.</td>
<td>Allerton</td>
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<td>‘Active’ Municipality</td>
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<td>Upton</td>
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<td>Newhall</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Castlefield (Britannia Basin)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type Three</td>
<td>Arm’s length public agency (from local or central government) plays an executive role, acting as both land developer and building developer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Special, Executive Public Agency’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type Four</td>
<td>Arm’s length public agency (typically from either local or central government or joint venture partnership) acts primarily as a facilitating land developer with multiple parcel developers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Special, Facilitative Public Agency’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type Five</td>
<td>Public agency contracts with a managing development agent – through transfer of a consolidated land holding; the managing developer acts as land developer with multiple parcel developers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Managing Development Agent’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type Six</td>
<td>Public agency contracts with a private developer through transfer of a consolidated land holding; the developer acts as land developer and building/parcel developer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Single Private Developer’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type Seven</td>
<td>‘Enlightened’ private developer (or consortium of developers) acts as land developer with multiple parcel developers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Town Founder’ Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type Eight</td>
<td>‘Enlightened’ private developer owning preponderance of land within an area and seeks (with varying degrees of support from the local authority) to enhance place quality.</td>
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<td>‘Solo Developer’</td>
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7.2 European contrasts in delivery

The institutional structure of the place delivery body does not determine, nor automatically produce, a particular outcome. However, European local authorities are more powerful than their UK counterparts, with their own funding and greater ability to borrow funds. This gives them better access to resources for masterplanning, and for advance infrastructure provision. European local authorities have often acquired the necessary technical and financial capacity, often through multi-disciplinary teams, local development agencies and in some cases public private partnerships with private developers. Indeed, expertise is more likely to be retained in-house, reflecting the multi-functional nature of local authorities in Europe. Although often working with the private sector, local authorities in Europe normally expect to take the lead.

At Adamstown, Hammarby Sjöstad, IJburg and Vauban, municipalities were seen as central to place delivery and well equipped to take projects forward by sharing risk with the private sector. None of these case studies were delivered by separate agencies (although Hammarby had initially started with a separate organisation, but this was found to be too distant). All four used internal but specially assigned staff within an existing structure. This ensured dedication to carrying out the roles required for place-shaping by experienced staff who could make use of their contacts and their familiarity with their organisation’s modus operandi to get things done. While Adamstown co-ordinated this via the Strategic Development Zone team within South Dublin County Council, IJburg and Hammarby-Sjöstad had their own project bureaux within the DRO/City Planning Authority respectively. The common factor was that staff were effectively seconded within the organisation to do the job of place-making to the exclusion of their previous role. This requires a budget large enough to support specialist staff on the time horizons that projects like this take. However, it may well be cheaper and more flexible than creating a whole new company/organisation from scratch.

In England, local authorities are much more constrained and generally unable to fulfil this role, so responsibility for place delivery was led by special government agencies at Allerton and Upton, by the original landowner at Newhall and by a pioneering developer, Urban Splash, at Castlefield (Britannia Basin). The UK case studies also demonstrated the importance of hired professional consultants. EDAW was very important at Allerton and Upton; while Roger Evans Associates played a crucial role at Newhall.

The UK approach to place-making also tends to be more adversarial – with each party seeking to shed risk and grab reward. Local authorities generally fear doing things that are unfamiliar and have moved towards an aversion to risk. They have become over-reliant on developers (especially housebuilders) to deliver place leadership, despite them not necessarily having the competence or enthusiasm to do
so. UK local authorities have also become much more dependent on government funds and grants, and on the sale of capital assets, including land and property. This is a high risk approach that produces great variability in place quality. In contrast, the European attitude is more collaborative and mature: it is centrally about a fair reward for a fair share of risk. But it does need a more sophisticated understanding than most UK local authorities can claim about how markets work.

### 7.3 The support coalition

In a democratic society, delivery organisations often find themselves under external pressure and scrutiny to remain true to the original vision for a place and not to compromise as implementation difficulties arise. Such pressure can come, for example, from prominent politicians, community groups, informed local experts or the local media, and can amount to a ‘support coalition’ that encourages and cajoles the delivery organisation to ensure the place is completed to the quality originally intended. In this sense, a strong ‘support coalition’ may serve to reinforce the capacity of the delivery organisation.

This support coalition matters because, by tapping expertise and enthusiasm, it can enlarge the resource pool, align the project with local aspirations, and foster local ownership and buy-in. The challenge for the place promoter is to hold this support coalition together and benefit from it – garnering support from central or local government politicians and departments, from the principal public agencies (e.g. economic development, housing), from the community and local stakeholders, and from landowners, developers, designers and others.

### 7.4 The role of professional consultants

At their best, external consultants are typically new-style engaged, committed, value-positive professionals rather than old-style, disinterested, value-neutral professionals/consultants. Good consultants should be able to offer rigorous independent professional advice calling upon their own skills and experience. At their best, such independently-minded professionals can become part of the support coalition for the project. This is a matter of ethos and mindset rather than of qualification or discipline.

Critical professional support can have a catalytic effect. Allerton, for example, had been a very slow project until EDAW came along and started running a series of (many) workshops to get everyone talking. Once a dialogue was established, the project moved forward quickly and successfully. At Upton, there were two Enquiry-by-Design events (see below), instigated and led by The Prince’s Foundation and subsequently aided by EDAW. EDAW also ensured English Partnerships remained faithful to the principles of the design code.
7.5 Stakeholder engagement

Broader stakeholder and community engagement is important in delivering place-making for three reasons:

- To enhance project quality (and place quality) by tapping into local expertise and enthusiasm.
- To align the project with local aspirations and develop a support coalition by fostering local ownership of, and buy-in, to the project.
- To generate clarity in what, how and when the project delivers.

The plan-making process – whether for the place vision or spatial development framework - is an important means of building social capital and of conflict identification and resolution. The case studies show positive commitment to stakeholder engagement. Hammarby-Sjöstad, for example, was based upon consensus in principle between all parties. There were (and continues to be) 'lots' of meetings.

At Adamstown there was a significant public response to the public consultation process in the surrounding area, both formally and in terms of public campaigns, poster campaigns and media coverage as part of the draft Planning Scheme.

The place vision for Upton evolved out of a pair of Enquiry-by-Design events – the first in 1999 and the second in December 2001 – which critiqued the existing conventional plans for development and proposed something much better. Enquiry-by-Design is a UK-version of the US charettes – large-scale workshops involving stakeholders, communities and professionals in the planning and design of an area during intensive sessions typically lasting a week or ten days. To some extent, the participants already knew what they did not want; what they did want emerged through the Enquiry-by-Design process.

The vision for IJburg was developed over a very long consultation period, which culminated in a referendum in 1997. There was widespread support within the Amsterdam DRO for the project, even if it initially met with significant opposition. Rather than consultation carried out by ‘regular’ planners, the DRO has a dedicated consultation and PR team, which, amongst other things, maintains a comprehensive website to ensure all parties are kept up to speed with development proposals and progress. The DRO consists of experienced experts who have the requisite skills to communicate propositions and facilitate the exercise.

At Vauban, Freiburg City Council began by announcing an extended citizen engagement process for the Vauban site. Forum Vauban applied to coordinate this, and, in 1995, the City made it the official body for the consultation process. From 1999, it also became responsible for community development
within the new neighbourhood. Combined with a publicity campaign, the participation process mobilised prospective residents to meet, to contribute their ideas, and to form housing co-operatives. As well as newsletters and general public activism, citizen engagement was promoted through a series of workshops and study visits. Between 1996 and 2000, 40 major workshops were organised ranging across a variety of topics, including energy and green issues, co-operatives, design, mobility, community development and others. The key message is that the Community engagement exercise was also a marketing opportunity. The exercise enabled prospective tenants and purchasers to be identified and create a real ‘buy in’ to the project.

Forum Vauban acted as joint place promoter, offering critical support to the City: its activism and energy pushing the City’s officials and politicians further that they would otherwise have gone. For example, without Forum Vauban, the legal hurdles to parking-free and car-free living may have deterred the City Council. However, accounts that emphasise Forum Vauban’s autonomy and self-direction also understate Freiburg City Council’s support and assistance, especially the energy and vision of the city’s Chief Planner, Wulf Daseking and his team.

As Vauban demonstrates, consultation and engagement are an accompaniment to action, and must continue beyond merely being a prelude to development to include longer-term place management.
Creating better places: place delivery in action

8.1 The challenge of co-ordinated delivery
8.2 Controlling the spatial development framework
8.3 Achieving regulatory approvals
8.4 Exercising ownership power
8.5 Enabling advance infrastructure by attracting investment funding
8.6 Securing design quality through procurement strategies
8.7 Making property markets
8.1 The challenge of co-ordinated delivery

What really makes delivery organisations effective in creating better places is the extent to which they are able to co-ordinate and control the spatial development framework, achieve regulatory approvals, exercise ownership power, enable advance infrastructure to be provided by attracting investment funding and secure design quality through their procurement strategies. The more delivery organisations can manage and integrate these five aspects of the development process, then the greater their chance of creating better places. To a greater or lesser extent, these actions are as much about making markets as making places – since over time, successful places become self-sustaining and attractive in market terms. This section therefore considers each of the five aspects in turn, before assessing their combined impact in making markets, especially in regeneration areas.

8.2 Controlling the spatial development framework

A robust and imaginative spatial development framework or masterplan is essential to creating somewhere that functions as an integrated place, where the various elements reinforce each other and contribute to making the whole much greater than the sum of the parts. The place vision typically starts as a set of conceptual sketches, ideas and options, and develops over time into the spatial development framework or ‘masterplan’. However, all ideas and options must be informed by prior and appropriate research into property market demand and a general understanding of servicing issues such as utilities and drainage along with geotechnical matters. There is little point in having a vision that can’t be implemented as a result of uneconomic technical barriers.

Many contemporary spatial frameworks use a connected street network and a traditional street block (perimeter block) structure. Although the best masterplans strike a balance between certainty and flexibility, to be effective they must co-ordinate strategic decisions about form and layout and guide infrastructure provision, phasing and land release.

What is crucial here is that the place leader or promoter takes overall responsibility and control for both generating and delivering the masterplan. A well thought out plan that has agreement from all parties gives the leader the confidence to ensure that the project is implemented without dilution or deviation.

Although often commissioned from consultants, the place promoter should therefore oversee the masterplanning process, making full use of the client brief to control its commission and ensure that what is proposed can be delivered on the ground. Once approved, the place promoter then needs to ensure that it is delivered parcel by parcel, by resisting pressures from individual parcel developers to make changes to the masterplan to suit their short-term interests and agendas.
8.3 Achieving regulatory approvals

Delivering new places normally involves obtaining numerous regulatory approvals, often from different State agencies. The standard procedure of sequential individual approvals can have a devastating impact on project viability because the time taken can significantly lengthen the development period (and therefore risk), increase development and finance costs and cause ‘windows of development opportunity’ to be missed. Alongside this, regulatory decisions can be highly unpredictable or simply in conflict with each other. A typical example of the latter occurs when a planning authority encourages the development of shared highway space or ‘home zones’ but the highway authority refuses to give its approval.

The challenge here is to accelerate and co-ordinate the approval process. Ideally, place promoters may wish to see sequential individual approvals replaced by simultaneous, multiple approvals. This might be achieved, for example, in a charette where all the regulatory bodies are brought together at the same time and placed alongside other stakeholders, and conflicts ironed out. Alternatively, if the regulatory bodies can be persuaded to sign up to an agreed design code, then it becomes much clearer what needs to be achieved on individual developments, with those meeting the code gaining the basis of a consent.

For development management to be different to traditional development control, it must mean that local planning authorities take an active role in integrating and accelerating all the various regulatory approvals, with the aim of creating a single development consent. As an example, South Dublin County Council (SDCC) is the specified delivery body for Adamstown SDZ. This is a statutory declaration under Irish law. SDZ status meant that a more integrated planning approach was developed for Adamstown than is usual. The Adamstown Project Team is composed of four SDCC staff members who were specifically assigned to work to deliver Adamstown over the long term. They communicate daily with the developer, Castletown Construction, while providing an interface for other relevant Council departments, such as Education, Health, Environment and Transport. SDCC is able to bring together all of the actors involved in delivering the public infrastructure and provide a common interface between them and the private sector.

Developers are motivated by securing consents by the easiest possible means while regulatory problems can tempt place promoters to settle for the least common denominator in order to lessen that delay. Cutting through red tape is therefore essential to the delivery of quality places since it is not simply about speeding up projects but about integrating regulatory demands without compromising quality.
8.4 Exercising ownership power

Land is a vital resource in the development process. Like planning control, land ownership provides a form of power over the future use and development of land. But while planning control is general and largely negative – it can prevent things more effectively than it can make them happen – ownership of land provides control of specific land parcels and can be used positively to make things happen. Land ownership thus brings direct and positive power to ensure development happens at the time, location and quality desired.

Effective place delivery often involves consolidating multiple land ownership to ensure subsequent co-ordinated development. Fragmented land ownership can prove a major obstacle to development. If the land cannot be consolidated, the development process is fundamentally different. Land consolidation allows greater operational flexibility. It matters in six main ways, by:

* Enabling the design of areas as a single entity, rather than individual landowners being overly concerned with their own land parcels.
* Facilitating viability – providing certainty and confidence to the market.
* Devising the appropriate procurement process that sets out clear and precise objectives to enable a fair selection of developer candidates rather than be forced to deal with developers with conflicting propositions.
* Allowing conditions and covenants to be attached to the land as mechanisms of control.
* Allowing a phased and structured land release for development.
* Allowing infrastructure to be agreed and implemented in an efficient manner.

Achieving ownership control produces clarity and confidence in the market by enabling developer and investors to know what will happen on subsequent phases, which then creates favourable conditions for value growth.

The case studies show that the ownership of land is critical in delivering projects. All the European case studies were implemented by the public sector either acquiring or historically owning the land. Allerton and Upton were also publicly-owned by English Partnerships, who was therefore able to deliver the projects to the agreed vision. In each case, without the willingness (and determination) of the landowners to develop a real place on their land, quality development would not have happened.
Newhall provides an excellent contrast between what happens when land is retained rather than sold early on. Its immediate neighbour to the south – Church Langley – is a standard 1980s/1990s speculative car-based development. Both sites were originally farmed by the Moen Family. Church Langley was sold to national housebuilders who, having acquired the land, were free to build their standard product subject to local planning authority policy. Second time around, the Moens retained control over the land, ensuring they were able to exercise more control over the development effectively demonstrating that land ownership can deliver better quality than the planning system.

At Castlefield (Britannia Basin) Urban Splash own or have options on most of the neighbourhood. This allows the company to develop the place on its own terms, as opposed to having to work with many other developers. The other major landholder in the area is Peel Holdings, who also have an interest in maintaining the value of the land for the long term and who, following encouragement from Manchester City Council, drew up a masterplan with Urban Splash, assisted by EDAW. Peel Holdings therefore helped to maximise the development value of its own land by co-operating with Urban Splash’s place-making efforts, while not developing anything itself.

Adamstown was assembled through a process of land banking during the 1990s undertaken entirely by private interests (Castlethorn, Tiera and Maplewood). Land assembly was relatively straightforward. There were not many individual land holdings and the sales were uncomplicated. Ultimately the land was developed by the same interests that had assembled the site.

Land ownership thus carries significant place-making power as landowners can release or not release land, release it in certain sizes and in certain locations, impose conditions on the subsequent development of the land released, and lease rather than sell land. Land disposal in this context should be seen as place-shaping and as creating sustainable value.

Despite the clear importance of land ownership to development, the purpose (and motivation) of many UK public or private authorities in disposing of land is rarely about creating better place. Local authorities typically market land only where there is no need to retain the land asset as it has become non-operational, or for the short-term benefit of an immediate capital receipt, regardless of wider strategic value. Notwithstanding pressures caused by financial crisis and fiscal retrenchment, public authorities interested in place-making need to resist the temptation to gain capital receipts from a quick sale of development land. This connects with the idea of patient equity where the investor is willing to defer any return for an extended period of time, because, by foregoing immediate return, the investor anticipates more substantial profits/rewards downstream.
8.5 Enabling advance infrastructure by attracting investment funding

Quality places work well because the necessary physical and social infrastructure is planned and provided as an integral part of the overall development programme. Physical infrastructure includes roads, open space, public transport, sewers, drainage, water and service utilities, etc. Some elements are essential to ensuring the project can proceed – for example, roads and sewers, while others are more discretionary – for example, public transport.

Social infrastructure covers schools, shops, nurseries, community facilities etc. Provision typically occurs when a certain population threshold triggers it or when it is considered commercially viable. In both cases it is often later than when the need for the facility first occurs. To facilitate creation of a rounded place, the challenge is again to ensure early provision. The continental European case studies all demonstrate municipalities committed to the development of rounded places at an early stage.

The challenge is therefore to ensure advance provision of both physical and social infrastructure. This matters for four main reasons:

- It establishes the physical development framework for the place and demonstrates commitment to the project.
- It provides serviced plots where participants must accept the promoter’s rules.
- It reduces private sector risk and encourages developers to take part, allowing wider participation from a variety of players.
- Provides greater control on development phasing and, with multiple developer participation, allows projects to be completed quicker.

Without advance infrastructure, subsequent investment may not happen and the place-making ambitions remain unrealised. In the UK, masterplans are often produced without any accompanying commitment to advance infrastructure, as a result of which nothing happens on the ground. This type of masterplanning has therefore tended to be seen as an exercise in architecture on a grand scale, wasting resources rather than mobilising them for implementation.
The case for advance infrastructure is compelling. Early installation of high-quality public transport infrastructure, for example:

- Demonstrates commitment by the public sector to a project’s development.
- Reduces the project’s effective distance from the rest of the city.
- Encourages early formation of more sustainable travel habits, so reducing car dependency.
- Encourages the use of space by people who do not live in an area but who like to use it for whatever appeal and activities it has (such as Hammarby-Sjöstad’s nature reserve and ski slope).

Hammarby-Sjöstad had a tram line built very early on in its development. Here, public sector investment of €500m primarily on land decontamination and transport infrastructure generated subsequent private-sector commitment of €3bn, but costs were recovered from sales of development parcels (i.e. the municipality did not end up making a loss overall and got the benefit of delivering a better place). The tram links in with the T-Bana (Stockholm metro) and ensures the development is well-connected to the rest of the city, in direct contrast to Hammarby’s previous status as a somewhat ill-connected backwater.

Transport infrastructure can also change a previously marginal, low-value site into a more accessible and therefore more valuable one. Large projects need high quality transport and high levels of investment in transport infrastructure, as at Adamstown, IJburg and Hammarby (and Vauban after 2006). Although three of the smaller four case studies (Newhall, Allerton Bywater, and Upton, all in England) had no public transport investment, they were all convenient for existing settlements and too small to justify tram/rail systems.

In most cases, off-site infrastructure serves more than the particular development site. It has usually been provided by society at large through general taxation, although developers may have been asked or required to make financial contributions towards it through some form of betterment tax, planning gain or community infrastructure levy.

In most cases, on-site infrastructure has been the immediate financial responsibility of the land developer. The cost has generally been recovered through the subsequent sale of the land to either parcel/building developers or the eventual purchasers of the development. However, public agencies sometimes contributed to the cost of on-site infrastructure, seeing it as an investment in the place.

The main challenge today is to secure investment funding for all advance infrastructure which can be recovered or exceeded from future revenue from the sale of serviced plots to developers. This approach clearly requires the public sector to take on risks attached to the infrastructure investment. However, if the public sector creates the development framework, risks are removed from developers who should pay
more for the certainty of prepared and serviced sites. This approach allows developers to concentrate on building houses for sale rather than asking them to roll out good quality streets and spaces which they treat as a cost to development rather than a particular benefit.

It can be argued that there is little or no difference between ‘investment in place infrastructure’ and ‘investment in property’. The important issue is to establish the essential investment criteria, instil good practice in managing and productivity of the asset and growing asset value and performance. Place making as an investment is more risky as there is a greater element of imperfect knowledge as a result of multiple interests and interaction, political interventions, general trading and events. However, it is clear that investors make places not developers, since developers tend to focus on what is easy, avoiding the complex and concentrate on the short term.

Not having previously existed, IJburg was perceived by city residents as peripheral (perhaps even more so than Hammarby-Sjöstad). Development was possible only as a result of substantial public investment in creating islands, building bridges and developing extensive transport infrastructure, including new roads and express tram. Early roll-out of the high-speed IJtram was significant in demonstrating that, in terms of time taken to get to Centraal Station, it is psychologically ‘closer’ than much of south Amsterdam. The infrastructure was funded upfront by the City Council, but recovered from selling serviced development plots to developers. Developers must comply with the requirements of site-specific and area-specific design codes.

This reflects the experience at Vauban where substantial funds to remediate the area and to develop the infrastructure came from the State Government’s redevelopment fund and from credits raised by the City Council. All credits had to be repaid through selling building lots and, due to the need repay these credits, the City Council had to keep to a strict development timetable.

The development of Allerton Bywater also depended on advance infrastructure spending of £24m by English Partnerships on drainage, roads, extensive site clearing and decontamination, which significantly reduced subsequent development risk. Part of this investment was recovered through land sales to developers. A phased programme of land sales can help repay infrastructure costs, since developers are normally willing to pay more for serviced than unserviced land, since their own development costs will consequently be reduced.

Infrastructure investment provides greater flexibility in development participation allowing the scale of development to vary greatly, reflecting the different capacities and interests of individual owners, co-operative/housing associations, local private builders, and national volume developers.
Such multiple participation has several advantages:

* It creates varietychoice, competition, increases speed of development and is less exposed to the risk of non performance than the single developer approach.
* It reduces the bargaining power of any one developer. A single developer can play a strong hand against a public promoter whereas a disparate group of interests have a weaker hand unless they enter into a developer coalition.
* It allows phasing which provides an opportunity to grow values through competition.
* On large sites, developers prefer working with other developers as wider participation expresses confidence to the market.

Infrastructure investment encourages greater co-ordination with public utilities and opens up opportunities for energy production as part of the place development process. It allows greater co-ordination of planning gains/obligations, relating to transport, education, affordable housing etc. It can be argued that these obligations can be most efficiently addressed by a place promoter who combines land ownership power with infrastructure provision. If seen at this scale then it will be understood that the planning obligations are not treated as a development cost but necessary to create ‘place value’.

In contrast, a single developer will seek to minimise planning obligations through time consuming negotiations. Uncoordinated or late infrastructure provision may both impair place quality and make development riskier and more expensive in the long term. The unwillingness of banks to lend in the current markets has significantly curtailed the delivery of new private sector development and prevented potential spin-off public projects. Local authorities are also facing difficulties in funding large-scale projects as a result of increasing national debt and subsequent budget cuts. The economic downturn has affected the extent to which private sector can fund infrastructure by agreeing planning gain and developer contributions with local authorities through section 75 agreements.

Rather than individually negotiated agreements, a superior approach may be similar to the Milton Keynes ‘roof tax’ as reflected in the new Community Infrastructure Fund in England. Alternatively, Tax Increment Financing (TIF) could essentially capture future tax revenues from investment in enabling infrastructure within a particular area. Tax receipts that would not have come about but for the infrastructure investment, are then used to meet repayments on the original investment. This allows the benefits of development to be achieved without increasing taxes or diverting public spending from other projects. As the European project case studies demonstrate infrastructure funds are recovered by subsequent serviced land sales. Therefore, the investment is relatively short term and provides wider benefits from multi and varied participation.
8.6 Securing design quality through procurement strategies

Land ownership may need to be consolidated to enable co-ordinate development to happen. Thereafter encouraging a range of different developers to participate in the build-out can significantly assist design quality by promoting variety, creativity and innovation in the built form. As Figure 2 shows, rather than to create a single product, land consolidation should be seen as a means to enable multiple participation by diverse developers including individual, co-operative enterprises, small-scale and large-scale property companies.

Figure 2: Land consolidation as a means to an end

If larger developments are therefore planned into a series of smaller projects to be implemented over different time frames, each by a different building developer and perhaps a different designer, this will encourage a range of styles, and, once built, a diversity of owners. With the exception of Upton, all case studies had relatively small development parcels. Diversity was ensured at Newhall, for example, by splitting the site into separate development parcels, of no more than 100 homes, each designed by a different architect. At Adamstown, a similar idea was used but the parcels are larger and diversity was less.
Project phasing is an important part of implementation and enables variety to be achieved. Where land release can be controlled, programmed phases allow coherent and efficient provision of infrastructure, a critical mass of development, focus and synergy. Phasing also allows for a learning curve and can be used to alter the rate of development in case of demographic or economic change. All case studies had controlled phasing of development.

Two types of developers/housebuilders were active in most of the case study areas:

- The first type are the corporate, major, or volume housebuilders. Public bodies often prefer doing business with larger organisations who may be deemed to be safer and less risky. However, corporates work to a tried and tested formula, which rarely bring about quality places. There is often a need to ‘bend’ their practices away from a standard model (i.e. in/out, short-termism, producer sovereignty model) towards one that meets the place promoter’s requirements by contributing toward the larger whole rather than just concentrating on their own parcel or building development. Design control mechanisms are needed that ensure the parts amount to a larger whole. Upton and Allerton Bywater provide good examples of how this can be achieved.

- The second type are the local, small, bespoke, or custom developers, who offer much greater potential to create diversity, identity and character. By releasing land parcels in small parcels, wider participation can be achieved. At Vauban, much of the development was undertaken by owner co-operatives, which gave plentiful diversity and variety – though this requires sufficient people willing to form co-operatives and undertake self-build. Small-scale developers also tend to provide greater opportunity to ring fence the place investment including training and employment initiatives. Where pioneers lead and show the success of a particular product, others follow. In other words, the corporates frequently follow the path-breaking experience of non-corporates. The experience of Urban Splash in Castlefield demonstrates how this can work in practice.

Land sub-division and release strategies affect the scale of developer willing to participate and produce different outcomes. Smaller developers often prefer small parcels. Owing to their larger operation, larger developers may need larger parcels to gain sufficient economies of scale. Smaller land parcels are more prevalent in Europe. Small parcels spread the risk of one developer proceeding slowly or running into problems, and increase consumer choice.

The need therefore is for smart parcelisation that addresses the needs of the place rather than ease of development. Traditional urban block structures and plot divisions offer ways of sub-dividing larger development projects. Figure 3 shows four common approaches to land release/sub-division, which yield different outcomes in terms of the number and variety of developers and designers. Smaller parcel sizes often attract smaller developers, while discouraging larger developers.
Only IJburg and Vauban made any use of plot-based development. IJburg has the most diverse range of building types of the case studies and a striking range of domestic architecture. This has been achieved through small building plots, a strong self-procurement mentality in the Netherlands and the use of a small number of rules about overall form (e.g. overall height, height of ground floor ceiling, building line, etc) within which designers had significant freedom. A range of plots sizes (and form codes) were used, so allowing a mix of 4-5 storey narrow townhouses, 3-storey (wider) terraces and 2-3 storey detached, terraced and semis. The styles range from mock 17th century to ultra contemporary.

Design codes can also play a valuable role in securing consistency in design quality between different developers, with each taking responsibility for delivering particular parcels within an overall design expectation. With the exceptions of Castlefield and the early stages of IJburg (Steigereiland), all of the case studies used design codes of sorts. The former is relatively small scale and is delivered by a developer investing long term in the design quality of the place; the latter sought to encourage creativity and experimentation. Design codes can be enforced by planners (Allerton, Adamstown, Vauban), landowners (Newhall) or by both mechanisms (Hammarby, Upton).
8.7 Making property markets

In certain circumstances, where markets are mature and buoyant, public sector intervention in place-making may require no more than the sensitive implementation of development control powers. But in other locations, where markets may have failed or simply not exist, effective place-making becomes equally about establishing market frameworks as about making places. Public sector intervention in such cases can play a crucial role in breeding confidence, reducing risk and coordinating timescales. The end result is to challenge developer attitudes and behaviour by turning development that would otherwise be considered unviable to the private sector into development that comes to be seen as an attractive opportunity for a developer. It also has the potential to produce places of a much higher quality than the standard development products normally created by the private sector.

The key issue to discover here is where, how and to what extent does the public sector need to participate in making effective markets in order to make better places. Each of the case studies offers important lessons about this for Scotland.

Newhall, Harlow, England

Newhall provides the best example of where place-making involved relatively little public sector intervention, apart from planning control. This was made possible by two essential ingredients: a buoyant housing market and an active landowner prepared to act as place promoter.

As a popular commuter town, Harlow was well placed to ensure that the additional development costs required to achieve higher development quality than in the adjacent standard speculative estate could be covered by an additional premiums in the achieved selling prices. These premiums were also assisted from limited land releases in the South East of England, which enabled developers to manage the rate of development at Newhall to achieve such required sale prices. In other words, even in Harlow, making places involved market management, albeit by the private sector, to avoid excessive release of new homes at any one time. This suggests that a wholly private-sector approach to place-making may imply a relatively slow pace of development consistent with the capacity of the local market to absorb new supply without a detrimental impact on price levels.

The unusual role played by Newhall’s active landowners, the Moen brothers, as the place promoter demonstrates how a buoyant housing market needs to be coupled with a long-view of market returns, if place-making is to be left largely to the private sector.
However, even in favourable market conditions seen at Harlow, the private-sector approach was unable to deliver social infrastructure in advance of, or alongside, housing development, even if it achieved satisfactory provision of physical infrastructure. Newhall offers Scotland some limited pointers in relation to the development of new settlements or major greenfield extensions in well established and healthy market conditions, but it also provides a warning that wholesale reliance on the private sector may create places initially lacking in social infrastructure.

Adamstown, Dublin, Ireland

Adamstown seems much like Newhall in its reliance on the private sector, albeit on a far greater scale with an intended development of 10,000 homes rather than the 2,500 eventually planned for Newhall. However, it is easy to misinterpret the developers’ role at Adamstown and consider that their very substantial investment in land assembly and infrastructure provision could be readily replicated elsewhere. This would be to avoid the critical question of why even a well-resourced developer would expose itself to the long-term risk of what amounts to a development equivalent in scale to one of the early British new towns. The answer at Adamstown is to be found in the strategic rather than the operational intervention of the state in the development process.

Adamstown was initially planned when the booming Irish housing market necessitated the designation of Strategic Development Zones by a process that invited local authorities to make proposals to the Irish Government. The designation of Adamstown as an SDZ sent two important signals to the private sector:

- the sustained commitment by South Dublin County Council to facilitate the development by a streamlined approach to decision-making, rather than simply acting from a distance as regulatory authority, and
- the sheer scale of private-sector development proposed at Adamstown necessitated a strategic framework that limited the potential for immediate competition, which the SDZ process ensured.

This gave the developers confidence that their initial investment could be more than recovered as land values rose over time and enabled them to react to the recent downturn in market conditions by reducing the annual rate of development.

Here the lesson for Scotland concerns the role of the public sector in strategic market management and again in seeing the market relationship between the pace of development and the prospects of achieving development quality.
Castlefield (Britannia Basin), Manchester, England

Britannia Basin may also appear to be another private-sector led development, with the innovative approach of Urban Splash central to its success. Again, however, this would underestimate two critical public-sector interventions.

First, over a lengthy period of time, significant public-sector investment in the broader Castlefield area and then in nearby Hulme had transformed the central Manchester housing market, making the Urban Splash scheme viable by ensuring that it did not stand alone in a sea of deprivation, but instead could be well connected to what were already considered ‘better places’. The connectivity of the Urban Splash development at Castlefield (Britannia Basin) was reinforced by public-sector investment in the extension of the Manchester Metrolink to Salford Quays, with the opening an adjacent new tram stop almost coinciding with the completion of the development.

More directly, the £2.1 million of support from English Partnerships towards land assembly came at a critical point in the development process in cash flow terms, enabling Urban Splash to take the risk of an innovative form of development.

Again, as at Adamstown, the positive approach of Manchester City Council, in doing what it could to speed the development through the regulatory system, bred confidence and reduced development risk. Castlefield (Britannia Basin) therefore points to the importance of long-term public sector commitment to concentrated urban regeneration and shows how this can eventually encourage sustained private-sector commitment to innovative and place-making.

Allerton Bywater, Leeds, England

Allerton Bywater required much greater state commitment to strategic market making, since unlike the Urban Splash scheme at Castlefield (Britannia Basin), there was very little similar surrounding development to connect with. This helps explain the scale of the English Partnerships’ investment, which at £24 million, was more than ten times the amount invested in Castlefield (Britannia Basin) for roughly the same number of homes delivered. Again, however, as at Adamstown, this investment was not required to produce financial returns until the long term, as land was sold off to the eventual developers.

Even though Allerton Bywater itself had to be transformed into an active housing market as well as an attractive place to live by such state intervention, it had the good fortune to be located in a prosperous sub-region. It was close to Leeds, that had by then become the booming financial centre of the north of England. In regulatory terms, the design code provided the developers with certainty and ensured faster public-sector decision-making on individual projects, which reinforced the financial commitment of English Partnerships.
Each house at Allerton Bywater cost about £300,000 less than an equivalent dwelling at Newhall, reflecting the scale of public sector investment. For purchasers, Allerton Bywater thus provided excellent value for money in a booming regional housing market and this enabled the development to move ahead much faster than at Newhall. In short, reconciling place quality with strategic market transformation and a rapid pace of development required very substantial public sector intervention.

What is distinctive about the continental Europe examples is that this public sector commitment to market transformation, evident at Allerton Bywater was central, and indeed even more clearly apparent in Hammarby Sjöstad, IJburg and Vauban. While the transformation of Allerton Bywater from a former mining village into an attractive residential location depended on its economic linkage into the broader Leeds sub-region, new property markets at Vauban and IJburg, for example, were created from scratch by redeveloping within the city or bolting development on to it.

Vauban, Freiburg, Germany

All the Continental examples involved substantial public-sector commitment not merely to place-making but to creating the kind of market environments in which the private sector could most effectively be persuaded to contribute development of a quality not widely seen in the UK. In each case, local authorities played a central role in the delivery of each project, and not just in its regulatory control. At Vauban, the City Council spent DM 40 million on land acquisition and was subsequently able to fund 30% of the cost of the tram infrastructure from land sales. Another DM 5 million towards the cost of remediation and infrastructure came from the State Government.

This scale of investment put the City Council in the driving seat, while the specific form of spatial planning seen at a local level in Germany, created clarity and confidence for individual developers. Indeed, it created development framework that deliberately favoured smaller developers, co-operatives and individuals, rather than large-scale developers. Of course, were such an approach to be adopted in Scotland, the public sector may need to accept that smaller organisations tend to pay less for land than larger developers who can call upon scale economies. At Vauban, development proceeded at a rapid pace, with the main scheme of 1,800 units built out in around four years.
Hammarby-Sjöstad, Stockholm, Sweden

Hammarby Sjöstad involved the creation of an entirely new urban district in an area previously dominated by scrapyards and redundant industrial premises. Negative externalities alone would have prevented a private-sector led development, even on a piecemeal basis. Stockholm City Council’s approach was to take the lead in assembling the site and creating the development framework, which provided a settled context for individual private-sector developers to take responsibility for specific portions of the site. In other words, public-sector intervention was essential to making the development happen by creating the development framework opportunity within which private developers could then concentrate on achieving returns while operating within contained risks.

Such clear intervention put the City Council in a strong position to require place quality, while ensuring a relatively rapid pace of development. Interestingly, Hammarby Sjöstad was originally intended as an Olympic site and like its counterpart in London, would have remained in a run-down state without a clear public-sector vision and commitment. Stockholm City Council’s long-term commitment and investment in market making was therefore essential to drawing in the private sector on terms that prioritised place-making.

IJburg, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Much the same approach was taken at IJburg where the market as well as the place was created from scratch by public sector action and investment led by Amsterdam City Council. Like Adamstown, the strategic planning context has enabled IJburg to flourish as a major growth area in which developers could have confidence in the likely level of demand.

Phase 1 of IJburg is almost the same scale as Adamstown but has moved ahead considerably faster with 75% now built. The public-sector led nature of the scheme has ensured a clearer and more consistent development programme. Intriguingly it has tied developers in at an early stage though a form of development partnership that required the private sector to buy land at a price agreed in advance and also to contribute to infrastructure provision.

The scale of this commitment to both place and market transformation reduced risks for both private and public sectors. IJburg again shows what is possible when planning and development are seen as integrated activities led by the public sector and intended to provide a tempting platform to encourage private-sector contribution to place-making.
Place design and making markets – summary of evidence

The case studies thus offer clear and important lessons in relation to the economics of delivering better places. In most cases, policy aspirations require markets to be transformed or re-made in order for better places to be created. Importantly, successful places appear to interpret market transformation as a matter far wider than the housing market, seeing the important linkage that has to be made between housing demand and broader economic activity in the region. The potentially most isolated case study in housing market terms, Allerton Bywater, depends on the broader Leeds economy. The case studies therefore caution against seeking to develop entirely new places in regions where the local economy would not support a buoyant housing market.

Taken together, the case studies emphasise the importance of substantial public-sector commitment, expertise and investment, even if that investment is more than recouped in the long term. What the investment does is to reduce developer risk and therefore encourage developers to become more innovative and more strongly committed to place quality. It also has the potential to achieve development at a faster rate than the private sector could alone. If Scotland wishes to engage with the process of creating better places on a more sustained and broader basis, its policy-makers need to engage seriously with these economic essentials by re-thinking the extent of public-sector commitment and investment to market transformation.
Creating better places: investment in stewardship and sustainability over time
Rather than the short-term approach of speculative developers, delivering better places takes time and demands long-term commitment and investment to place quality. This requires greater commitment at the early stage to ensure efficient performance in the long run. Really good places cannot be created simply by real estate development but require careful management and maintenance to ensure growing reputation and attractiveness.

In a commercial sense, this is much like any property management role intended to grow investment value, since it will seek to ensure vibrant activity and full occupancy, backed up by the necessary promotion and maintenance. At an early stage in the development process consideration should be given to creating the right operational structures to retain and grow the place’s asset value.

At Upton, for example, English Partnerships has set aside funds to establish the Upton Management Company, which thereafter will charge every unit a management fee to cover the cost of maintaining the area, including the SUDS, landscaped areas and even the community buildings. At Newhall, a similar role is played by the Harlow Residents Association, which charges a standard fee to maintain green spaces and street trees, while also providing residents with broadband and cable TV. Stockholm City Council takes direct responsibility for after-case at Hammarby, but in Castlefield, there has been increasing concern about the local council’s decreasing commitment to maintenance, reflecting the tight financial position of most UK local authorities.

This highlights the need, at least in the UK, for independent management organisations to be established to secure the pro-active care and continued sustainability of newly developed places. Well before any development is completed, careful thought thus needs to be given to how continued place quality and rising investment value will be achieved over the long term.
Section 10
Creating better places: the main lessons for Scotland
The main lessons for Scotland

In recent decades, Scotland’s record in place-making can best be described as mixed. While some limited exemplars have been developed at particular Scottish locations, most development has been of a standard form and average quality, creating places that are mundane and crucially not well integrated. The mistake has too often been made that the pressing regeneration needs in Scotland can be met only by a cost-cutting and rapid approach to development. In reality this has simply created unsustainable places that do little to bolster Scotland’s economy or benefit the poorest in society, whom regeneration is supposed to assist.

The main lessons learned are set out in the Learning Point in section 2 but in summary, the key message from this study is that proactive vision, confidence, effort and investment is necessary from the start to achieve long-term benefit. The main reason for poor quality places is that people fail to address the difficult problems early enough. Rather than simply going-with-the-flow and allowing place to occur without proper thought or integration, delivering better places requires key actors to grasp the difficult challenges and proactively seek to shape places from the start.

Experience from elsewhere, and especially from continental Europe therefore suggests that Scotland can do much better in making places, even to the extent that its experience and achievements again become those to which other countries turn to in looking for best practice. This, however, requires a radical change in thinking across all those involved in development and regeneration in Scotland, both in the public and private sectors. The Scottish Government can certainly take the lead in promoting and encouraging this change in development cultures, but others including the Scottish Property Federation, Homes for Scotland, individual development companies and the relevant professions all need to sign up to a radical change in direction.
Section 11

Case studies

Case Study 1: Adamstown Dublin, Ireland
Case Study 2: Allerton Bywater, Leeds, England
Case Study 3: Britannia Basin, Castlefield, Manchester, England
Case Study 4: Hammarby-Sjöstad, Stockholm, Sweden
Case Study 5: IJburg Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Case Study 6: Newhall, Harlow, England
Case Study 7: Upton Northampton, England
Case Study 8: Vauban Freiburg, Germany
1. Development Opportunity

Adamstown is a new town under development at a greenfield site previously used for farming, at Lucan 16 km west of Dublin city centre. When complete, it will have around 10,000 homes and up to 125,000m² of commercial space, plus schools, parks, leisure facilities and a railway station, all built to a consistently high standard of urban design. It is the first New Town to be created in Ireland since Shannon Town in 1982.

Adamstown has its origins in the growth of Ireland’s ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy, which generated substantial increases in housing demand throughout much of the 1990s and 2000s. House prices soared as large areas of undeveloped land outside Dublin were turned into suburban housing estates. While they provided extra housing, these new suburbs were commonly characterised by cul-de-sac layouts, highly generic architecture, poor permeability and high levels of car dependency. Lucan, which had expanded steadily westwards throughout the 1990s, has had much development of this type with generally poor levels of public infrastructure. Adamstown was identified as the next stage in the growth of Lucan. The site was large, flat and uncontaminated, with good road (N4 and N7) and rail access.

According to Karen Kenny of South Dublin County Council, Adamstown was conceived “as a demonstrable, best practice, sustainable mixed-use, medium density alternative to the segregated land-use, low-density suburban development paradigm”. It was based on the mutual realisation by South Dublin County Council and the developer that there ought to be a better way to carry out urban expansion than the seemingly endless cul-de-sacs that dominate much of Lucan. This idea was developed through visits to European exemplars, including BO01, Copenhagen and Vauban, Freiburg.

During the mid-late 1990s, Ireland’s National Government’s Action on Housing Committee (AHC) sought ways to reduce Ireland’s housing supply crisis, caused by a low rate of supply and an increase in demand brought about by rising population and wealth. Following the report of the AHC, the Irish Government invited local authorities to make formal representations requesting designation of areas as Strategic Development Zones (SDZs). Following discussion with the developers, South Dublin County Council submitted the Adamstown site as an SDZ proposal in 2001. On 1st July 2001 the Irish Government
designated 223.5 hectares of land at Adamstown as a site for an SDZ, giving South Dublin County Council, as the specified Development Agency, enhanced powers to facilitate development two years to devise a planning scheme for the area. This proved instrumental in the delivery of the spatial development framework.

2. People and Organisations

South Dublin County Council is the specified delivery body for Adamstown SDZ. Under Irish law, SDZ status meant that a more integrated planning approach was developed for Adamstown than is the case elsewhere. This required a project-specific team of SDCC staff members to oversee it. The Adamstown Project Team is composed of four South Dublin County Council staff members who have been specifically assigned to work to deliver Adamstown over the long term. They communicate daily with the main private developer, Castlethorn Construction, while providing an interface for other relevant Council departments, such as Education, Health, Environment and Transport. South Dublin County Council is able to bring together all of the actors involved in delivering the public infrastructure and so provide a common interface between them and the private sector. According to Karen Kenny of South Dublin County Council, the project team was “instrumental to success” for delivering public realm and design quality “over and above” minimum standards.

The actual design and development of Adamstown has been largely influenced by the vision of a single landowner-developer, Joe O’Reilly of Castlethorn, who has built the company’s reputation on creating quality developments. His hope for Adamstown is that he will “…be able to walk his grandchildren round a place 20 years hence and show them how successful and appealing it is”. Castlethorn had a clear vision for Adamstown as a community and not just as another standardised development.

Interestingly, despite its large size, Adamstown has not required a separate executive agency. Instead, it has been delivered by specialist teams from the private and public sectors, each of which have provided a central reference point for the numerous smaller actors. It provides an excellent example of how a well-resourced, forward-looking local authority, a co-operative development consortium and the designation of the site as a Strategic Development Zone (SDZ) can help deliver a high quality place without requiring the cost and complications of a fully-separate delivery agency.

The presence of a dedicated team for the long-term significantly reduces levels of uncertainty and helps ensure that communication between the many...
interested parties is straightforward and frequent. Castlethorn (and the other developers) know they will see the same project-specific Council staff year-on-year. As well as being sensible knowledge management practice, this arrangement enables a long-term relationship to be built up, based upon trust. The way in which this worked is shown in the Figure CS.1 below:

While South Dublin County Council is the statutory delivery body, the developers brought all the private actors together. At the peak of activity in 2007 there were 55 consultants employed on Adamstown, including architects, civil and structural engineers, transport consultants and urban designers.

Case Study 1: Adamstown
Dublin, Ireland

Figure CS.1 Organisational Relationships at Adamstown
The key people involved in the delivery of Adamstown are:

**Private Sector**
- **Joe O’Reilly**: Head of Castlethorn
- **Jude Byrne**: Project Planner at Castlethorn

**Public Sector**
- **Kieran Kennedy**: Director of Planning at South Dublin County Council
- **Paul Hogan**: Project Manager
- **Karen Kenny**: Project Planner
- **Mary Dimas**: Assistant Project Planner
- **Derek Taylor**: Project Technician (also responsible for overcoming the obstacle of highways engineering dogma)

### 3. The Overall Vision

#### 3.1 Spatial Development Framework

According to Karen Kenny of South Dublin County Council, “The overall project vision was to prepare and implement a plan that would result in the delivery of a demonstrable, best practice, sustainable mixed-use, medium density alternative to the segregated land-use, low-density suburban development paradigm”.

Adamstown has a traditional town layout incorporating a loose grid of connected through-streets, on-street car parking and buildings close to the street. It is thus similar to Newhall, Harlow, but is a much larger development. A cornerstone of Adamstown’s development plan has been the delivery of public infrastructure to accompany the housebuilding. So far, this has included schools, shops, a brand new railway station and major roads.

The Planning Scheme is a comprehensive (126 page illustrated A3) document, adopted by the local council that covers the following topics:
- Type of development
- Extent of development
- Design of development (large section)
- Proposals for transportation
- Proposals for services
- Proposals for the provision of amenities, facilities and services for the community
- Development and amenity areas
- Phasing and implementation (again very large)
- Environmental appraisal
Case Study 1: Adamstown
Dublin, Ireland

Adamstown is one of the first developments in Ireland to make use of a design code. Design guidelines were drawn up with the landscape architects, Camlin Lonsdale, with different typologies for different areas. An overall Adamstown public realm design guide was also prepared and a detailed materials strategy manual is evolving as Adamstown-specific urban design works are implemented on site.

Castlethorn appointed O’Mahoney Pike as architects for the first phase at Adamstown Castle, as they already had a good working relationship. The first phase of any project is important, so having a reliable architect was considered essential. Adamstown’s District Centre was designed by Metropolitan Workshop, who was selected following a competition run by Castlethorn. In turn, Metropolitan Workshop chose six designers to develop the seven components, ensuring a relatively rich variety of built forms.

3.2 Stakeholder Engagement

Following the preparation of the draft Planning Scheme in December 2002, it was made available for public viewing in January 2003. This was publicised in two local and two national newspapers and on South Dublin County Council’s website. Copies of the Draft Planning Scheme were sent to the local community and residents groups, known landowners, local business interests, relevant state and public bodies/agencies and elected local representatives.

There was a significant public response to the public consultation process in the Lucan area, both formally and in terms of public campaigns, poster campaigns and media coverage. Written submissions were made within a period of six weeks from this date and changes were added to the Scheme in the form of motions in April 2003. The elected members of South Dublin County Council decided to adopt the draft Planning Scheme subject to variations and modifications in May 2003. The decision of South Dublin County Council to adopt the draft Planning Scheme subject to an appeal to An Bord Pleanala in June 2003. An Bord Pleanala held an Oral Hearing in respect of the draft Planning Scheme in July 2003 and approved the Scheme in September 2003.

The most striking evidence of success is the fact that Adamstown is popular both with its residents and people who live in the surrounding area. When first proposed, the unconventional and relatively high density nature of the scheme aroused a large number of objections from Lucan residents. However, Adamstown is now seen by local residents and politicians as an exemplar. A similar development has been under consideration at Clonburris and people’s initial reaction to the proposals were “couldn’t you make it more like Adamstown?”.
4. Development Process

4.1 Land ownership and assembly
The Adamstown site has been assembled and banked over several years by three private developers (Castlethorn, Tiera and Maplewood) who ultimately developed the project.

4.2 Infrastructure provision
Adamstown has been developed according to a quite different business model from the majority of UK and Irish developments, since it is based upon significant upfront investment and long-term appreciation of the value of the site. On-site infrastructure will include two new primary schools, a secondary school, crèche and local shop, and a playground. Off-site infrastructure will include a new railway station, several kilometres of roads and busways, bridges, a sewage pumping station and an electricity sub-station.

The up-front provision of infrastructure and facilities is governed by a system of sequential, rather than time-based or primarily geographic, phasing. Each of the 14 phases of residential development is statutorily accompanied by a specified quantity of infrastructure, services, facilities and amenities that must be delivered at the same time or beforehand. This ensures that, as the settlement grows, it has the necessary infrastructure to function effectively. Use of a sequential model allows the rate of development to alter according to external (mainly economic) factors.

Infrastructure is financed and co-ordinated by a joint venture company called Chartridge, set up between Castlethorn and Maplewood (Tiera Homes are not part of Chartridge). Chartridge will spend a total of €100m on infrastructure for Adamstown, funded primarily by Castlethorn, who is developing the majority of the site.
Education, health and transport infrastructure will be built by the public sector, but financed by the private sector. Chartridge expects its infrastructure investment eventually to be covered by development revenues, while also producing higher future land values.

This makes Adamstown a developer-led project. The financial risk for this project has been borne almost entirely by the developers, who have assembled the site at their own expense, invested extensively in on- and off-site public infrastructure and constructed the development. However, the risk associated with a long-term delivery process is counteracted by Adamstown’s status as an SDZ. This reduces the planning uncertainty and makes infrastructure provision worthwhile. In addition, confidence has been generated by the long-term working relationship between the developers and South Dublin County Council.

4.3 Land release and development procurement

Land development at Adamstown is not separated from building development. Both these processes are carried out by Castlethorn, Maplewood and Tiera on their respective parcel(s). Adamstown’s development is phased on a “sequential” basis and does not have a fixed completion date. There are 11 residential phases and four commercial phases, split between the three developers. Each parcel has a different designer. A large amount of public realm has been installed prior to the development of private realm, with 50% of the public space budget spent so far.

The first residential phase at Adamstown Castle comprises 12.5 hectares of net residential development, a local shop, a cafe, a crèche, two primary schools and a post-primary school.

4.4 Design control

A Council implementation team was established to monitor and oversee development and to develop additional guidance to supplement the information contained within the planning scheme. However, architects appeared to have reacted well to the design code because it brings clarity to their work and provides a context to develop a brief.

4.5 Long-term management arrangements

Public realm is managed by a management company headed by Castlethorn. This will pass to a community-owned company when the development is complete.

5. Quality Appraisal

The only fully-complete section of the development is Adamstown Castle (though Airlie Stud and Adamstown Square are mainly finished). This appraisal therefore centres on Adamstown Castle but cites examples from the other two, where appropriate.

It is clear that Adamstown is attractive and has well-managed surroundings and high quality housing. As it has yet to be finished, it lacks the full range of facilities that would be expected when it is complete. Despite this, the commercial and public infrastructure operates successfully and is popular with its residents. In comparative terms, it is far more appealing than the neighbouring suburbs.
in Lucan since houses and flats are more spacious and the development more far attractive. Values are holding up value relatively well despite the recession.

Additionally, Adamstown does have the benefit of very long-term commitment to its development. Castlethorn are inextricably bound up in the completion of the project and are likely to be with it until it is completed. South Dublin County Council maintains its project team for Adamstown and this is likely to help ensure that the development continues at the same level of quality. Long-term management arrangements are in place.

The overall project vision for Adamstown was to prepare and implement a plan that would result in the delivery of a demonstrable, best practice, sustainable mixed-use, medium density alternative to the segregated land-use, low-density suburban development paradigm. Judging by the popularity of the completed sections, it has succeeded. Adamstown’s only real failing has been to fall victim to a major recession, severely delaying the roll-out of the place.

Adamstown shows how a large land/building developer can also act as co-ordinator for other private sector actors. Provided that all public- and private-sector actors are engaged in a successful and long-lasting dialogue and are working towards the same vision, this can lead to a very healthy working relationship and a higher quality of place.

The main lessons from the Adamstown experience can be summarised as:

- Special planning designations can make it possible to devise new, more effective delivery structures.
- Day-to-day contact between major players in project helps build consensus and delivers a healthy working relationship.
- Major players can act as co-ordinator for smaller actors, obviating the need for a separate executive agency.
- Developer-led place-making can deliver quality places, provided the developer is seeking to make money based on a long-term development plan Adamstown shows how developer-led projects.

Case Study 1: Adamstown
Dublin, Ireland
Assessment of Adamstown according to Scottish Government’s ‘Designing Places’ criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the place have a distinct identity?</td>
<td>Adamstown has a very distinct identity, due both to the design of the streets and buildings, as well as the fact that such a development is clearly unprecedented in Lucan. The eastern entrance to Adamstown has landmark buildings, fountains and large stone signs saying ‘Adamstown’, clearly visible from the main road.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does the place have spaces that are safe and pleasant?</td>
<td>Despite the relatively high density of the place, there are plenty of areas of attractive open space. Many of the green spaces have retained mature trees and the main roads through the development are themselves pleasant. There is a large green space in the SE corner of Adamstown Castle with a playground and there are plans for four major parks, the designs for which were subject to an international competition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the place easy to move around (especially on foot) ('permeable')?</td>
<td>The street layout is quite similar to that at Newhall, albeit on a larger scale. There are very few dead ends; for the most part it is permeable, with good sightlines and plenty of links to its immediate surroundings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place make visitors feel sense-of-welcome?</td>
<td>Adamstown’s distinctiveness and accessibility make it a relatively welcoming place to visit. At the same time, many flats have security gates to inner courtyards, which can make the place seem somewhat formidable. In addition, it can feel quite quiet, with relatively little street activity because the place does not have anything like its design population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will the place adapt easily to changing circumstances ('robust')?</td>
<td>Adamstown’s resilience has been quite severely tested over the past few years as Ireland’s economic situation has deteriorated. The pace of development has slowed, which could pose trouble for a phased development like this. However, the use of ‘sequential’ phasing (as opposed to time-based) allows some degree of adaptation to external constraints. Additionally, the Planning Scheme does allow a degree of flexibility. There is a 20% variation on minimum/maximum quanta of dwellings and floor space as specified as permissible. Resilience may be limited by the extent to which housing units may be adapted in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place make good use of scarce resources ('sustainable')?</td>
<td>The move away from car-oriented development suggests that, in the environmental field, Adamstown is far superior to neighbouring developments. At present, however, on-site facilities are not yet fully developed and it would, at the moment, be difficult to live there without a car. Buildings appear well-designed, but use conventional materials, particularly concrete. Nonetheless prefabrication has led to high standards of insulation.</td>
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Further Information

Further information about Adamstown can also be obtained from:

http://www.adamstown.ie/
1. Development Opportunity

Six miles south-east of Leeds and two miles north of Castleford in West Yorkshire, Allerton Bywater Millennium Community is an addition to the village of Allerton Bywater. It is being built on a 23 hectare brownfield site which, until 1992, had been the site of the village’s colliery. Unlike many of the case studies presented here, the Allerton Bywater Millennium Community has been built for transformation – to reinvigorate and expand a former mining community, badly affected by the colliery closure. It will provide an additional 520 homes and 25,000 m² of commercial and community space, and remove a significant brownfield site in the centre of the village.

Conceived in 1997 and in effect a forerunner of eco-towns, the Millennium Communities programme was initiated by the launch of a design competition for Greenwich Millennium Village in London. The programme originally aimed to deliver over 6,000 homes by 2010 and over 9,000 homes (later revised down to 7,000) by 2014. It was intended to influence and direct the housebuilding industry towards increasing environmental quality and creating high quality sustainable communities. Seven new ‘villages’ were eventually selected – the other five are New Islington (Manchester); South Lynn (King’s Lynn, Norfolk); East Ketley (Telford); Oakgrove (Milton Keynes); and Hastings (Sussex).

The Millennium Communities initiative was “... designed to deliver a lasting legacy of environmentally innovative and sustainable developments in diverse, challenging locations.”

Allerton Bywater seemed to fit the bill: the site was available and in public ownership. The larger question was whether Allerton Bywater was an appropriate site for a Millennium Community because the environmental standards did not seem deliverable by the market.

Allerton was identified as a Millennium Community in 1998. A masterplan competition had been held in 1998-1999 but subsequent progress had been slow. Greater momentum was established after 2005, but was curtailed by the 2008-09 recession. Developed in accordance with a masterplan and a site-specific design code, two phases of housing are now complete, and a third is under construction (early 2010). Each has been built by a
Case Study 2: Allerton Bywater Leeds, England

different housebuilder (Miller Homes, Fleming Fusion and Barratt Homes). The development consists mainly of family houses and a small number of flats. Social housing constitutes 25% of the development and is pepper-potted throughout the neighbourhood.

2. People and Organisations

Allerton Bywater’s place promoter is English Partnerships (now the Homes and Communities Agency)\(^1\), acting on behalf of central government, which has provided public investment of £24m and has championed the project. Within English Partnerships, Ian Charlesworth, who has been in charge of the project from very beginning and continues to be in charge has been a key individual (and the de facto place promoter). By taking the lead, English Partnerships has sought to demonstrate to housebuilders that difficult brownfield locations could be worthwhile, pursuable and profitable ventures.

Originally owned by the National Coal Board, the development site came into English Partnerships’ hands in 1995. As part of its Coalfields Regeneration Strategy, English Partnerships was charged with bringing the site back into use. Land assembly was unproblematic, but as a brownfield site it required remediation and preparation before development could take place. English Partnerships was the successor body to English Estates, and, in its early years, was primarily focused on land remediation, development and regeneration. Significant actors within English Partnerships, such as David Taylor, the founding chief executive (from 1993 to 1996) and David Lunts, who had come from the Urban Villages Forum and had previously led the City Challenge renewal of Hulme in Manchester, were instrumental in advocating and advancing a design/place-making agenda. English Partnerships’ development of a design/place-making agenda distinguished it from its predecessor organisations (English Estates and the Commission for New Towns) which had been more single-mindedly focused on achieving land and property development rather than place-making as such.

English Partnerships’ initial work focused on land remediation because, in essence, land remediation was a prerequisite of everything else. The former colliery was a complicated, difficult site requiring considerable remediation. There was land contamination, noxious gases, geological faults arising due to the existence of the mine, unstable land due to mineral extraction and subsidence issues. These all were expensive to cure, as well as raising various contingent liabilities. Remediation of this nature was also a learning process and remediation standards becoming more demanding through the process, so that what was initially acceptable was not sufficient later. English Partnerships eventually capped nine mine shafts.

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1 English Partnerships – the government’s national regeneration agency – was set up in 1993. Its functions and assets, together with the investment functions of the Housing Corporation were transferred to the newly established Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) in December 2008. For the purpose of this report, reference will be made English Partnerships since this was the body for the greater period of the project’s development. Actions taken following HCA’s establishment are attributed to HCA.
In addition, the site is in the Aire Valley, on the edge of a flood plain. This required the installation of flood alleviation and attenuation measures and flood storage basins in the form of a sustainable urban drainage system (SUDS) – one of the first such systems in the North of England and therefore another area of innovation and learning process.

As it stood, the site was not attractive to housebuilders. Allerton Bywater could be seen as a commuter town for Leeds, but it is perhaps not sufficiently close enough to the M62 or M1, and it is closer in nature to the Wakefield area. Clean-up costs were high and also uncertain, while projected low end values were low. Prior to the announcement of the Millennium Community, Persimmon Homes had expressed interest in the site - but recognised how difficult it would be to develop and so withdrew their interest. Development would have been highly unlikely without government involvement both in the form of investment through English Partnerships and through designation as a Millennium Community.

Indeed, its likely fate was wholly transformed by its selection as the second Millennium Community (after Greenwich, London) by the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, in 1998.
Case Study 2: Allerton Bywater
Leeds, England

3. The Overall Vision

3.1 Spatial Development Framework

Allerton’s status as a Millennium Community established its overarching place vision, determining, amongst other things, that it would be a design exemplar – displaying a better quality of development than the normal standard housebuilder product – and also an environmental exemplar, achieving higher than code environmental standards. The overall vision for Allerton Bywater aimed to build a community in which people would want to live. It thereby sought to address the wider challenges of depopulation due to a vanished industrial base, a large amount of derelict land (with related blight) and high perceived development risk, all of which meant that the area was not readily attractive to housebuilders.

Allerton Bywater is a relatively sprawling village, with a larger section to the west of the colliery site, merging in with Great Preston and another section to the south. The colliery site was thus central within the village, and as a disused site was a significant blight on the area. The Allerton Bywater Millennium Community site thus sits between the two larger (though separate elements) of the village.

Masterplan competition

A masterplan for Allerton Bywater was procured through a two stage joint developer-designer competition, with English Partnerships inviting bids from developers to masterplan and build 520 homes. A competition route followed best practice of the period and had been influenced by other projects such as Glasgow’s Crown Street and Berlin’s IBA. It was a design and development competition, rather than just a design competition.

The competition had a demanding and challenging brief, requiring competitors to embrace the sustainability agenda, to be innovative and creative, and to pledge zero defects. The attraction as such was that English Partnerships was investing heavily in cleaning up the site, along with the Millennium Community brand. Nonetheless significant doubts existed regarding whether the end values would cover the environmental extras without further public subsidies.

Three consortia were selected in November 1988 to go forward to the second stage: Aire Regeneration, working with Aire Design (a joint venture between housebuilders Miller Homes and initially Barratts and then Gleeson Homes); a consortium led by Bellway Homes (with EDAW providing the design); and a third consortium led by US architect Daniel Libeskind. An honorarium of £100,000 was provided for each second stage bidder.

After the first stage of the masterplan competition, Barratt Homes who had been the original partner in Aire Regeneration withdrew, stating that the second-stage brief was too financially demanding and that as a plc accountable to shareholders, it did not feel the site’s revenue generation possibilities were sufficient to warrant involvement. Gleeson Homes replaced Barratt Homes as the joint-venture partner of Miller Homes in the developer-led Aire Regeneration Partnership.
Gleeson Homes felt that it could accept the wider challenge, since it was not a volume housebuilder and felt that its customers were demanding more innovation. Millers saw the changes in the consortium coming down to the extent to which each was determined to accept change and innovation in the pace at which we build, and the cost of building.

All developer-designer teams had to consult with the local community prior to the competition, although in practice this was limited. Design aspiration in terms of funkiness of some of the teams and of the judging panel was seen as not compatible with a Yorkshire mining community.

**Case Study 2:**
Allerton Bywater
Leeds, England

**Competition outcome**
The masterplans were presented to a stellar judging panel, which included international renown masterplanner David Mackay, Frank Duffy (the then outgoing RIBA President, Richard Rogers and others. The Libeskind bid completely rethought the basis for the provision of affordable housing but was described as ahead of its time; the ‘safer’ option seemed to be the Aire Regeneration bid.

As an outcome, English Partnerships established an exclusive deal with Aire Regeneration - to act as building/parcel developers. The development was originally envisaged as consisting of two main phases - the first of 350 units and the second of 170 units; all to be designed by Aire Design.

Contrasting with the relatively low density suburban type development in the existing village and in accordance with the masterplan brief, the Aire Design masterplan proposed a higher density (30-50 units), more ‘urban’ development based on an interconnected street pattern and outward facing perimeter blocks. The masterplan was based on two main, traffic calmed cross streets, the north-south one initially called ‘The Boulevard’ and the east-west axis initially called ‘The Avenue’. They linked into and related to the existing village, meeting at a new public square (Silkstone Square) where the colliery pithead previously stood and dividing the development into four quadrants.

To the south a new village Green acts as a hinge between the new and old Allerton Bywater. The masterplan also featured ‘green amenity’ streets, residential lanes, new allotments (developing a tradition in the village), and a village square. As developed, the new cross streets do not reinforce
Case Study 2: Allerton Bywater
Leeds, England

Section 11: Case studies

or develop existing desire lines and do not seem connect with anything particular, and so seem unlikely to become well trodden paths.

Difficulties arise
Proposals for Phase One (35-units) were exhibited in February 2001 to obtain feedback and comment. The design of Phase One raised a series of design challenges, including that of responding to “affordable innovation” on a remediated site that needed a new natural and human ecology; depressed local market conditions; the build costs for the houses, which were capped at £500/m²; the need to meet series of performance benchmarks (targets on energy conservation, waste reduction, defects, and digital communication links); and the continuing problem of low end values relative to development costs.

About this time, English Partnerships sought a different way forward. Initially it had adopted a more detached, “hands-off” role. It had a development deal with Aire Regeneration as an outcome of the masterplan competition; and normal planning control was seen as the primary means of controlling the quality of the development. In late 2002, however, English Partnerships withdrew from its exclusive deal with Aire Regeneration – promising that Miller Homes and Gleeson Homes would still be involved. Instead, it adopted a more direct, “hands-on” role, resolving to market the land on a parcel-by-parcel basis via an open developer competition. What had been described as a ‘nominal’ partnership with Aire Regeneration was dissolved – there had in any case been a change of personal in both Millers and Gleesons – and there was wider recognition of the need to find a different way to take things forward.

Change of direction
Phase One proposals continued to prove problematic. Between 2001 and 2003, proposals for Phase One were developed by Aire Design (now in association with Broadway Malyan) for Miller Homes. What made progress particularly difficult was that the land values were not sufficient to support the level of innovation and aspiration (SUDS, home zones, environmental standards, social infrastructure). The real costs had not been clear at the masterplan stage and did not become clear until cost consultants and quantity surveyors had been able to look in detail at the costs and returns involved. To find ways of taking the scheme forward, a CABE enabler was invited to run a workshop in 2004 focused on the design of Phase One. This workshop included local highways and planning authorities (including Leeds City Council’s head of Urban Design Mark Burgess), plus Miller Homes and its intended architect (Philip Rickinson Associates). The aim of the workshop was to explore ways of enhancing the original masterplan and of building something financially viable.
Design code
In retrospect, this was a critical moment, and was instrumental in a change of approach. English Partnerships subsequently commissioned a design code from EDAW (now AECOM) who ran a series of workshops as a means both of developing the design code and of providing more community/stakeholder engagement. Prior to the EDAW-led workshops, there had been limited community and stakeholder input – and in essence there was a sense that the development was being imposed on, rather undertaken with, the local community and the various stakeholders. Similarly, until this point, Leeds City Council’s role had been primary that of regulator rather than as partner.

Commissioning a design code addressed three interrelated issues.

* Partnership working – The process of developing the design code became a means of building a partnership and of ensuring greater community engagement and stakeholder buy-in from the various actors involved in Allerton Bywater, including notably English Partnerships, the prospective housebuilders and their designers, the local planning and highways authorities, and the existing community.

* Control mechanism – A design code gave English Partnerships, rather than the housebuilders or Leeds City Council, more control over development and design quality. A design code is, in effect, a formal statement of the place promoter’s development ‘rules’. What is also needed, however, is the prospect of sufficiently lucrative development to ensure developers are willing to accept those rules. Developed with input from the other stakeholders, EDAW’s design code was worked within the broad parameters of Aire Design’s masterplan and the existing infrastructure.

* Time – A design code can be a means of speeding up a project. It persuaded Leeds City Council, as planning and highways authority, substantially, in principle, to resolve regulatory issues through the design code rather than later through individual planning applications. If the design code was accepted by Leeds City Council and other regulatory bodies, then compliant parcel designs in accordance could, in principle, be fast tracked through the planning consent process. Barratt subsequently received a 13-week turnaround on its planning application. The masterplan had indicated the notion of home zones – residential areas where the design of the spaces between homes provide shared space for all users, including motor vehicles and other road users, with the wider needs of residents, including pedestrians, children and cyclists, would be fully accommodated. The Home Zone proposed would be one of the largest in Europe. The highway engineers had been wary of the notions of no kerbs, no demarcated carriageways, and short forward-viewing distances, but, in a first for Leeds City Council, planning consent was secured for the home zones at Allerton.
The workshops and the resulting design code, enabled English Partnerships and its partners, along with the various stakeholders to agree the way forward. After a number of years when limited substantive progress had been, after 2004, two phases were underway within 18 months, with the first residential completions in late 2006. Nonetheless despite designation as a Millennium Community in 1998 it had still taken until December 2006 for the first house to be occupied. Unfortunately, the project had missed a ‘window-of-opportunity’ for development and ran into the 2008+ recession, which will lengthen the development/build-out period still further.

3.2 Stakeholder engagement

Procured though a competition route – and perhaps because it was largely funded by the bidders – the winning masterplan had had only limited community and stakeholder engagement. Further consultation with residents revealed some concerns. The number of terraced houses was reduced from 459 to 317, and the number of semi-detached and detached houses increased from 61 to 203. Densities would still be around 37 to 40 dwellings per hectare. Local residents also wanted traditional materials to be used on façades. There was far greater involvement in design workshops, as described above.

4. Development Process

4.1 Land ownership and assembly

Allerton Bywater has been developed on the site of a former colliery, which closed in 1992. English Partnerships (now HCA) ‘inherited’ site from the National Coal Board in 1995.

4.2 Infrastructure provision

The development of Allerton Bywater involved a separation of land development through land remediation, infrastructure provision and land sub-division and marketing (to be undertaken by English Partnerships) and building development (to be undertaken by a series of housebuilders). English Partnerships’ investment in advance infrastructure and thus the provision of serviced parcels for housebuilders was intended to drive development forward by simplifying the development process for housebuilders, who did not need to consider wider matters of land development and could focus on parcel development and house building, and thereafter the marketing and selling of those houses.

A start on site was delayed by severe floods in 2000 and 2002, requiring additional work to the SUDS to meet Environment Agency standards and by protracted negotiations with the Health and Safety Executive over safety issues arising from a chemical factory adjacent to the site. To improve access to the site (and to increase site capacity), English Partnerships funded the upgrading of two road junctions – Barnside Road – Station Road and Barnside Road – Park Lane. After completing site decontamination and pit-shaft capping, English
Partnerships started work on a range of social and community facilities in 2002, investing £2 million in a range of new social and community facilities within the existing village, including refurbishing a former school building and the redundant miners’ welfare hall to create childcare and community facilities. Work was also progressed on cricket, bowling and skateboarding facilities, and on new allotments. A children’s playground was built in the centre of the Millennium Community.

English Partnerships commenced other infrastructure works in 2003 by building drains, gas lines, water pipes, electricity supply and the main east-west and north-south roads to provide access to the development parcels, planting semi-mature/sizeable oak and pear trees (also trees in the gardens), and installing the SUDS and other elements of the water infrastructure. English Partnerships therefore delivered the primary on-site infrastructure in advance – the main cross streets, and the related public realm including the main public square in the centre of the scheme, the SUDS infrastructure and associated green spaces. The major cross-routes and the main public square, were installed by English Partnerships prior to parcel development. Housebuilders could therefore plug-in to an established public realm. Secondary streets and home zones within the land parcels would be provided by the parcel developers.

The initial cost remediation and infrastructure was met by the public sector but had in principle to be recovered from land sales to developers. English Partnerships’ economic impact assessment showed upfront £24m investment of public money for extensive site clearing and decontamination, drainage, roads and other infrastructure represented good value. Some elements of infrastructure were required by a S106 agreement associated with the planning consent. As English Partnerships intended to recover its costs from land sales and in the event of a shortfall, through a public subsidy (an investment in place), it largely bore the land development risk as land developer.
Case Study 2: Allerton Bywater
Leeds, England

4.3 Land release and development procurement

The sizing and spatial pattern of land parcels and the timing of their release affect the nature of the build out and the coherence of the place as it develops. The intention is usually to provide a coherent roll-out of development with infrastructure preceding development. It is a balancing act and a number of factors have to be considered, such as parcel size, pattern and the timing of release. Different parcel sizes, for example, attract different scales and types of developer.

Development of Allerton Bywater is phased through the release of land parcels, typically parcels comprising several street blocks. There seems to have been limited competition for development sites which is probably testimony to a relatively weak local housing market and to the higher standards required. Thus, to some extent selection of housebuilders was largely through negotiation.

The Millennium Community site was sub-divided into three housing development parcels.

Figure CS.2: Land Parcelisation at Allerton Bywater
Case Study 2: Allerton Bywater
Leeds, England

Section 11: Case studies

Miller Homes

The first development parcel was developed by Miller Homes. Consisting of 193 units (including 39 homes for shared ownership through a local housing association), it had been designed before the EDAW design code, but was redesigned afterwards. The development includes a range of houses arranged around a home zone.

Miller built out its parcel in three phases of about 60 units per phase, which was seen as large enough to provide sufficient variety of units for sales and marketing purposes. In retrospect, Miller Homes considered it had underpriced the first phase/release. There were few comparables – not many houses had been built in Allerton in the past 40 years; no houses of this type (e.g. three-storey units; apartments; etc). Selling agents expressed surprised at the initial price of £187,500. The price was thereafter increased to £192,000 and similar units later sold at £215,000.

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Case Study 2: Allerton Bywater
Leeds, England

An innovation at Allerton Bywater required by the design code is the provision of accessory ‘atelier’ (office or studio) units, which are particularly useful for those working from home. In the Miller development, these units are located above the garages and have toilets – though they cannot be used as (permanent) sleeping accommodation, nor made into permanent residential units, separate from the main house.

Fleming Fusion
Contiguous with the first parcel, the second development parcel consists of 23 units and was completed by Fleming Fusion in 2007. It was linked to English Partnerships’ Modern Methods of Construction (MMC) initiative – also referred to as the ‘offsite manufacture’ methods – and to the 2005 Delivering Sustainable Communities Summit held in Manchester. Working with the housebuilding and construction sectors, the MMC initiative sought to speed up housing delivery; enable higher standards of design quality; and reduce resource consumption by embracing various technologies and processes involving supply chains, prefabrication and off-site assembly.

Prior to the Sustainable Communities summit, English Partnerships had commissioned Fleming Developments and Fusion Building Systems to design a three-storey townhouse – The Summit House™. This was intended to demonstrate how MMC could create a property providing a flexible and desirable home, while also meeting the EcoHomes ‘Excellent’ standard. Following the Summit, Fleming Developments and Fusion Building Systems (forming a joint venture) were invited by English Partnerships to consider building the Summit House within a development of 23 units at Allerton Bywater. To provide greater variety, four additional house types were designed by the architects, Phippen Randell Parkes (PRP).

The houses are constructed using an off-site manufacturing process. Capital costs are higher, but site costs are lower because each house can be erected in two days. There is a sense that the small number of more contemporary-looking houses have proven difficult to sell – though this may be due to difficulties in getting a mortgage for MMC building rather than an adverse reaction to contemporary design. The units also have kitchens on the first floor, which can be an awkward layout that may not suit families. Here, the Atelier units are above the parking spaces and do not have a toilet.

Barratt Developments
The third development parcel was also negotiated rather than an open competition. Developed by Barratt Developments, it consists of 151 units on a 3.2 hectare site and was partly completed at the end of 2009. Barratt Developments was a winner of the Design for Manufacture (DfM) competition – a Government-initiated competition, launched in April 2005 and intended to demonstrate the feasibility of building good-quality homes for a construction cost of £60,000 – and were invited to build a demonstration project at Allerton Bywater. 30% of development is DfM – look up DfM publication.
4.4 Design control

Build-out quality was controlled through the use of design briefs coupled with the design code. A design code can be a means of speeding up a project. Developers still had to obtain planning approval, but because the local planning and highways authorities had bought into the design code beforehand, this helped to speed up the planning process (a mere 13 weeks for Barratt). The Design Code was ‘adopted’ by Leeds City Council as an ‘approved’ planning document, rather than as a supplementary planning document (SPD) – the latter can be a protracted process and limits flexibility.

The design code formed part of the development license between the housebuilder and English Partnerships, which in practice (and provided the local planning authority ‘trusts’ the land developer to oversee the development license) is a more straightforward process than having the design code approved as SPD. As compliance with the design code forms part of the development license, English Partnerships inspects the properties to ensure compliance with the scheme design, the planning approval and the design code. English Partnerships is regarded as stricter than normal enforcement of planning consent – in part because, by being concerned with long-term place quality (at least in terms of the values of its remaining land parcels), it more directly bears the consequences of a lack of control/enforcement.

4.5 Long-term management arrangements

To ensure the shared facilities are looked after, English Partnerships enabled the establishment of the Allerton Bywater Community Partnership as a limited company and the local community.
5. Quality Appraisal

Allerton Bywater Millennium Community is essentially an example of the ‘good ordinary’ based upon commonsense principles. High quality new housing provision has been delivered, there is a series of new open spaces (many associated with the SUDS), plus new employment space and enhanced social and community facilities. Development is not complete however, and the development will be a more rounded community when it is finished. At present the Millennium Community stands close to, but does not seem integrated with, the older village – greater social integration will come in time not least because some of the ‘new’ social and community facilities have been located in the existing village.

The open spaces and home zones are conducive to social interaction, and are regarded as instrumental in helping to ensure that people to know their neighbours – Allerton is regarded as friendlier than many new-build developments. Developing a large area of new housing in an area that has lost its main raison d’être involves significant risk, but in this instance it seems to have helped to revitalise the area. People have been attracted to Allerton Bywater because it is a pleasant place to live with such items as Home Zones, Secured-by-Design, SUDS, live-work facilities (atelier units) and high quality children’s play facilities contributing to the overall offer. The relative proximity of work opportunities (especially Leeds) and the newly-refurbished community facilities also make Allerton Bywater Millennium Community a more rounded place – a village rather than an estate – and thus a more attractive and desirable place to live.

Allerton Bywater is still a largely car-dependent community – most people will need to use a car to live there. The local planning authority, for example, still requires a 200% parking provision. Existing facilities in the original village have been enhanced by English Partnerships’ investment in the social and community infrastructure, while employment spaces have also been developed.

As a Millennium Community, Allerton Bywater is intended to be an environmental exemplar, with all houses required to achieve EcoHomes ‘Excellent’ standard and to be designed to use substantially less water, gas and electricity than a ‘standard’ house. Indeed, all the Millennium Communities projects had to achieve specific environmental and quality standards, with standards being progressively updated and increased over time so that they remain in excess of “normal” regulatory standards. These achievements will increase its resilience in the face of change and thereby enhance its long-term place value.
Case Study 2: Allerton Bywater
Leeds, England

Assessment of Allerton Bywater according to Scottish Government’s ‘Designing Places’ criteria

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<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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<tr>
<td>Does the place have a distinct identity?</td>
<td>Yes – three-storey housing, relatively small plots, terraced housing, cars parked within street blocks, give the development a more urban character. The home zones within the housing are a distinctive element.</td>
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<td>Does the place have spaces that are safe and pleasant?</td>
<td>Yes – consistent use of street blocks with public fronts and private blocks means streets are overlooked and surveyed by ‘eyes-on-the-street’. The perimeter block layout establishes a clear front/back distinction and provides doorways and windows onto the public areas.</td>
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<td>Is the place easy to move around (especially on foot) (‘permeable’)?</td>
<td>Yes – the consistent use of block structure makes the street pattern very legible. The extensive use of home zones makes the development easy to move around.</td>
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<td>Does the place make visitors feel sense-of-welcome?</td>
<td>Yes – though quiet during the day, apart from opening and closing times of the school. Neighbourhood presently lacks amenities. Central square has been laid out and public realm installed, but no development around it yet.</td>
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<td>Will the place adapt easily to changing circumstances (‘robust’)?</td>
<td>Houses are low-rise and could be converted to other uses. Houses have small gardens, and thus opportunities for extensions are relatively limited.</td>
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<td>Does the place make good use of scarce resources (‘sustainable’)?</td>
<td>All housing achieves EcoHomes ‘Excellent’ standard. Development appears quite car dependent – bus routes/stops are clear and convenient; intensity of buses and bus usage may increase over time. Commercial spaces have been developed and amenities exist within the existing village. Elements of mixed use development are in the pipeline.</td>
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Further Information can also be obtained from:

http://www.cabe.org.uk/case-studies/allerton-bywater

http://www.homesandcommunities.co.uk/public/documents/Allerton%20Bywater.pdf
Case Study 3: Britannia Basin, Castlefield, Manchester, England

1. Development Opportunity

For reasons of clarity and to avoid confusion, the term ‘Castlefield’, as used here, refers to the adjacent Castlefield Urban Heritage Park (the original Castlefield), while ‘Britannia Basin’ refers to the case study location to the west of Mancunian Way bounded by railway tracks to the North.

Begun in the late 1990s, Britannia Basin is an inner city regeneration project, delivered in an area of brownfield land to the immediate south-west of Manchester City Centre. The subsequent branding of the area as ‘Castlefield’ - it is, in reality, an annexe to the original Castlefield - reflects its proximity to the Castlefield Urban Heritage Park whose boundary has been extended to cover Britannia Basin. This also trades upon Castlefield having become an established and popular area within Manchester.

Although Britannia Basin is flanked by two areas (Hulme as well as the ‘original’ Castlefield) which received very significant regeneration and investment in the 1980s and 1990s, it remained under-developed relative to its location. Urban Splash, which has since developed a reputation for enlightened and place-sensitive development, then saw the opportunity for high quality residential conversion of former mill buildings which, though derelict, were attractive and sound. The first development met with success and encouraged Urban Splash to think on a much larger scale with regard to developing the rest of the area. In the late 1990s, Urban Splash was neither as large nor as established as it is today and taking on a project of this scope and scale was a significant risk.

The development has been based upon a mixture of new-build and refurbishment of former industrial and warehouse buildings to create residential and commercial space. So far Urban Splash has undertaken six projects, with more to follow. Other developments in the area are by Mayfair Developments (Castlefield Locks) with two by Dandara (Base and St George’s Island).

The use of high design standards successfully to accommodate high density housing in an attractive urban environment corresponds with existing and proposed redevelopments nearby. More generally, the site’s location adjacent to two areas of significant public investment (in the ‘original’ Castlefield by the Central Manchester Development Corporation and in Hulme by the City Challenge Company) demonstrates how public sector land development in one area can have spillover effects on to adjacent sites, making them commercially viable, without need for significant further direct investment.
The story of ‘original’ Castlefield is important context for Britannia Basin. Due to its wealth of historic buildings, canals and other historic transport infrastructure, most of Castlefield was designated a conservation area in 1979. At the time, much of the land was owned by the then Manchester Ship Canal Company (now part of the Peel Ports Group owned by Manchester-based Peel Holdings). The 1982 City Centre Local Plan supported the opening of the Museum of Science and Industry on London Road as a flagship project enhancing the area’s tourism offer, which was further bolstered its self-nomination as Britain’s first Urban Heritage Park in 1983.

The step change in the area’s fortunes was substantially due to the Central Manchester Development Corporation (CMDC), which was established in 1988 to formulate regeneration proposals for nearly 187 hectares of central Manchester (approximately 40% of the city centre), including Castlefield. With a small team and capital budget for environmental works, including bridges and signage, Central Manchester Development Corporation was able to conduct hands-on management of the area in a way few UK local authorities seem able to do. Its approach focused on strengthening and developing the Castlefield’s tourism base, establishing a vibrant residential community, and sensitive conservation and enhancement of listed buildings, canals, viaducts and public spaces.

CMDC also set up the Castlefield Management Company (CMC) 1992 as a non-profit company to ensure maintenance and coordinate events. An Urban Ranger service was set up to assist visitors, guide tours and oversee the Urban Heritage Park.

By the time that Central Manchester Development Corporation was wound up in 1996, Castlefield has been substantially transformed from decaying buildings, neglected canals and overgrown pathways to an attractive, interesting and rewarding urban quarter. Public investment in public realm improvements attracted further private sector investment, resulting in the re-colonisation of a city neighbourhood through conversions to residential, office and leisure uses and new development.

2. People And Organisations

Among the eight case studies presented in this study, Britannia Basin is distinctive because it was almost entirely developer-led with limited input from the public sector. A private development company (who owns most of the site) has been instrumental in taking a longer-term perspective on the site’s development. It has carefully phased and designed the sequence of development projects to create a place of quality. Urban Splash has controlled build-out and, to some extent, avoided flooding the market with flats/apartments though it cannot control what other nearby developers do, nor when they bring developments to the market.
The place vision reflected the underlying strategy at Manchester City Council, which has had strong and stable leadership over the past two decades, coupled with a clear vision of for the city. For delivering this vision, the Council chooses to target its resources at a small number of projects. According to Dave Roscoe of Manchester City Council, “We have a vision of Manchester as a World Class city. For this we demand that developers only use world-class designers. If developers appoint quality teams then we will want to work with them.”

By the mid-1990s, the council’s priorities had shifted from Castlefield, to places such as Ancoats, the Northern Quarter and New Islington. Thus, while Manchester City Council encouraged the high-quality development of Britannia Basin, it did not play an active role nor did it commit any extra resources to it itself – though once initial development had begun it did encourage the drafting of a non-statutory masterplan.

“Urban Splash see themselves as partners, working with the local authority” Dave Roscoe, Manchester City Council.

Hence the place vision was developed by the private sector with the encouragement and acquiescence of the Council. The hands-off approach at Britannia Basin in the 2000s can be compared and contrasted with Central Manchester Development Corporation’s more hands-on and proactive approach at original Castlefield in the 1990s.

3. The Overall Vision

3.1 Spatial Development Framework

The place vision was largely created in-house by Urban Splash, as were the designs of the first two building projects. Urban Splash founders Tom Bloxham and Jonathan Falkingham recognised Britannia Basin’s potential for development for these reasons:

- Well-located, adjacent to ‘original’ Castlefield and 15 minutes walk from Manchester city centre.
- Architecturally interesting buildings with potential for redevelopment.
- Pioneering, high-risk nature of development meant land and buildings could be acquired cheaply; value would be generated through the creation of a quality place.

“Urban Splash was the first developer to see potential in Britannia Basin. It was something of a leap of faith” Dave Roscoe, Manchester City Council.

The decision to develop the surrounding area required input from the other major landowner in the area, as well as an external consultant (EDAW). And following a change in policy at Urban Splash, subsequent building projects were designed by external architects.
3.2 Stakeholder engagement

Very little community and stakeholder engagement took place in the early stages of the development. The area was more-or-less completely vacant, and there was much less onus on developers to conduct consultations. This was very limited because there few people were living nearby and consultation requirements were much lower in the mid-1990s. The majority of local engagement was with Manchester City Council as the local planning authority who wanted to ensure place quality. Consultation with the local community would be more extensive now, not only because statutory requirements have increased but also because the wider Castlefield community has become more active in the face of development proposals in the area, especially those for high-rise development.

4. Development Process

4.1 Land ownership and assembly

The site was a very fragmented one, held in passive ownership by current and former industrial landowners. Urban Splash either owned or had options on many of the plots/sites in the area. The site was acquired in parcels and where possible retained in its original, revenue-generating uses until it is ready for development, reducing the opportunity cost of postponing development, removing time pressure for immediate development and allowing a long-term approach.

4.2 Infrastructure provision

Only limited off-site infrastructure was required to enable the project to happen. The site is close to a major east-west road, built in the late 1980s long before the site had been considered for high-value development. On-site infrastructure is also relatively uncomplicated.

While adjacent roads remain in the public realm, Urban Splash purchased Worsley Street and Burton Place from Manchester City Council, which were redesigned, closed to motor traffic and had public realm improvements funded by Urban Splash. The area therefore benefits from developing within an existing urban frame – though it is an industrial frame rather than a residential frame.
It is apparent that the wider Castlefield area is one that has become a residential area rather than one that has been planned and designed as a residential area with the full range of local facilities that one might expect in a mature urban neighbourhood (such as school, doctors, dentists, etc). At Britannia Basin, no other public amenities were provided as part of the scheme, and health, education and transport infrastructure are all located off-site.

The only public sector financial support came from English Partnerships, who provided £2.1m to support the development of Britannia Basin. The remainder of the development has been self-funding, with the necessary infrastructure being funded by Urban Splash. Apart from the English Partnerships support for Britannia Mills, the private sector did almost everything. This is very unusual, but it reflects Urban Splash’s model of making money through place-making and Manchester City Council’s approach of only becoming involved in projects it can properly commit to.

4.3 Land release and development procurement

Urban Splash has developed Britannia Basin as a series of six development projects; each is functionally separate from each another. As the scheme is built on previously-developed land, most of the public infrastructure was already in place and did not have to be provided prior to development.

The phased development of Britannia Basin as a series of discrete parcels means that the pace of development can be changed according to demand: when market conditions are favourable a site is developed. In the meantime vacant sites are preferably held in a revenue-earning state, reducing the opportunity cost of holding land and allowing development to take place at the most suitable time.
The first development to be completed was the refurbishment and fit-out of Britannia Mills in 2000, with subsequent phases incorporating both new-build and refurbishment. Following the success of Britannia Mills, Urban Splash decided to commit to developing most of the rest of the area. For this, it was encouraged by Manchester City Council to draw up a non-statutory masterplan in co-operation with the other major landowner in the area, Peel Holdings. The plan set out how development might continue across the remainder of the site. It was, in principle, in Peel and Urban Splash’s interests to follow the masterplan since doing so would lead to a higher place quality and a more valuable development opportunity.

“The conversion of Britannia Mills created a market. Good design adds value”. Chris Stalker, Urban Splash.

Table CS.2: Development phases at Britannia Mills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developer</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Splash</td>
<td>Britannia Mills</td>
<td>Refurbishment. 0.61Ha, 125 apartments</td>
<td>Completed June 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Splash</td>
<td>Box Works</td>
<td>Refurbishment. 0.5 Ha, 81 apartments</td>
<td>Completed June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Splash</td>
<td>Timber Wharf</td>
<td>New build – 181 apartments plus office and retail space</td>
<td>Completed June 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Splash</td>
<td>Burton Place</td>
<td>New build – 90 apartments plus office space</td>
<td>Completed October 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Splash</td>
<td>Moho</td>
<td>New build – 0.23 Ha, 102 modular apartments, plus office and retail space</td>
<td>Completed May 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Splash</td>
<td>Albert Mill</td>
<td>Refurbishment. ‘Shell space’. 6,700 sq ft. Commercial, 21 residential units</td>
<td>Completed Autumn 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dandara</td>
<td>Base apartments</td>
<td>104 residential units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dandara</td>
<td>St George’s Island</td>
<td>New build – 434 residential units. Five blocks ranging from 15-storeys to eight storeys.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayfair</td>
<td>Castlefield Locks</td>
<td>New build – 222 residential units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But while Manchester City Council may have benignly facilitated the development process, it was Urban Splash who actively drove it. Other landowners in the area were able to benefit from Urban Splash’s pioneering work. These included Peel Holdings, who made significant money selling building land to Dandara in the early 2000s, which would not have taken place without Urban Splash’s prior investment in Britannia Mills and Box Works. Nonetheless, Urban Splash was not merely altruistic. It had several further plots to develop and was looking to enhance their value. Values at the first development project (Britannia Mills) had been no higher than ‘standard’ comparables, but as Urban Splash anticipated, subsequent stages sold at higher prices and have held up well, especially when compared to later city flats.

Urban Splash is first and foremost a profit-making business and extensive financial analysis was carried out before the developments started. The development model used at Britannia Basin requires the creation of a recognisable place that increases desirability and values. This was only possible due to Urban Splash having a large enough land holding, which meant that the company made significant returns on later phases.

4.4 Design control
No formal, supplementary public design control instruments were used at Britannia Basin. Quality was maintained as a result of Urban Splash’s long term commitment to the site, which meant each component had to contribute to the whole in order to maintain values. Manchester City Council was also clear in its resolve not to approve low quality designs. Planning consents were granted on a ‘project-by-project’ basis, so the City Council would have refused permission if an individual design was not considered acceptable.

Urban Splash was free to choose its own designers. Britannia Mills and Box Works were designed in-house. Urban Splash subsequently moved to using external architects. Timber Wharf was designed by Glenn Howells Architects, who won a competition run by RIBA and chaired by Lord Rogers. Subsequent phases have been designed by architects selected through competitive tender.

4.5 Long-term management arrangements
The area is managed for and on behalf of Urban Splash, who have also adopted a number of public roads on-site. Adjoining public space and highways are managed by Manchester City Council.
It is also apparent that the wider Castlefield community is becoming both active and more concerned about the wider area’s future. The concern is at two levels. The first is in regard to the day-to-day management and upkeep of the wider public realm. Concerns have been expressed about Manchester City Council (for example, in terms of the allocation of section 106 payments associated with developments in the area) and Peel Holdings, who bear some responsibility for estate management (such as maintaining Merchant’s Bridge, which has become dirty and is unlit). There is a need for an area-based management and events company with an adequate budget to secure effective repair and maintenance of the public realm. Such a company could, in addition, ‘make-things-happen’ by encouraging life and activity in the key public spaces.

The second level of concern is about recent planning and development in the area, particularly in relation to proposals for over-scaled and poorly-detailed buildings. The concern is that this will both change the area’s visual and physical character and reduce or damage the area’s mix, diversity and complementary uses and activities. It has been argued that too many small flats with short-term tenancies result in a high turnover and militate against community-building in Castlefield.

5. Quality Appraisal

Britannia Basin is distinctive, attractive and successful. The developments respond well to their surroundings and skilfully juxtapose old and new to create a strong sense of place. The presence of ground-floor commercial occupiers in Timber Wharf, Burton Place and MoHo provides animation to the ground-level and ensure the open spaces are well-used throughout the day. A neighbourhood convenience store and two bars mean that a respectable level of local service provision is a feature of the development. It also benefits from its proximity to Castlefield, which is less than a five-minute walk and to Manchester city centre which is a 10-15 minute walk.

Britannia Basin is itself attractive but is surrounded on two sides by poor-quality urban space. This is partly due to development not yet being complete. Other shortcomings include a limited variety of dwelling types (and therefore a narrow and potentially unstable community) – all units are flats. Nonetheless, within this typology there is some variation – provided not only by the use of multiple designers and buildings, but also the use of ‘shell fit-out developments at Box Works and Albert Mill.

Britannia Basin appears higher in quality than the neighbouring developments completed by rival firms, with more consideration given to place-specific design. Across the canal from Timber Wharf is St George’s Island, which houses five substantial slab blocks built by Dandara in 2007. While attractive in their detailing and surrounding gardens, these blocks make little response to their surroundings.
A more drastic comparison can be made with another waterside block just a bit further west. On the other side of the railway viaducts is a very large apartment complex on Water Street. This is much larger than Timber Wharf and is less than five years old. Despite being near contemporaneous with Burton Place and MoHo, it makes poor use of its location, doing little to contribute to the place. It is dominated by a parking court and is completely impermeable, blocking off all access to one side of the Irwell. The contrast with the Britannia Basin’s permeability and outward-looking design is striking.

Between Britannia Basin and original Castlefield lies Slate Wharf – a series of relatively low rise apartments built on the edge of original Castlefield in the mid-1990s. Occupying one of the finest waterfront sites in Manchester, it fails to engage with the water edge and offers little to the pedestrian. It is also characterised many gated parking courts facing on to the streets.

In summary, the main factors that have made a difference at Britannia Basin are:
- a far-sighted developer with long-term commitment to site
- its willingness to undertake development of a non-mainstream site
- ensuring land could be bought cheaply and leaving opportunity space for creative design
- the prior regeneration of adjacent areas (Hulme and ‘original’ Castlefield)
- the favourable macroeconomic circumstances of the late 1990s and 2000s
- a collective commitment to a place vision by all stakeholders, including politically-stable local authority.

What is also significant is that some discretion and latitude might be given to trusted developers – in this case Urban Splash’s track record of quality and sensitivity to place quality.
### Assessment of Castlefield (Britannia Basin) according to Scottish Government’s ‘Designing Places’ criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the place have a distinct identity?</td>
<td>The place’s identity is of a similar nature to the earlier Castlefield development to the north of the A67, but is more daring and contemporary in its design. Its location is also well defined by physical boundaries, which makes it more distinctive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place have spaces that are safe and pleasant?</td>
<td>Urban Splash has taken over some of the main streets and manages them as part of the scheme. Other parts of the site are managed on behalf of Dandara, one of the other major developers on the site. At the same time, the area is not fully developed and there are a number of unattractive areas of waste ground that do not enhance to the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the place easy to move around (especially on foot) (‘permeable’)?</td>
<td>Yes, though it could be better. A towpath leads along the Bridgewater canal and there is a good grid of roads. Its main deficiency comes from the very large block that makes up Timber Wharf and Britannia Mills, as well as connections to the north of the site. It is also not easy to get into original Castlefield by foot; the only route is via the dark towpath under the A67.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place make visitors feel sense-of-welcome?</td>
<td>There is very little evidence of excess gating and there are active frontages. There are also two bars and a good local shop. This is a pleasant contrast to Slate Wharf to the immediate north, which is a much more straightforward early-mid 1990s development with very vocal security and parking restrictions and no immediate amenities. Parking in Castlefield is not difficult (yet) though there is evidence of car break-ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will the place adapt easily to changing circumstances (‘robust’)?</td>
<td>The individual units are able to accommodate a variety of ground floor uses (retail, offices etc) so can (and have) adapt to changing circumstances. Shell fit-out schemes such as Box Works and Albert Mill are also adaptable. The remainder of the site is held as a series of currently-used parcels, so they can be developed as and when required. It does appear to be relatively robust. “We are not slavish to one particular design or use”. (Chris Stalker, Urban Splash).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place make good use of scarce resources (‘sustainable’)?</td>
<td>While not exactly at ‘passivhaus’ standards, it does reuse the structure of a series of substantial buildings, saving embodied energy. It is also possible to live without a car (underground parking spaces cost extra).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Development Opportunity

First conceived in the early 1990s, Hammarby Sjöstad is a new neighbourhood for Stockholm, located to the south of the city centre. The site had originally developed as an industrial area in the early 20th century. It was mostly occupied by low-value industrial uses, scrapyards, car breakers and the like. It was widely regarded within Stockholm as an insalubrious area: the haunt of small-time crooks and gangsters. To the immediate north of Hammarby Sjöstad is the 19th century Södermalm district. The two areas are separated by a large body of water called Hammarby Sjö (meaning lake in Swedish), which had previously formed the southern boundary to central Stockholm.

In 1994, a masterplan for the Hammarby site was drawn as part of Stockholm’s bid for 2004 Olympic Games. The central tenet was that the Games would be as environmentally friendly as possible. Stockholm ultimately lost the contest to Athens, but the momentum remained as Stockholm City Planning Bureau decided to commit resources to the wholesale development of the site. Hammarby is widely regarded as an exemplar in place making. It is attractive, well thought out, environmentally sound and very well integrated with the existing urban fabric.

Hammarby Sjöstad is well known for being built to the highest environmental standards. The Hammarby site had previously been occupied by low-rent industry and scrapyards, but its fortunes were transformed in 1994 when it was chosen as the site for Stockholm’s 2004 Olympic bid. Though this bid failed, the momentum remained within the Stockholm City Planning Bureau who decided to commit resources to the wholesale development of the site. Hammarby is widely regarded as an exemplar in place making. It is attractive, well thought out, environmentally sound and very well integrated with the existing urban fabric.
Internationally, Hammarby is best known for its pioneering role in the development of the ‘Hammarby Model’ for handling energy, water supplies and waste streams. This closed-circuit system reflects the wider environmental aims for the project. It is intended that all flats use only 50% of the energy and water of a typical Swedish development in 1990.

For the purposes of the study, Hammarby is of particular interest due to the way in which it has been delivered through a process of state-led consensus. Stockholm City Council took a leading role in the delivery of the project, engaging a very large number of private and public sector actors, including 41 developers and 29 architectural practices. This led to the rapid and successful development of an attractive area with a strong local economy in its own right and high property values.

2. People and Organisations

Although Hammarby is a typically Scandinavian example of consensus-based planning, much of the vision and early work is generally credited to the late Jan Inge Hagström who was chief city planner at Stockholm City Council in the 1990s. He designed the original strategic masterplan for Hammarby and was instrumental in the emergence of the place as it is today.

The Hammarby project was conceived, delivered, financed and managed by Stockholm City Council to ensure that Stockholm’s growth took place in an environmentally friendly way as possible. The project has been delivered by Hammarby Sjöstad Project Team, which is composed of staff from two different organisations: the City of Stockholm Land Development Bureau and City of Stockholm Planning Bureau. Each assigned staff specifically to the Hammarby project to engage and work with developers, architects, public sector stakeholders and Stockholm residents.

3. The Overall Vision

3.1 Spatial Development Framework

The strategic masterplan drawn up by Stockholm City Council for Hammarby envisaged a mixed-use residential neighbourhood, with a very strong emphasis on energy efficiency and environmental protection. A design code ensured that the overall character of the plan was delivered in practice. The planning process was highly integrated, with all actors were closely involved right from the start. One significant outcome of the integrated planning approach is the ‘Hammarby Model’ for dealing with energy, fresh water and waste (see Figure A.2). This has allowed the development of a closed-circuit resource model with very high levels of energy and heat recovery.
Case Study 4: Hammarby-Sjöstad
Stockholm, Sweden

Figure CS.3 The Hammarby Model
Masterplanning and design coding have been critical in translating the strategic vision to a more local scale. This is a two-step process:

- ‘Detailed plans’ are made for the smaller details of the project, such as building lines, heights, roof pitches, the locations of jetties and gardens etc and the sizes of flats. These are based upon extensive discussions between the City Council, developers and their architects. The City Council uses its power as landowner to enforce these plans. Notably, the Council does not give much leeway regarding the location of buildings. Enforcement of the building line creates certainty for developers, who can exist safe in the knowledge that the balcony depth, height etc of a later building will not affect their own development adversely. This is essential to successful high density development.

- To really guarantee the outcome of the building designs, the second step is to use ‘Quality Programmes’ which are produced after the detailed plans are finished. These are similar to design codes and cover facades, windows, colours etc, producing a very detailed specification of how each building will look. Each area has its own Quality Programme and emerges as a result of discussion between planners, architects, builders and the planning enforcement team. The quality programme forms part of the planning permission for the building. So essentially there are two stages of regulation: one is the right of sale, the second is the right of permission. Both are controlled by the City Council.

3.2 Stakeholder Engagement

A quite extensive consultation process was undertaken throughout the planning process for Hammarby, by the City of Stockholm Planning Department, reflecting the need for consultation as enshrined in Swedish law. As well as the incumbent industrial occupiers, there were already some residents on the north shore.

There was a general welcome for the redevelopment of the Hammarby shore, since it was felt to make for a safer area. The area was felt to be a haven for illegal activities and the consensual opinion was “it couldn’t be worse.”

Further support was given to the proposals by neighbours because the development of Hammarby has been accompanied by the development of waterside paths and bike tracks along both sides of Hammarby Sjö. This potentially benefits everyone in SW Södermalm. Ironically, public engagement and further modification/refinement of the design code has become much harder now that the majority of the development is complete. It is easier to carry out community engagement when the perceived need for significant investment is essentially unequivocal and there is a relatively small local community.
4. Development Process

4.1 Land ownership and assembly
Land assembly was undertaken by the Stockholm City Development Department, who already owned the majority of the Hammarby site. Compulsory purchase and relocation was largely met with acquiescence by the remaining owner-occupiers, as their premises were out of date, poorly located for industry and as they believed they would be better served by new premises in a different part of the city.

4.2 Infrastructure provision
The City Council has invested about €500 million in Hammarby and generated around €3 billion of private investment. If the project had failed, it would have seriously damaged the City Council’s reputation. Much of the public infrastructure was put in place early on, including Hammarby Allé and its constituent tramway. As Hammarby is built on former industrial land, decontamination was the other main upfront, which was both expensive and extensive.

4.3 Land release and development procurement
With the exception of the north-shore flats (whose residents in any case tend to think that they live in Södermalm) Hammarby’s development has started from the ‘core’ (i.e. Sickla Udde) and worked outwards. There are 15 phases in total. The 12th phase is currently being designed. Phasing has worked very well; the development is continuous and there are no large and obvious gaps in the middle of the urban form.

4.4 Design control
The building of Hammarby Sjöstad was (and is) very tightly regulated, and not only because the City Council is strict. This is because the codes emerge from detailed with architects and other professionals and have widespread support. (For clarification, in Swedish nomenclature, a ‘planner’ is seen as someone who looks forward and works to deliver a vision along with architects and developers. A ‘regulator’ is someone who enforces the rules, and is much more in line with the notion of a ‘planner’ as construed in the UK’s planning system.)

4.5 Long-term management arrangements
The public realm is managed by Stockholm City Council.
5. Quality Appraisal

“Hammarby Sjöstad cost about 5% more to build than a ‘standard’ development model, but values are 20%-25% higher than comparables” Henrik Svanquist, Skanska Construction.

“It is always a risk, developing an urban area and you never know whether it will deliver this bustling urban life that you dream of as a planner. But I think it has been very successful, especially along the main road. There are lots of shops and restaurants and it is a location for good urban life and good public life. I also think there is a good mixture between the public parts (i.e. the parks) and the more private aspects (i.e. the courtyards).” Louise Heimler, Stockholm City Planning Bureau interviewed in January 2010.

Hammarby Sjöstad shows how former industrial areas with poor connections can be reinvented as part of the city. Its previous physical condition corresponds to numerous industrial sites in semi-peripheral areas of large cities, particularly Glasgow andEdinburgh. Key lessons of relevance from the Hammarby experience are:

* A combination of a strong vision, high levels of consensus working throughout the project, and wholesale commitment to design excellence can produce a very successful place indeed. Successful collaboration also breeds market certainty.

* Public transport infrastructure needs to be installed early on, so that the new neighbourhood is well-connected and accessible, influencing people’s travel patterns from the start.

* When creating an ‘urban’ place from scratch, it needs to have (as Hammarby does) a full range of social infrastructure: library, parks, activities, sports activities/centres, schools etc.

* ‘High density’ does not have to feel intense and oppressive. High quality open space ensures that the area is pleasant to live in.

* Clean-sheet thinking on energy, water and waste can combine with a strong institutional delivery capacity to create a place that has exemplary environmental credentials.
## Assessment of Hammarby according to Scottish Government’s ‘Designing Places’ criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Does the place have a distinct identity?</strong></td>
<td>Hammarby Sjöstad is made unique by its distinct, place-specific architecture and its relation to its surroundings, most particularly the water. The place has been designed to the same basic proportions as 19th century Stockholm but the architecture is very definitely 21st century. Its strong environmental credentials have made it a world famous example of a successful new urban area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Does the place have spaces that are safe and pleasant?**              | There are many places in Hammarby that fit this:  
  - Linear park, with stream running through Sickla Kaj  
  - Hill, park and playgrounds in middle of Sickla Udde  
  - Lens-shaped path in Hammarby Gård de Gård  
  - Sickla Park (just over the motorway)  
  - Nacka nature reserve (likewise Skistar.com ski slope Streets and courtyards are also themselves pleasant. |
| **Is the place easy to move around (especially on foot) (‘permeable’)?**  | Hammarby is arguably the most permeable of the case studies. There are paths and passages everywhere. It is possible to walk from courtyard to courtyard or along any number of footpaths between locks or along watercourses. There are almost no dead ends. Moreover the courtyards are really attractive because they have been designed to be so. Parking and rubbish collection both take place underground so there it no need for the courts to be dominated by such activities and they feature as good gardens and thoroughfares. |
| **Does the place make visitors feel sense-of-welcome?**                 | Yes. Five reasons particularly spring to mind:  
  - The buildings are all outward-facing; it does not seem that the place is turning its back on you.  
  - The place is permeable; you can go anywhere, there are no implicit “keep out” signs.  
  - There is plenty for a visitor to do. There are attractive parks, shops, cafes, sushi restaurants etc that are used by both locals and visitors.  
  - There is almost no CCTV so the visitor does not feel an intruder.  
  - It is easy to get to with the tram, bus and ferry. |
Case Study 4: Hammarby-Sjöstad
Stockholm, Sweden

Will the place adapt easily to changing circumstances (‘robust’)?

Hammarby Sjöstad is an urban area with good connections, a good mix of land uses and a strong economic base. There is a wide variety of flats and they are designed to cater for all ages, as reflected in the broad demographic range, so the place should adapt easily. The only proviso here is that there is not that much free space for new infrastructure and buildings.

Does the place make good use of scarce resources (‘sustainable’)?

Absolutely. It makes best use of energy, water and waste via the excellent Hammarby Model. Wholesale development of the area has also made good use of land that was previously used in a suboptimal way. Living in Hammarby reduces energy consumption and discourages the temptation to drive everywhere. This has been assisted by early introduction of a tram line, ensuring that people’s travel patterns immediately became centred on public transport.

Further Information

Further information about Hammarby can be obtained from:
http://www.cabe.org.uk/case-studies/hammarby-sjostad
1. Development Opportunity

Amsterdam city has a long and distinguished tradition of urban planning and development. Constructed on a series of seven artificial islands on Lake IJmeer on the city’s eastern side, IJburg is Amsterdam’s new residential district and has been built entirely from scratch. Land, street layouts, buildings and all other components of a complete urban district have been developed in less than ten years on what had previously been the seabed. Previously isolated, the district is now about 15-20 minutes by express tram for Amsterdam city centre. When complete, it will house 45,000 people in 18,000 dwellings. A deceptively simple new district – an example of the ‘good ordinary’ – it already feels like other neighbourhoods of Amsterdam, while having the benefits of new buildings and infrastructure.

Amsterdam’s potential for expansion is limited. The city is surrounded by restricted areas – by areas of natural, historic or cultural value and the approaches to Schipol airport – and cannot expand in any other direction. The east side, where IJburg sits, has been described as the city’s ‘last ever’ expansion.

The project is well advanced, with Phase I approximately 75% complete. Phase I consists of two main islands – Steigereiland (Jetty Island) and Haveneiland (Harbour Island) – and a set of three smaller islands, known collectively as Rieteiland (Reed Islands) and consisting of Groot Rieteiland, Kleine Rieteiland, and Rieteiland Oost. Phase II consists of a further four islands.
was termed Nieuw Oost (New East – renamed IJburg in 1995). As importantly, the 1980s and 1990s saw an urban renaissance in Amsterdam and a rediscovery of city living, with the redevelopment of urban areas such as the Eastern Docklands. The City’s Fourth Report on Spatial Planning (1988) again identified IJmeer Lake as a possible location for future growth as part of spatial development framework for Amsterdam through to 2015.

What made IJburg a reality was the VINEX programme – an abbreviation of ‘Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening Extra’: the fourth Dutch Ten Year Housing Programme (1996-2005) and also a supplementary document to the 1990 Fourth National Policy (in effect, the Dutch National Planning Framework). VINEX was an ambitious programme. Between 1995 and 2005, it proposed to address the housing shortage by building high quality, high density (over 30 dwellings per hectare), neighbourhoods, well-connected by public transport to jobs and services, and with at least 30% of the housing being affordable. Over a ten year period, it produced some 90 urban extensions and increased the nation’s housing stock by almost 8% – adding a further 455,000 new homes.

The 1993 VINEX plan identified possible locations for housing development. Nieuw-Oost, as IJburg was then known, was included among them. At about the same time, the Amsterdam Regional Conference determined that between 1995 and 2005 the city needed a further 100,000 housing units in the Amsterdam region. Amsterdam was to build 36,000 units, including 18,000 in IJburg, with the other 64,000 units to be built in Almere region.

The VINEX programme put the onus on local authorities to submit bids for inclusion and, reviving the 1980s ‘Nieuw Oost’ plan, Amsterdam put IJburg forward. IJburg became an official VINEX location in the summer of 1994. Though the government provided seed capital to help in decontaminating land and providing infrastructure, the schemes had to be self-funding. Local authorities would also play the lead role in commissioning masterplans and providing infrastructure.

As a new district built on artificial land, IJburg was in the Dutch tradition of creating land to build on. The test project was launched 1994, when a 30,000m2 island was built to test the technical and financial feasibility of the land-creation method of depositing dredged sand. The test island was successful and now forms Noordbuurt, the northern part of Steigereiland. Surprisingly perhaps, compared to the costs of preparing and developing brownfield land, IJburg’s land-creation element was considered to be comparatively good value for money.

Following the success of the test island, the Municipality of Amsterdam established Projectbureau IJburg in 1995, specifically to lead and champion IJburg’s development, and in 1996 it gave its seal of approval to the construction of IJburg. The debate between those in favour of and those against IJburg’s development led to a referendum in 1997. When it was deemed that there was insufficient opposition, IJburg was approved for development.
Case Study 5: IJburg Amsterdam, The Netherlands

2. People and Organisations

IJburg has been a corporate undertaking delivered by the Municipality of Amsterdam. Within the Municipality, the lead department is the Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening (DRO – Department of City Planning). More specifically, delivery has been lead by Projectbureau IJburg, a task-specific team at Amsterdam DRO.

It was also delivered within the support of a national framework for urban growth. Key National bodies involved in its development were the Ministry of Urban Affairs (which designated IJburg as VINEX location and encouraged its development) and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (Ministry of VROM).

IJburg was not the child of a single person, but the result of collaboration between groups with different visions, priorities and interests. Consultations and cooperation between experts from various disciplines led to solutions and responses that were acceptable for as broad a group of the parties concerned as possible. A continued input from the public consultations shaped the outcome of the final place. There were also many meetings between a very wide range of stakeholders and the DRO.

Nonetheless, Ar Oskam (initially) and then Klaas de Boer (from 1997) were the administrative principals for IJburg on behalf of the municipality’s aldermen, and thus effectively the place promoters. Frits Palmboom produced the initial urban design in 1996 and was later joined by Dirk Sijmons, of H+N+S Landscape Architects. Tineke Van Der Pol leads of the Urban Design Team at the DRO.
Case Study 5: IJburg Amsterdam, The Netherlands

IJburg involved an integrated planning process involving a larger number of public agencies in the design and planning process. This enabled the plan to be produced by a wide range of disciplines right from the start, and reduced the risk of isolated teams working alone.

Public sector bodies involved in delivering IJburg (all of whom have staff dedicated to work on full-time on the project) include:

- Amsterdam Welfare Service (DWA)
- City Housing Department (SWD)
- Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening (DRO – Department of City Planning)
- Engineering Agency Ingenieursbureau Amsterdam (IBA) (in charge of the execution of the infrastructure work)
- Environmental Services Department; the Department for Infrastructure, Traffic and Transportation (dIVV) (the future operator of the main infrastructure and a number of bridges and locks)
- Grondbedrijf (Amsterdam City Land Development Co) which functioned as the commissioning body for the land creation part of IJburg
- Municipal Administration Department
- Omegam Research Institute (for environmental studies and soil mechanics)

- Project Management Bureau (IJburg has been project managed by ProjectManagementBureau Amsterdam – an autonomous department owned by the Municipality of Amsterdam – which also project manages other major urban projects in Amsterdam such as the Zuidas, Zuidelijke IJ-oever, and Nieuwendam-Noord. PMB has expertise in guiding complex government decision-making processes.)
- Water Management and Sewers Department (DWR)
- Zeeburg district, which has the day-to-day responsibility for managing IJburg. It also has a role in running the IJburg visitors centre and collaborating with the district’s sales office, maintaining collaboration between the public and private sectors.
3. The Overall Vision

3.1 Spatial Development Framework

“Islands make Amsterdam. Thanks to the water in and around the archipelago, IJburg has the potential to become the most interesting VINEX location in the Netherlands. But this is neither important or sufficient. It must become a fully-fledged district of Amsterdam, a regional attraction, interesting for residents, day-trippers and tourists as well as providing a good place to work. We will only know if it has succeeded 20 years from now.” (Tineke Van Der Pol, DRO, 2010)

The IJburg place vision was one of an urban area that would feel like the ‘real’ Amsterdam, yet with the benefit of easy access to water and nature. The intention was also that as well as just being part of Amsterdam, the new district should also add something to Amsterdam. The design would also have to be ecologically sensitive – a ‘guest-in-the-water’. Involving extensive earthworks on the edge of a nature reserve, the IJburg project was controversial. It proponents argued that the negative effects could be mitigated by a sympathetic approach to nature. The idea was also to have nature closely intertwined with the development; water and open space now feature prominently in IJburg.

The spatial development framework for IJburg proceeded alongside community engagement. Published in May 1996, Frits Palmboom and Jaap Van den Bout’s initial Design for IJburg was approved Amsterdam City Council in September 1996. This was laid out across a series of new islands and was based on creating a contemporary version of nineteenth and twentieth central Amsterdam, with enclosed residential rectangular housing blocks, positioned adjacent to a network of canals. The spine (armature) of the new district was a new boulevard – IJburglaan – with a new tram route running along its centre. Rather wide and perhaps too straight, the intention is that this boulevard will become a well-used public space.

The spatial development framework for three larger islands – Steigereiland, Haveneiland and Groot Rieteiland – was based on a grid of rectangular blocks, rectilinear streets, green strips, waterways, quays, squares, etc, modelled on studies of the patterns, dimensions and character of the neighbourhoods of central Amsterdam. The spine of the development was a wide central boulevard – IJburglaan – carrying the tram and designed as a multi-lane boulevard, and as a pedestrian street rather than as simply a road. The tallest elements would be on this central boulevard and would be of 8-storeys, with lower rise elements towards the edges of the islands. On Haveneiland, in particular, the streets were designed to be 30 m wide (the VINEX norm is 22 m) including generous pavements. There would be a fine grain of mixed uses, with each development block required to provide a defined mix of dwelling types, offices, local services and general amenities. Within this spatial framework, there would be four large public spaces – market place; public garden; playing field; and large city park – plus play areas, crèche, sports ground, leisure centres, place of worship, hotel, doctors, riding school, harbour, tennis courts, etc.
The spatial development framework was designed and configured to enable a rich variety of building types and styles, with the islands intentionally having different characters. Development on Haveneiland is dense, mainly flatted and has been developed through street block land parcels. Steigereiland and Rieteiland are less dense, and mainly composed of houses and delivered using plot-based platting. Zeeburgereiland (see below) has also been platted for plot-based housing developments (though development here has been stalled by the recession), while Phase II will be developed using a combination of plot-based and (smaller) block basing.

3.2 Stakeholder Engagement

Due to the size and controversial nature of the proposals, there was an extended and extensive engagement process. There was also an intense process of communication with all kinds of people and also with organisations that would provide services there.

IJburg had a potential population, but no actual population: while an area can be planned, it cannot be known in advance precisely who will live there. The DRO thus had to take the concerns of everyone into account and wanted to get a very broad view of what potential residents would want from the new dwellings and within the new neighbourhood.

With the referendum on the City’s decision to develop IJburg due in 1997, a publicity campaign started in the mid-1990s. For the city to win the referendum, it was necessary to have people saying either that they wanted to live there or, alternatively, to support its development even though they did not intend to live there. The shortage of housing in Amsterdam affected people in different ways: even if not directly affected, they would have friends or children who were unable to find a place to live: “Everyone is interested in solving the housing problem but there is always debate on how and where to solve it.” (Tineke Van Der Pol, DRO, 2010).
Interestingly, because the site was isolated, there was no NIMBY-ism. Some of the most common themes included the quality of the housing and neighbourhood (e.g. whether it would be "... somewhere where I would be interested in going to live."); whether there would be a mix of prices, housing types, and opportunities for renting/buying; and whether it add something to the city: "...would it add to the city for me if I'm not going to live there; would I have reason to go there, would I like it, would there be something for me to experience there?" The development of a new place as both a somewhere to live and somewhere to visit was seen as vital for connecting a new district with the city in the minds of the city’s residents.

Due to the location of the proposed development, there was also an environmental/ecological debate about whether development could (and should) happen somewhere else to avoid disturbing Lake IJmeer or, alternatively, whether the development and design could happen in an ecologically-sensitive manner. Accordingly much of the early engagement took place with environmental pressure groups. Bringing them on board ensured a made for a mutually satisfactory outcome, with IJburg’s design philosophy being ‘a-guest-in-the-water’ – catering for the interests of both the human and natural world. People have easy access to water and nature reserves, while the extensive soft banks and planting provide habitat for flora and fauna.

In March 1997, a referendum was held to ratify the municipality’s decision to develop IJburg. The City lost, but, given the low turnout, it was deemed that there was insufficient opposition.

4. Development Process

4.1 Land ownership and assembly

A major obstacle to IJburg was financial rather than technical. Even though the Ministry of Urban Affairs wanted IJburg to go ahead, another public agency – the National Land Holding Organisation – owned the IJmeer seabed. It was under a duty to maximise the income from the land sale and, despite the Municipality being the purchaser, held out for as high a price as possible. The price that the Municipality had to pay for the seabed came close to rendering the project unviable. A compromise was eventually reached.

4.2 Infrastructure provision

Following the successful test island, construction of the other islands started in January 1999 and was largely complete by the end of that year. Infrastructure and services were delivered as part of innovative ‘red carpet’ programme in 2001. In 2001, the first building was completed on Haveneiland West and in 2005, the IJ Tram came into service and in October of that year, when work also started on the construction of the first dwellings on Haveneiland Oost, marking the final part of IJburg’s first phase. In the summer of 2006 the iconic bridge Nesciobrug, the new cycle and pedestrian bridge connecting IJburg with Oost-Watergraafsmeer, was opened.
As a series of new islands, for IJburg to be developed a significant amount of advance off-site infrastructure was required, especially transport connections, due to the need to overcome its actual and perceptual isolation. Until Amsterdam’s ring road motorway was completed during the 1990s, IJburg had been very isolated. But to make the new island habitable and attractive to potential residents, further new road connections and bridges had to be built. What was especially important was the express tram. Amsterdam already had a tram system so connecting IJburg to it was a matter of building and integrating an extension rather than creating a new network. The development of the tram would also demonstrate how close to central Amsterdam IJburg was. The IJ Tram was opened in 2005 – four years after the first development at IJburg, when development of Steigereiland and Havenel island was well underway.

The principal access to the west of the development is provided by a new bridge carrying road, cycle, foot and express tram ways and linking to the Pietheintunnel. The striking ‘Nescio’ bridge, soaring over the Amsterdam Rijkanal and designed by Nicholas Grimshaw, links IJburg to Amsterdam’s eastern suburbs. A new road bridge leads from the east of Havenel island. This links in with the existing local road network and will in time be directly connected to the A1/A9 interchange.

Development also entailed the complete relocation of the sewage works on Zeeburgereiland. Built in the early 1980s, it handled waste water from almost all of Amsterdam. At considerable expense, it was replaced by a new sewage plant located elsewhere, ensuring both that IJburg would not be directly downwind of a major sewage plant and freeing Zeeburgereiland for development. In early 2004, it was formally included in IJburg’s planning area.

Land development and building/parcel development were carried out separately, but co-ordinated throughout by the DRO. DRO was the land developer, overseeing and forward funding the infrastructure provision. Utilities were installed alongside the other physical infrastructure by the normal providers, with installation co-ordinated through what is known as the ‘Red Carpet’ system – the name given by the IJburg projectbureau to the project co-ordinating the construction of bridges, cables and pipes. The essential idea was to ensure a continuing dialogue between the projectbureau and the multitude of utilities companies to ensure the installation of services infrastructure would be smooth and straightforward.
4.3 Land release and development procurement

Building the artificial islands was a significant development risk, the municipality having to commit expenditure of approximately 300 million Guilders in the late 1990s to creating the islands, but, without really knowing how attractive the resulting land would be to private developers. What was also significant was that it was not feasible to build the islands incrementally:

“... you can’t just make some land, build a bit, see what happens see if people like it and then stop if they don’t. It is a real All-Or-Nothing situation. You make a decision and take a lot of risk. Would the costs be in line with estimates? Would the project be on time?” (Tineke Van Der Pol, DRO, 2010).

To reduce its exposure and to tie in future developers, the municipality decided to form a public-private partnership with the public sector pledging to create the land and to provide key infrastructure. The private partners guaranteed to buy the land at a price agreed in advance and also to provide some infrastructure. In other words, it was a pre-sale of the land. The contract was made with three development consortia (who, in turn, comprised 20 different development firms) and was for 6,000 dwellings on Steigerland, Havenreiland and Groot Rieteiland.

A public-private partnership of this nature was an experiment. But, by signing the contract, the developers committed to the development. The commitment signal was very important; it showed the private sector’s confidence that this would be an area where people would want to live.

Complications arising from the public-private partnership led to a difficult relationship between the development consortia and the DRO. In retrospect, the arrangement was unsatisfactory in three key respects.

* Scale: 6,000 units and 20 parties meant each developer had relatively few units (an average 300 dwellings), and yet still had to commit to participating in a lengthy development process. A solution here might have been to have fewer developers with each of having more units, though this would conflict with desires to have a fine urban grain and a diversity of developers.
* Land price: the contract specified land prices, but, when the market later boomed, this was deemed to have been far too low as the Muncipality could have financed a greater proportion of IJburg’s costs from land sales. This had not been apparent to the Muncipality when the contract was signed. The Muncipality was cautious and wanted sufficient security – the price of that security was a lower land price. The developers might have appreciated that the land price was low at the time, but ultimately they were rewarded for the risk they took.
* Timescale: IJburg was a long term commitment for the Muncipality, but the private partners were reluctant to make commitments to buy land too far in advance: more than 5 years, and even 3-4 years, was too far into the future. The experience of the public-private partnerships was such that the private partners were reluctant to do it again, while the public partners recognised that partnerships with the private sector should be on a smaller scale and for shorter periods of time.
The developers gained from being able to obtain relatively cheap land that was ready for development. Conversely, they were committed to being involved with the design stage for extended periods in advance, which tied up energy and resources that had an opportunity cost with respect to other potential projects.

It was originally intended that the public sector would provide curb-to-curb infrastructure and to require private developers to provide public realm as and when they built out their land parcels. But this proved difficult to work, and public realm is now installed by the DRO before private development takes place, allowing quality standards to be better controlled. Schools and other social infrastructure were financed by developers as part of their contractual obligations.

IJburg had a meticulously planned phasing, with a rolling programme of infrastructure provision and land release, and development taking place on an island-by-island basis. Steigereliland and the western end of Haveneliland were the first real phase of IJburg to be developed and served as a testing ground. Building development and design was controlled by a masterplan and through a design code, and also through phasing and parcelisation, with developers purchasing serviced plots. There were many building developers; Haveneliland and Steigereliland were delivered by the three development consortia comprising more than 20 development companies.

Steigereliland
Bisected by IJburglaan, Steigereliland is a roundish island, and incorporates many different types of accommodation, including some space reserved for floating dwellings. It is entirely low and medium rise, rarely rising more than five storeys. The spatial development framework here was based on a so-called ‘collage city’ concept, with eight character areas. Much of it consists of individually-procured street houses. To further stimulate a rich variety of architecture, design regulations were limited.
Case Study 5: IJburg Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Haveneiland and Rieteilanden
Haveneiland and Rieteilanden were largely developed in parallel, working progressively towards the south east. The larger Haveneiland had more rules governing massing, materials, etc. Groot Rieteiland is similar to Haveneiland but with narrower streets and smaller street blocks. On Kleine Rieteiland, it is different again because individual land plots are being developed by private individuals working with an architect of their choice, without a co-ordinating architect and without any design control by the municipal inspectorate.

Phase II
In 2004 a spatial development framework was produced for the four islands – Centrumeiland, Middemeiland, Strandeiland and Buiteneiland – comprising Phase II. Phase II has since been delayed because the spatial development framework plan was thrown out in 2007 when the Council of State judge ruled that the flexibility of the plan was such that it allowed for the possibility of environmental damage. The new zoning plan is to be submitted in the summer of 2010, after which work can start on the final four islands. In the meantime, however, the financial crisis has contracted the world’s supply of development capital. Land creation and infrastructure provision will not happen until the City is sufficiently confident that the land creation will be profitable.

4.4 Design control
To ensure design quality and integration, the city council appointed a ‘quality team’. Each architect/designer working on a housing block/parcel was placed under the supervision of a block principal, called a ‘coach’, who acted as a coordinating architect ensuring that the building and block designs of individual designers combined coherently, and that potential conflicts between different uses were also considered. The work of the architects and block principals was overseen by a team lead by Kees Rijnboutt (a former government architect), and consisting of Frits Palmboom as masterplanner, two architects, an urban planner, landscape architect and the chair of aesthetic control commission. Developers soon learnt that the best way of getting through this process was to employ a good architect: “Nobody can simply choose the path of least resistance and trot out a design on autopilot.” (Claus 2001: 72)

The detail of the design control regime varies from island to island, with each island intended to have a different character, and different building types, ranging from large 8-storey apartment blocks along IJburglaan to individual detached houses on the edge of the development.
5. Quality Appraisal

IJburg is a splendid example of the creation of a ‘good ordinary’ neighbourhood – something much more difficult than the term suggests. IJburg is still less than 10 years old, yet already seems well-established. This fast build-out has also helped to reduce interest payments on the funding of the advance infrastructure provision. It shows how a successful urban extension becomes a functioning part of the city. IJburg has functionality as both a place to live and a place to go to. It is a rounded neighbourhood, which feels and functions like a pre-existing part of the city, yet even the earliest bits are little more than five years old. It has a distinctly urban character, with a mix of functions – even the diminutive Steigereiland has little bars and a school, while Haveneiland has pretty much everything.

Twice the density of the average VINEX development, it provides a diverse and varied urban landscape, with a range of different housing types. It also demonstrates how careful planning and a robust delivery mechanism can allow the build-out of an area with many different designers and development models, producing a rich variety of built environment than is normally expected in a newly-created neighbourhood. It avoids the temptation to be outlandish in layouts or design of the place. The street layouts are conventional and within this framework there is space for some quite extraordinary architecture, but it is contained within a framework of well defined streets and blocks that allows architectural variety without distracting from the place. There has also been a significant provision of public infrastructure (especially transport), minimising any feelings of being ‘on the periphery’ – though it is still seen as such by people who live elsewhere in Amsterdam.

IJburg also has high levels of interaction with surrounding water and nature: “Water is still the boss. IJburg is a guest in the IJmeer”. There are lots of jetties and boats, and the integration with the natural features of banks, lakes, canals and the reserve has been skilfully executed to ensure a good relationship between city and water and to minimise the environmental impact of development. It provides the best features of living in urban Amsterdam, but on the edge of the city: people feel like they have a lot of room, they are close to nature and yet that they also live in Amsterdam.
On the negative side, there is some criticism that IJburg has been over-planned and that this is at odds with the way that people collectively define the use and identity of their neighbourhood, and form communities. In Haveneiland, for example, a cobalt blue townhouse – known as ‘The Blue House’ – in the middle of the ‘Castellum’ (‘Block 35’), served from 2005 to 2009 as a centre for artistic and cultural production and research into community development on IJburg, particularly the tension between spontaneous, ‘organic communities’ and planned, ‘socially engineered’ communities. The Blue House influenced the municipality’s approach to IJburg Phase II, proposing such ideas as reserving ‘grey’ spaces for temporary uses and allowing time to explore options before deciding how best to develop them in response to the needs of the new community.

Planners also necessarily made assumptions about the number of people living there and what facilities were needed when, about how many elderly people and young families there would be and how these groups would interact. But the planners’ assumptions were only assumptions and reality might prove different: a social centre for young people was planned to open in 2014, for example, there were soon far more 12-18 year olds than had been anticipated.

To summarise, key delivery lessons include having a dedicated delivery body and project team assigned to the project; getting all public partners on board at the start of the process; and having a robust vision and framework for the site, coupled with the resources to deliver it. For Scotland, it offers an excellent example of a planned urban extension.
### Case Study 5: IJburg Amsterdam, The Netherlands

#### Assessment of IJburg according to Scottish Government’s ‘Designing Places’ criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the place have a distinct identity?</td>
<td>Its identity is recognisably Amsterdam, with its high density and proximity to water. At the same time it is very much Uburb and could not be mistaken for any other VINEX location nor for anywhere else in Amsterdam or the Netherlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place have spaces that are safe and pleasant?</td>
<td>Very many. The streets themselves are pleasant, attractive and free in most places from too much traffic. There are also small and large parks, a beach (in summer), a popular marina, the adjacent Diemerpark nature reserve and the water itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the place easy to move around (especially on foot) (‘permeable’)?</td>
<td>Yes. It is built to a grid that has similar dimensions to the traditional neighbourhoods of Amsterdam. It is also easy to move from IJburg to the surrounding mainland and to Amsterdam; IJburg is very well connected, with many bridges, especially for pedestrians/cyclists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place make visitors feel sense-of-welcome?</td>
<td>Yes. It is easy to get to and find your way around IJburg, due to its coherent layout and dedicated tram line. The (sole) Band B is built in a shape reminiscent of an upturned boat and is very welcoming to visitors indeed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will the place adapt easily to changing circumstances (‘robust’)?</td>
<td>IJburg’s rich variety is a strength. Fine urban grain and use of small plots allows for incremental development and renewal of buildings. Many land uses and good connections ensure that the place will always have a number of functions and purposes. The main risk for IJburg is that of rising sea levels. This is partly mitigated by the development of floating houses on Steigerreiland and provision of spaces for houseboats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place make good use of scarce resources (‘sustainable’)?</td>
<td>It certainly makes good use of a very scarce resource in Holland (land) by simply creating more and building to a high density. It is quite possible to live in IJburg without a car, or at least only need to use one occasionally. Most journeys can be made by tram or bike; both are probably quicker than driving in Amsterdam. IJburg, while very good, does not however have the same overarching commitment to environmental sustainability that characterises Hammarby Sjöstad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further Information

Further information about IJburg can be obtained from:

Claus, F; van Dongen, F; and Schaap, T (2001), IJburg, Haveneiland and Rieteilanden, 010 Publishers, Rotterdam

http://www.IJburg.nl


http://www.publicartonline.org.uk/casestudies/regeneration/bluehouse/description.php
Case Study 6: Newhall, Harlow, England

1. Development Opportunity

Newhall is a planned extension on greenfield, formerly agricultural land east of the former new town of Harlow, in Essex. With a present population of 78,000, Harlow is a popular commuter town for people working in London. Masterplanned in 1947 by Sir Frederick Gibberd, it was designed as a series of neighbourhoods of 6-10,000 people, with amenities at the centre, in contrast to Clarence Perry’s original neighbourhood unit, where the shops were placed on the edge of the neighbourhood. At Harlow, the neighbourhoods are somewhat isolated because of this and further separated by ‘green wedges’. Newhall is the latest ‘cell’ of development within this structure and was allocated for residential use in the Harlow Local Plan of the early 1990s.

2. People and Organisations

The Moen family owned land holdings around Harlow that were becoming ripe for development in the early 1990s. The development site was an already consolidated land holding, in the ownership of a legally-defined trust controlled by Newhall Projects, in effect brothers Jon and William Moen, who are the place promoters. Other family members, and others, have stakes in the trust, so the Moen brothers have had to show that a design-led development achieves at least similar value as more conventional development.

The Moen brothers engaged a consultant to create a masterplan and design codes for the site, who would prove to be of central importance to the project: Roger Evans of Roger Evans Associates (REA – now Studio|REAL).

3. The Overall Vision

3.1 Spatial Development Framework

The place vision sought to respond to the opportunity for growth; the desire to achieve a much higher quality of place than prevailing developments; and for a much higher standard of built environment than the prevailing standard. The means to achieve these was to commission a comprehensive and detailed masterplan, and to build it out using small land parcels designed by different designers and developed by different developers. The masterplan’s design principles were translated to land parcel briefs through design codes.
The Moens knew precisely what they did not want: another Church Langley: the development to the immediate south. Church Langley is a typical 1980s housing development, with standard house types, built around cul-de-sacs, and now adjacent to a large supermarket. The overall impression is one of placelessness; the development is highly generic and could be found almost anywhere within the UK.

Part of Church Langley had, however, been built on land previously owned by the Moen family. The Moens were deeply disappointed by the outcome, feeling that the housebuilders had focused on speed and profit, at the expense of quality, and so was galvanised into seeking to ensure any future development on their land would be of much higher quality. The rationale for Newhall was thus the landowner’s determination to do ‘something better’: to deliver development incorporating high quality contemporary architecture and attractive streets, with a distinctive sense-of-place.

The Moens also knew the type of place that they did want: a ‘real’ neighbourhood, possessing the spatial qualities of historic cities but expressed in contemporary ways and with contemporary architecture. From the start of the project the Moens realised that a masterplan would be essential. Commissioning a masterplan was an important means of taking the initiative and in determining how the land would be developed. Having selected Roger Evans as the masterplanner, a first step was to superimpose the figure-ground plans of Bath, Oxford, Florence and Venice on the Newhall site and to determine the possible densities. Evans was also a believer in the instrumental value of the masterplan in creating confidence and certainty, not just with the local authority but also with the different developers developing adjacent land parcels within a single plan.
Surrounding development was typically at 30-35 dwellings per hectare (dph). To give variety, it was proposed to build character areas at Newhall with different densities, with greater densities (and heights) along the main streets and in the centre, and lower elsewhere. Higher density would mean smaller gardens than neighbouring developments, but also more units per hectare and also a smaller unit land cost for developers. The spend more unit on public realm would also be more concentrated. The quality of the public realm was important as a factor in sales, since people paying a premium for large houses on smaller plots would expect a high quality public realm outside their front door.

The Moen’s intention was to create a ‘real’ neighbourhood, rather than simply another estate. At this early stage, various other design principles were established. There included no cul-de-sacs (very much in contrast to Harlow, which is almost entirely composed of residential cul-de-sacs). Two of Harlow’s characteristic features were also adopted - ‘green wedges’ between neighbourhoods and neighbourhood centres within 5 minutes walk.

The design of the masterplan was informed by the following place values:

- Conserving natural assets.
- Creating a legible street structure.
- Providing focal points within the plan.
- Defining streetscapes and character areas.
- Developing different housing typologies for different locations (i.e. creating character areas and achieving local distinctiveness).
- Ensuring a mix of housing types.

The use of masterplans and design codes entailed protracted negotiation with the public authorities on many matters of planning development (Harlow Borough Council), particularly on highways matters (Essex County Council). The masterplan was, however, a means of proactively opening up discussions and negotiations with the planners and highways engineers, particularly the possibility of using innovative road designs and street patterns. While generally supportive of Newhall, it took time for the planning authorities to develop confidence in the Moens and in Roger Evans Associates, and to cultivate the project from a distance.
3.2 Stakeholder engagement

Consultation began with the first planning application for Newhall Phase I (440 dwellings) submitted in 1994. A revised version submitted in 1996 resulted in further consultation. Some NIMBY-ism did occur but was less vocal than it might have been. The lack of opposition was attributed to three main factors: first, it was accepted that development was inevitable; second, Newhall is on a self-contained site and does not overlook anyone; it has no immediate neighbours to lodge objections; and third, it was considered that, as a New Town, people in Harlow were accustomed to development taking place. Interestingly, those objections that did occur tended to be from people who were opposed to the contemporary design of the proposed houses.

Rather than through community engagement, Newhall’s design was based on precedent and iterative design processes. Based on the landowners’ and the designers’ experience and expertise, and ultimately it would be tested in the market place. The development had to cater for the tastes of the market and house styles, sizes and prices had to reflect what the market would support.

4. Development Process

4.1 Land ownership and assembly

The land at Newhall Farm has been in Moen family ownership since 1927.

4.2 Infrastructure provision

Newhall Projects Ltd acted as land developer. Using, somewhat ironically, funds obtained from the proceeds of the Church Langley development, it forward funded Roger Evans Associates’ masterplanning work throughout the 1990s. These costs and some infrastructure and marketing costs were recovered from land sales to developers (sold at fixed prices) – though, as discussed below, Newhall Projects were as interested in design criteria as financial criteria in the land sale competition. Land prices have increased with later sub-phases selling for higher prices than earlier sub-phase parcels.

The land parcels were carefully configured and phased so that successive parcel developers built the primary infrastructure that connects up the development parcels. The main road through the development (The Chase), for example, was built along with the first phase by Barratt. The costs of creating public realm, and was built by parcel developers in accordance with specifications in the masterplan and design codes.

There is no public transport yet, and the development is almost entirely car-dependent but a bus link to the station (every 15 minutes) is forthcoming. Harlow does not have a light rail or tram network, so an extension to it is not a realistic proposition.
The project does not, as yet, have much social infrastructure – this awaits sufficient demand and population to warrant its provision. Phase II, comprising a further 2,000 homes, will however, contain the neighbourhood centre, a primary school and commercial space. Subject to market conditions and Section 106 agreements, construction on Phase II will commence in 2010.

The Moens bore project risk. Although the Moens has some resources, including later land parcels (and thus might be considered to have ‘deep pockets’), the project had to be a commercial proposition. In terms of generating large capital receipts early in the project, it is acknowledged that Newhall is “... not the best business plan ...” and that more money could be made sooner, but it is likely that the overall receipts will be greater. The business plan is, in effect, based on the quality and success of Phase I increasing the value of Phase II land parcels. It is therefore a patient capital approach.

Development risk was also borne by the housebuilders and, in turn, their financial backers: as noted below, the project was perceived as high-risk by investors. However, prices (in £/m²) achieved at Newhall are higher than those for neighbouring schemes – though construction costs are also higher. In 2004, for example, build costs at Newhall were about 10-15% more than a conventional property in Church Langley, but the selling price was also 10-15% higher so that the developers’ margins were retained. Since then the Newhall properties have earned a higher premium, with land prices not suffering due to the intensity of the design procurement approach employed.

Covering 101 Ha, Phase I incorporates 550 homes (430 are completed to date) and was released through a series of six sub-phase parcels, each of approximately 70-100 units – a size considered to provide a good balance between the developer’s need to cover fixed costs and the landowner’s aim of ensuring a diverse grain of development.

The land parcels were configured to ensure the ‘seams’ joining parcels ran along rear boundaries, except for the most important public spaces where the joins were in the middle of the public realm, enabling greater architectural diversity around public spaces, but increased the coordination cost and the need for dialogue between architects. The parcels have also been released starting in the core and working outwards in order to minimise construction disturbance from subsequent developments.
Case Study 6: Newhall, Harlow, England

Figure CS.4: Land Parcels for Newhall Phase 1
Case Study 6: Newhall, Harlow, England

Table CS.3: Parcel developers and designers for Newhall Phase 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parcel</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Developer</th>
<th>Architects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Maypole Green</td>
<td>Barratt</td>
<td>Roger Hutson, with input from Roger Evans Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Abode</td>
<td>Countryside Properties</td>
<td>Proctor &amp; Matthews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1C</td>
<td>Cala Domus</td>
<td>Cala Homes and Newhall Projects</td>
<td>PCKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1D</td>
<td>North Chase</td>
<td>Newhall Projects</td>
<td>Richard Murphy, ECD Architects, ORMS, Roger Evans Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1E</td>
<td>Slo</td>
<td>Renascent Developments</td>
<td>Proctor &amp; Matthews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1F</td>
<td>Be</td>
<td>Linden Homes</td>
<td>Alison Brooks Architects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 Design control

The project explored and tested several methods of procuring development through a series of iterations and a learning process, involving, in practice, greater control by the landowner over the commissioning of the designer and the design. The learning process is viewed positively: Roger Evans, for example, accepts the inevitability of mistakes and compromises alongside the showpieces: "... it's not a stage set built with a historical pattern book."

Simplifying for clarity, the four iterations were as follows:

- **Developer selects architect** – This approach was tried for the first land parcel (Maypole Green; 100 dwellings) and involved the land being offered through a traditional design/tender competition. From among the 40 expressions of interest, six developers were selected and invited to tender, with the choice of architect left to the developer. Before tenders were opened, bids were rated according to sample designs submitted. The general level of design submission was disappointing, with most developers intending simply to recycle standard designs and producing designs that were "more vernacular" that the Moens had hoped for.
Case Study 6: Newhall, Harlow, England

It was also apparent that the industry perceived the project as more risky than a site with fewer constraints; some major housebuilders withdrew from the process, while, to reduce its risk and exposure, the selected developer, Barratt, felt compelled – and was reluctantly permitted – to use a more standard product on half its parcel.

* Landowner approves architect – For the second land parcel (Adobe; 80 dwellings) a design/tender competition was again held but this time using pre-approved architects. The winning entry – from Copthorn with Proctor & Matthews architects – proposed a mixed-use scheme including apartments, town houses, detached houses and live-work units at a density of 45 dwellings per hectare. Copthorn also indicated that city investors were reluctant to back a more innovative scheme when they could invest in “standard” schemes.

* Landowner commissions concept design scheme prior to developer selection – For the third land parcel (Cala Domus; 80 dwellings), a concept design scheme was commissioned and approved by Newhall Projects prior to developers being invited to tender. The concept design scheme was procured via an invited architectural competition, with three practices, Jestico + Whiles, Allford Hall Monaghan Morris and PCKO – the ultimate winners. The developer selected was CALA Homes in a joint venture with Newhall Projects Ltd – the Moen brothers’ first foray into direct development.

* Landowner further subdivides land parcel and commissions conceptual design schemes prior to developer selection – A fourth iteration involved achieving a finer grain development by reducing the size of the architect’s parcels, with the masterplan and design codes to ensure overall coherence. The design parcels were therefore smaller than the developer’s land parcels with the necessity that a developer take on the development of a single land parcel comprising designs by different architects (though this sub-phase was undertaken by Newhall Projects).

These approaches took time, while transaction costs were much greater than for other forms of procurement. It requires close working with the planning and engineering officers and a very large number of site meetings with the developer’s team and subcontractors. Conversely, it is also suggested that design codes can expedite consents – the codes are agreed with the local authority so that individual detailed planning applications that are compliant can be quickly processed: a theory that is not always borne out in practice. Increased transaction costs for the developer, however, must be regarded as the “entry cost” to develop at a highly desirable location. The landowner’s challenge, however, is to maintain the quality and value, and thus desirability, of the location.
Case Study 6: Newhall, Harlow, England

The use of masterplan and design code enforced through land transfers increased the opportunity space for architects compared to ‘regular’ development. It was impossible for developers to use their existing ‘standard’ designs and required a change of developer mindset with regard to design: no longer simply follow a path-of-least-resistance with regard to design, they must instead either develop elsewhere or employ good designers who can design a way through the enhanced regulation. It is also notable that the developers active at Newhall are smaller, more bespoke and innovative housebuilders rather than large, volume developers.

Responsibility for ultimate place-quality (including physical and architectural design quality) and for ensuring compliance with design briefs/design codes rests with Newhall Projects and REA. The design codes are enforceable through the legal agreement attached to the land sale.

Once concept designs have been agreed, the landowner requires drawings to be approved by REA prior to planning and building regulation applications. This is to ensure developers do not depart from, or dilute, the agreed design between concept and construction. But, in practice, housebuilders do seek to change the designs and REA is faced with enforcing the legal agreement, causing disruption to purchasers and occupiers, or letting some ‘mistakes’ stand.

4.5 Long-term management arrangements

Some areas adopted by Harlow Borough Council. Residents’ Association maintains the green spaces and street trees that the local authority does not adopt; fees are about £200 per year for all tenures, which includes broadband and cable TV.

5. Quality Appraisal

Newhall is attractive, distinctive, and well designed. It is uplifting being there, though it lacks social infrastructure and is car-dependent. Its delivery is interesting for several reasons: representing a successful reaction against prevailing trends in housebuilding and design; for the concerted and long-term dedication of landowners and masterplanner; and for the intensity of the landowners’ approach to design procurement.

What makes Newhall particularly different and distinctive are the innovative processes set up between landowner, architects, and developers, with designers and developers operating on the place promoter’s terms to ensure the most suitable designs are commissioned: this is legitimised by the place promoter’s focus on long term place quality.
The Phase I masterplan has now been substantially built-out by a large number of architects and developers bringing Phase I to near-completion. Provided that there is a masterplan, as well as sufficient control over, and coordination of, design to ensure the individual elements synergise, multiple developers and architects can create a rich and diverse place. Newhall has won numerous awards, both for overall place quality and for the design of individual housing schemes. These almost always feature adventurous architecture.

Newhall has prevailed against a conservative house building industry and planners, and is an inspiration for future developments using a similar approach (not least Newhall Phase II), but Newhall Phase I has been nearly 20 years in the making and its many unconventional (for the UK at least) characteristics have required extensive and patient negotiation with many public bodies and with developers. A ‘one-stop-shop’ delivery arrangement for the public sector departments (as used at Adamstown) could help here, but it is somewhat ironic that endeavouring to do ‘something better’ than default urbanism imposes significant time and transaction costs, which is likely to deter other, less patient developers from pursuing schemes like this. The rate of build-out has been slow (equivalent to about 40-45 units per year, despite six developers operating). The temptation – which has been resisted – has been to speed up the process by reducing the focus on quality. Instead the emphasis was on streamlining the systems, and taking time to get everyone on board. Therefore, one lesson is that better design and pushing unconventional things through the system takes time. The Newhall landowner persevered here but many housebuilders would take the simplest route to approval by following set standards.

Of the factors instrumental in the delivery of Newhall is the use of a masterplan to create a strong sense-of-place’, creating desirability and value. A strong sense-of-place increases distinctiveness, but this also requires that the place be worth living in. The second main ingredient is for landowners who genuinely care about long-term place quality: the best people to develop places are those that really care about them and have the willingness and wherewithal to carry this through. Use of many small, phased parcels allowed learning and for the development/delivery model to be refined through a process of considered experimentation and reflection.
Case Study 6: Newhall, Harlow, England

Assessment of Newhall according to Scottish Government’s ‘Designing Places’ criteria

**Does the place have a distinct identity?**
Yes – it’s certainly not an estate, nor is it generic suburbia. It looks and feels like a neighbourhood that has developed over time. In addition, the three-storey housing, townhouses, relatively small plots, terraced housing, cars parked within street blocks, give it a more urban character, which contrasts potently with Harlow’s predominant standard suburban development.

**Does the place have spaces that are safe and pleasant?**
Yes – consistent use of street blocks with public fronts and private blocks means streets are overlooked and surveyed. The neighbourhood is also quite compact.

**Is the place easy to move around (especially on foot) (‘permeable’)?**
Yes – consistent use of block structure makes the street pattern very legible; away from the main routes through the development, all streets are shared spaces.

**Does the place make visitors feel sense-of-welcome?**
Yes – though quiet during the day, apart from opening and closing times of the school. Neighbourhood presently lacks amenities.

**Will the place adapt easily to changing circumstances (‘robust’)?**
Houses are relatively low-rise and could be converted to other uses. Those along North Chase have higher ground floors to allow for later conversion to business premises. Houses have small gardens, and thus opportunities for extensions are limited.

**Does the place make good use of scarce resources (‘sustainable’)?**
At present, the development is car dependent; Harlow is itself car dependent. Elements of mixed use development are in the pipeline.

Further Information about Newhall can be obtained from:

http://www.rudi.net/books/10051
http://www.cabe.org.uk/case-studies/newhall-phase-one
1. Development Opportunity

While the 1940s and 1950s English New Towns programme had proposed smaller new towns in a ring within commuting distance of London, the 1960s New Town programme proposed larger settlements, located beyond the normal commuting range primarily in an arc north-west of London. While Milton Keynes was designated as a complete new town, New Town Development Corporations were established to promote the substantial expansion of Peterborough and Northampton.

With Northampton identified for major expansion to almost double its size to 230,000 by 1981, the Northampton New Town Development Corporation was set up in 1968 and soon acquired undeveloped land to the south-west towards the M1, including land at Upton. Growth was slower than planned and, following the Development Corporation’s winding up in 1985, the still undeveloped land was transferred to the Commission for New Towns – a body established in 1961 to take over the land assets of all New Town Development Corporations, when they were wound up.

By the late 1990s, a number of factors bolstered Upton’s credentials as a site for a demonstration project:

+ It was becoming ripe for development and was in public ownership.
+ Northampton had been identified as an area capable of accommodating household growth, with the East Midlands Spatial Strategy identifying it as the major population and employment centre in the south of the region.

The Government’s Sustainable Communities Plan, published in February 2003, subsequently identified it as a key focus in the Milton Keynes and South Midlands Growth Area. The West Northamptonshire (Urban) Development Corporation was established in 2006 to oversee part of this growth area.

Northampton Borough Council had been criticised for the quality of development in its area. Much of the surrounding area had been developed as highly profitable but car dependent, conventional suburban development.

Severe flooding of the site in Easter 1998 had raised the profile of environmental design issues.
After 1997, concurrent with the election of New Labour Government, a number of concerns were articulated and promoted through professional and political interests about the design quality of standard speculative housing development; and growing political and regulatory interests in environmental sustainability.

At this time, the ideas of the recently-formed (1993) US-based Congress for the New Urbanism were also becoming topical, particularly community engagement through intensive charrettes and design codes as place delivery mechanisms. The Prince’s Foundation for the Built Environment was (and is) seen as having expertise in these areas. The Foundation had been set up by HRH Prince Charles with the aim of “… improving the quality of people’s lives by teaching and practising timeless and ecological ways of planning, designing and building.” (see www.princes-foundation.org).

One of its main aims was to develop a number of exemplar projects. The Duchy of Cornwall’s development at Poundbury Farm, Dorchester, the first phase of which was being developed during the second half of the 1990s was its first and best known exemplar.

One practical consequence of this coming together of factors was a perceived need for demonstration projects. Initiatives such as the Millennium Communities programme was launched in 1997, as were proposals for two English Partnerships sponsored Enquiry-by-Design/charette exercises. These large-scale workshops involved stakeholders, communities and professionals in the planning and design of an area during intensive sessions typically lasting a week or ten days.

Upton’s genesis lies in it being selected (along with Basildon) as the focus for one of these pilot Enquiry-by-Designs.

Upton has since become the first phase of a larger greenfield sustainable urban extension known as the south-west expansion of Northampton, which, once completed, will comprise approximately 5,000 dwellings. The Upton site itself is bounded by the Weedon Road (A45) to the north, the Upton Way to the east, the River Nene and a country park to the south and the Upton Park expansion area to the west. Covering approximately 44 hectares, when complete it will comprise approximately 1,350 homes, together with a range of other uses, including a primary school, community facilities and commercial and retail uses. Two further phases are planned to the west – Upton Lodge (approximately 2,500 units) north of Weedon Road; and Upton Park (approximately 1,100 units) south of Weedon Road. Masterplanning and approvals work is presently proceeding on these locations.
2. People and Organisations

Upton’s place promoter was English Partnerships, which took over the responsibilities and assets of the Commission for New Towns. English Partnerships later became part of the Homes and Communities Agency, which was formed in December 2008 and which took over its functions and assets along with those of the Housing Corporation.

Key individuals within English Partnerships at Upton were Peter Springett, Silvia Short, and Trevor Beattie, who were instrumental in the decision to do something different and in winning political battles and persuading others to ensure that it happened. English Partnerships was also responsive to politicians and the growing political and policy interest in design and place-making. Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott personified the New Labour Government’s efforts in this area. Among other actions, he had criticised housing developers for providing ‘anywhere and nowhere’ developments and had made a well-publicised visit to the pioneering New Urbanist project at Seaside, Florida.

Another key influence at Upton was The Prince’s Foundation for the Built Environment. Influenced by New Urbanism, The Foundation had a longstanding interest and commitment to similar design and development principles. Keen to spread its influence and message, it had also gained influence within English Partnerships. Following its establishment in 1993, English Partnerships had been developing a design agenda – an approach that distinguished it from its predecessor organisations such as English Estates and the Commission for New Towns which had been focused on achieving land and property development rather than place-making per se. Lessons from Poundbury were thus morphed into Upton.

In partnership with The Prince’s Foundation and Northampton Borough Council, English Partnerships appointed a consultant team led by EDAW (now AECOM) in 1999 to run the second Enquiry-by-Design. Upton also involved redeploying key members of the consultant team from Poundbury. Of particular significance was Alan Baxter Associates – the consultant highway engineers largely responsible for Poundbury’s innovative streets. At Upton, Alan Baxter Associates worked with EDAW to challenge rather than simply acquiesce with conventional highways standards and standard road forms, and to develop more innovative street types, including the use of home zones.
3. The Overall Vision

3.1 Spatial Development Framework

The Commission for New Towns had previously been granted outline planning consent for the South-West expansion site. The consent was for what was later described as a conventional ‘by-the-rules’ scheme determined by local authority amenity standards and highway standards, based on cul-de-sac road layouts joined by local distributor roads with roundabout access onto the major peripheral roads. Limited by highways considerations, the planning consent for the Upton site was for 1080 units, a primary school and a local centre comprised of retailing, a medical centre, nursery and other community buildings – all concentrated in the scheme’s centre.

Primarily concerned with ease of development process rather than quality of product, the ‘by-the-rules’ scheme was a standard development rather than a place-making plan. The scheme anticipated further conventional suburban development rather than aspiring to ‘something better’.

Enquiry by Design

The shift towards ‘something better’ occurred between 1997 and 1999, and came through Upton and the South-West expansion of Northampton being the focus of the pilot Enquiry by Design in July 1999 and a second one held in December 2001. The Enquiry-by-Design workshops were formative and catalytic, establishing a consensus and partnership approach among all key parties at an early stage, saving time downstream.

Led by Chip Kaufman and Wendy Morris of the Australia-based Ecologically Sustainable Design, the first Enquiry-by-Design in July 1999 looked at the whole of Northampton south-west expansion. Challenging the thinking behind the ‘by-the-rules’ scheme, it offered a different design vision, planting the seed that would be developed in more detail at the second Enquiry-by-Design in December 2001. The workshop allowed participants to articulate what they did not want and what they actually wanted. A series of key issues and preferences emerged from the first event:

- A preference for a neighbourhood rather than an ‘insular’ estate.
- A preference for locating the commercial element on the edge of the new neighbourhood rather than at its centre – enabling it to link better with adjoining neighbourhoods (as indeed Clarence Perry had proposed in his Neighbourhood Unit concept). Located on the Weedon Road, the commercial units would also gain from passing trade and would thus be more viable, while cars would not need to rat run through the development to access the commercial units. The shops would still be within 8-10 minutes of all parts of Upton. The school would remain in the centre of the development, allowing synergy with a central public space (Upton Square) where parents could wait for their children.
- A preference for street-oriented rather than road-based housing, and a preference for traditional ‘streets’ fronted by house fronts, doors and windows rather than ‘estate’ roads fronted by garden fencing.
Recognition of the benefits of higher density development. The Enquiry-by-Design workshop proposed a scheme for 46,000 units compared with the ‘by-the-rules’ proposals for 37,000 units. This increase was achieved by providing less but better integrated and higher quality public open space, and by raising development densities by a third. Higher density, more urban development would also reduce the need for further developments/extensions into the countryside – growth that would be controversial and would be strongly opposed. It would also be more compact and thus more walkable; and would make local facilities and amenities, and a rapid transit line serving the south-western district more viable.

Preferences for the sustainable urban drainage scheme (SUDS) to be a green space network, rather than merely a piped system: if densities were to increase, more green open spaces would make it feel more open.

**Design code**

With both central government and English Partnerships pushing for its use at Upton, the vehicle to deliver the place vision was a design code. A design code is a set of specific rules or requirements to guide the physical development of a site or place and, in effect, constitutes the place promoter’s rules for development. It is ‘form-based’ because it focuses on physical form and the public realm rather than on land use, and guides the place’s overall spatial character while allowing flexibility (and thus diversity) in the design of individual buildings.

Upton was English Partnerships’ first major coding project and was thus a learning process for all parties. EDAW were subsequently commissioned to formalise the masterplan and to produce the Upton Design Code. The masterplan and the design code formed the Upton Urban Framework, which received planning consent in February 2003. The design code was not, however, formally adopted by the local authority and instead it became the landowner’s instrument for achieving the plan’s objectives and a basis for selecting housebuilders.
The Upton Design Code established a set of layout principles, specifying an interconnected street pattern and thus also a street block structure, and detailing a set of four character areas based on density and spatial character – ‘urban boulevard’ (fronting onto Weedon Road); ‘neighbourhood spine’; ‘neighbourhood general’; and ‘neighbourhood edge’. The Upton street structure also sought to connect into the wider street network by linking into the developments abutting the Upton site. Residents within these largely cul-de-sac developments, however, objected to the possibility of through traffic. Pedestrian and cycle links were established with provision for vehicular connections should these become acceptable at a later date.

The code also established the general three-dimensional form massing, setting out the heights of those buildings fronting onto key streets. All streets were assigned a place within a hierarchy of four street types – ‘urban boulevard’; ‘main street’ (some with swales); ‘lane’; and ‘mew’. Along the High Street, the code required taller ground floors, to accommodate future changes as population increases and small business uses emerge.

The design code also dealt with a range of other issues such as materials, elevations and openings; the detailing of the public realm; and the inclusion of affordable housing – 22% pepper-potted throughout the site, with no more than three units together, the external appearance of which is indistinguishable from market-housing; and sustainability issues.

The Design Code requirement for four-storey dwellings on certain streets has resulted in five-bedroom houses with small gardens (some north-facing) and a single allocated parking place. Housebuilders argue that the code results in homes that are too big, with too little parking and too small gardens, for local demand.

Parking provision proved an important factor in the overall design of the street blocks. Parking standards were originally one per unit, plus 0.5 spaces on-street for visitors. In the early phases, residents’ parking was primarily in landscaped parking courts accessed through archways with gates in the perimeter building blocks. Each dwelling was allocated a back court car parking space with additional unallocated spaces provided on streets and mews. Accommodating parking in rear courts was an important limiting factor on dwelling mix and type, since changing the proportion of flats (i.e. smaller units) to houses (i.e. larger units) changed the parking required and in smaller blocks was not feasible because there was not sufficient space. The initial parking standard was regarded as an under provision as parking was occurring in undesignated spaces and on pavements, and the local planning authority subsequently increased it to 1.5 plus 0.5 in later phases.
3.2 Stakeholder Engagement
The two Enquiry-by-Design workshops established a set of guiding principles that informed the place vision and subsequently a spatial development framework/masterplan and design code for delivery. The second Enquiry-by-Design event was focused more specifically on Upton, with residents, local stakeholders and key decision makers in the area becoming more involved with developing the place vision. It also established a set of principles to guide the development of a spatial development framework/masterplan. To deliver the project and to maintain community involvement, English Partnerships, Northampton Borough Council, EDAW and The Prince’s Foundation (and others) subsequently formed the Upton Steering Committee and the Upton Working Group in 2002. (Until 2002-2004, there had been strong representation from The Prince’s Foundation on the Upton Working Group. The Foundation representative then left to practice as an architect and became the coordinating architect for Parcel B, thereby creating a conflict of interest. With no one from The Foundation available, it withdrew from the Upton Working Group.) Bringing together political and community representatives, the Upton Steering Committee performs a strategic and scrutiny over the Upton Working Group. Providing technical support and maintaining good relations with developers and the community, the Upton Working Group performs a more executive and operational role.

4. Development Process
4.1 Land ownership and assembly
The site was ‘inherited’ by English Partnerships from Northampton New Town Development Corporation and the Commission for New Towns.

4.2 Infrastructure provision
English Partnerships’ investment in advance infrastructure (calculated to be £24.6 million) drove development forward by simplifying the development process for housebuilders. When provided with serviced parcels, housebuilders did not need to consider wider matters of land development and could focus on parcel development and house building, and thereafter the marketing and selling of those houses. Work on the on-site physical infrastructure started in 2003. Some elements of infrastructure (a school, SUDS, affordable housing etc) were required by a Section 106 agreement associated with the planning consent. English Partnerships funded some of this upfront and then endeavoured to recover its costs from land sales and in the event of any shortfall, through public subsidy.

Improvements were made to the surrounding road system. A roundabout was constructed on Upton Way to provide access from the south-east. To the north, Weedon Road has been downgraded from a 50 mph arterial road to a 30 mph ‘boulevard’. It is still a big road, but the changes give it a softer edge to the development, and reduce, though do not remove, the severance effect. The site’s development capacity was limited by the capacity of surrounding road infrastructure.
The highway capacity had originally dictated a maximum of 1,080 units, but the improvements allowed this to be increased to 1,450 units.

Immediately to the south beyond a large sports field, Northampton Borough Council has been developing the new Upper Nene Valley Country Park, which as well as enhancing the land’s function as a flood plain, provides approximately 43 hectares of open space including footpaths, bridleways and cycleways and improved access to the River Nene, and new woodland areas.

English Partnerships also funded, commissioned and oversaw the advance infrastructure on-site, encouraging and facilitating development while maintaining a high quality public realm. A standard approach is to provide minimal primary infrastructure and to offload other infrastructure costs to parcel developers. The primary infrastructure includes a spine road – now known as High Street – through the development site, linking Upton Way to Weedon Road, parts of the secondary street network, a set of public open spaces and the SUDS. The initial intention was for housebuilders to put in the SUDS infrastructure, but it was still innovative and new practice in the UK and so English Partnerships’ engineers wanted to retain more direct control.

Improvements were made to the nearby Duston Mill reservoir – a large flood attenuation device previously constructed by the Commission for New Towns to provide service water run-off catchment for the south-west expansion site. However, flooding issues also needed to be addressed on site by the inclusion of flood attenuation measures and flood storage basins (swales) to slow down run-off, which in turn raising issues of integrating and then managing the SUDS. The SUDS is an integrated part of the street design and creates an attractive landscape. As developed the surface water drainage system consists of a combination of SUDS elements and a conventional below ground piped system. The SUDS scheme consisted of a system of linked swales which, as well as having storage and infiltration functions, conveys runoff to wetland storage areas around the playing fields adjacent to the River Nene. It also promotes local biodiversity by allowing new wildlife habitats to establish, is a popular play space and provides a green space network.

A bus public transport system links Upton with Northampton town centre and the railway station, and has been running since 10 homes were occupied.
Social and community facilities include a new primary school accommodating 420 children. A changing facility/community meeting hall/Upton interpretation centre, partially powered by a wind turbine and including an educational area that uses renewable technologies and design innovation is presently being built on the community playing fields. The final development parcels (F and G, whose development has been delayed) – in the north of the development abutting Weedon Road will provide a convenience store (380 m²); small retail units (620 m²); a public house; office space (3,200 m²); a café/restaurant (450 m²); and a 70-place children’s day nursery.

4.3 Land release and development procurement

The sizing and spatial pattern of the land parcels and the timing of their release affects the nature of the build out and the coherence of the place as it develops. The intention is usually to provide a coherent roll out of development with infrastructure preceding development. It is a balancing act and a number of factors have to be considered, such as parcel size, pattern and the timing of release. Different parcel sizes, for example, attract different scales and types of developer. Smaller land parcels mean that the land developer is less reliant on a few housebuilders each developing larger sites and, in principle thus is less exposed if, for any reason, one housebuilder fails to build out its parcel promptly.

Serviced land development parcels at Upton were marketed through a two stage process. At the first stage, judgement is made on the developer’s design and environmental strategy, producing a short list based on design quality, from which the second stage winner is selected based on financial criteria (i.e. the land bid).

Developer selection typically takes four-months, with an eight-week period allowed for potential developers to prepare a scheme design including additional detail of specific sites as specified by English Partnerships. The marketing documents also provide details of adjacent sites so that housebuilders and their designers know what they are fitting into.

A key factor in the land marketing/developer selection process is to the need to create sufficient competition among housebuilders for the land parcels, which in turn requires the sites to be desirable. Competition empowers the land developer/place promoter, and can be contrasted with having to deal with a developer who already owns the land, or imposing standards on them once they have brought the land. Demonstrating that Upton and south-west Northampton was an attractive location for development, the marketing yielded competition for land parcels.
Starting in 2003, the Upton build-out was organised in eight development multi-block development parcels. The first housing building started in 2004. The development parcels are sold on a development license, with land ownership not actually changing until the completed unit is sold to the occupant. This also means that housebuilders cannot change the planning consent without also involving English Partnerships.

- Parcel A had 12 first stage bidders (with 6 being shortlisted for the second stage).
- Parcel B had 10 (6 shortlisted).
- Parcel C had fewer bidders (6 shortlisted) – but it was a much smaller parcel and fewer had been expected.
- Parcel D1 had ten first stage bidders (5 shortlisted).

The prospect of the selection process, including a detailed land brief and the design code, and subsequently the experience and/or cost of bidding, may deter some housebuilders, particularly since the costs of unsuccessful bids have to be recovered through successful bids. A number were seemingly easily deterred, though one housebuilder made submission for three land parcels, coming a close second the third time, before electing to try elsewhere.

As building costs at Upton were expected to be higher because of the higher environmental and design standards required, English Partnerships had been prepared for lower land values on some sites, but the first two phases attained higher-than-expected land values which were in fact comparable with other English Partnerships schemes in Northampton. Land values dropped for Parcel C, but this had also been expected since it involved fewer, larger units and thus did not have the same economies of scale as larger parcels.
Case Study 7: Upton, Northampton, England

Figure CS.5: Land Parcelisation at Upton
### Table CS 4: Summary of progress at Upton development parcels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parcel</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>3.7 hectares – 214 units</td>
<td>More historicist housing, evoking 1930s Garden City/arts-and-crafts; and German traditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marketed 2003; planning consent in March 2004</td>
<td>Housebuilder was Shenley Lodge Developments (formerly Paul Newman Homes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>4.5 hectares – 204 units</td>
<td>Parcel B has tremendous variety. The scheme design was by five firms of architects, plus a coordinating architect. When the urban form established by the design code is strong enough to carry the diversity of the architecture, when the urban form is weak, the scheme stands or falls on the quality of the architecture. If urban form is strong, the architecture is less important. Here the urban form carries the diversity of architectural idioms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marketed 2004; planning consent in March 2005</td>
<td>Housebuilder was a joint venture between Cornhill Estates (now Zero C) and Fairclough Homes (now Miller Homes). Cornhill did the scheme design and then sold on a land parcel with a scheme design to Fairclough Homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.9 hectares – 30 units</td>
<td>Project being completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marketed in September 2004; planning consent in March 2006</td>
<td>Housebuilder was David Wilson Homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>6.4 hectares – 345 units</td>
<td>Only 85 units have yet been built, as second phase of this key central land parcel has stalled. Leaving Upton Square with a surface level public realm, but not a surrounding frame of buildings. In this development six ‘One Earth Homes’ have been completed – the first commercially available houses in England to meet Level 6 of the Code for Sustainable Homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marketed in April 2005; planning consent in March 2006</td>
<td>Housebuilder was Metropolitan Homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>3.6 hectares – 165 units</td>
<td>Parcel is presently being completed. Closest to conventional housebuilders product. Due to Parcel D1 not having been completed, it is somewhat isolated within Upton. It also feels like a different place, in part because there are no swales within the housing areas and the spaces between the houses are corresponding smaller.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|        | Marketed April 2005; planning consent in March 2006 | Housebuilder was Barratt Developments. This parcel was marketed differently and was effectively reserved for a Design for Manufacture (DfM) scheme. DfM was a Government-initiated, launched in April 2005 intended to demonstrate that good-quality homes could be delivered for a construction
### Table CS 4: Summary of progress at Upton development parcels (cont)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parcel</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| E      | 1.3 hectares – 49 units  
Marketed April 2006; planning consent May 2007  
Housebuilder was initially KingsOak, but it was bought out by Barratt, who have to build the approved scheme design. | Parcel is presently being completed. |
| F and G| 6 hectares – 375 residential units plus a mixed use area (380 m² convenience store; 620 m² of small retail units; public house; approximately 3,200 m² office space; café/restaurant – 450 m²; and a 70-place children’s day nursery). | |

Land was marketed in 2007 and reached the stage of a scheme design. It then fell through, when the commercial partner pulled out and the partner housebuilder stated it was unable to undertake the scheme without the commercial partner. The parcel was re-marketed in April 2008 but no bids were received. In December 2009, it was being repackaged for new marketing effort. As the original planning consent for this phase had expired and the LPA had a new requirement for affordable housing, the social housing component of this parcel was increased from 22% to 35%. 

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Section 11: Case studies

**Case Study 7:**

**Upton, Northampton, England**
The Upton land development licence also specifies a build-out period of between two and two-and-a-half years. Housebuilders thus need to turn the land around relatively quickly. If they run into financing or marketing difficulties, then they might seek to negotiate a longer period with the land developer, in which case the land developer has to weigh up whether to continue with that housebuilder or whether to remarket the land. In general, a faster build-out is desirable and ensures earlier pay off of infrastructure costs; a faster community building process because the lag time before social and commercial infrastructure is in place is reduced. It also avoids disjointed development whereby some spatially isolated parts of the development are complete well in advance of others. A faster build-out, however, risks flooding the local housing market with properties and thus reducing sales prices.

The build-out at Upton has been slower than anticipated – partially, though not wholly, due to the recession since 2008. Development should have been finished by 2011/2012; it is now more likely to be 2015/2016. Given difficulties with the second phase of Parcel D1, it is also more disjointed and discontinuous than had been intended. Parcel D1 is a key central parcel, surrounding Upton Square. The surface public realm of the square is complete, but it lacks the surrounding frame of buildings that would define it as a space. The lack of development on Parcel D1 means that Parcels D2 and E are somewhere isolated.

4.4 Design control

Although housebuilders commission architects to prepare scheme designs, there can be a temptation for housebuilders to look to make costs savings by simplification and dilution of the scheme design. English Partnerships employs a local design inspector to undertake regular site inspection to ensure the specifications in the original design schemes and briefs are being implemented (ensuring, amongst other things, closer development control than a LPA would normally provide). Unlike a housebuilder’s clerk-of-works, who is an agent of the housebuilder and thus has mixed motives and will trade-off cost, time and quality, the sole concern of the English Partnerships inspector is with quality.

EDAW provided the urban design lead in the developer selection process, championing the code when it was challenged by housebuilders and parcel designers – recognising that parcel designers might promote their part at the expense of the whole, EDAW argued that the whole (the place) rather than the part (the individual
Case Study 7: Upton, Northampton, England

development parcel) mattered most. This is particularly apparent when, for example, several development parcels surround a public open space. The space is conceived as a single entity, but parcel designers and developers tend to see only their parcel rather than its contribution to the greater whole. EDAW saw this role as one of pulling-it-all-together – a role that might easily be overlooked.

Interviewees highlighted a series of benefits to the overall place, resulting from the use of a design code combined with a demanding developer selection process.

* First, to create expectations and to set down the ground rules – the place-making rules – for development at Upton. A key message of English Partnerships’ Upton Design Code launch was that Upton was going to be different and that developing at Upton would require housebuilders to do something different from how they might normally operate.

* Second, the design code virtually requires housebuilders to employ architects – though, in practice, usually only to prepare for a scheme design, which the housebuilder then builds out. The scheme design is part of the developer selection process and is approved by the Upton Working Group and forms the basis for the planning application and becomes part of the development licence.

* Third – to simplify planning approval. Provided local planners are involved in its writing, the code can simplify the planning process and can lead to faster consents.

* Fourth, to level the playing field, allowing smaller housebuilders more accustomed to building higher quality developments, to compete with volume housebuilders who usually reduce costs by deploying standard ranges of house types. It is notable that few volume housebuilders were developing at Upton.

It was also recognised that developing at a high profile design quality and environmental exemplar project such as Upton offered several types of benefit to housebuilders, including:

* **Enhancing their reputation** – housebuilders are attracted by an exemplar scheme because it is beneficial for their reputation. They may have to invest more, as development costs may be higher, but it helps their external profile and perhaps also translates into a larger market share.

* **Providing a learning opportunity** – exemplar schemes provide an opportunity to learn, and perhaps to innovate and experiment – and through successful experimentation to establish new products and a competitive advantage and to carve out a new market space. Upton, for example, offers a way of learning how to design and develop (and then sell) energy efficient housing designs. Based, in part, on its experience at Upton and seeing an opportunity for low carbon homes and to develop a profile, Cornhill Estates created a subsidiary – Zero C.
4.5 Long-term management arrangements

Upton Management Company is presently being established. English Partnerships will provide a dowry, but its ongoing funding will be through a management/fee charge expected to be about £60-100 per annum per unit. Upton Management Company will look after the SUDS, and other landscaping, plus what is not adopted by the local authority. The wind blows litter into the swales, but does not blow it out. Upton Management Company will also oversee/manage the community building when this is built. It will not manage the rear courts and each development has its own management company to look after these spaces.

Previously a Neighbourhood Watch, the Upton Meadows Community Association held its inaugural meeting in September 2009. It will be separate from the management company, but will work in partnership with it.

5. Quality Appraisal

English Partnerships developed the project through two Enquiry-by-Design events, with major input from The Prince’s Foundation and EDAW. It then led development through the provision of advance infrastructure with close control of development through a design code. Upton has been particularly innovative in terms of engagement through Enquiry-by-Design, the large scale use of a design code and the implementation of a sustainable urban drainage system (SUDS). It also combines traditional urbanism principles – such as traditional streets and a clear front/back distinction – and advanced sustainability principles, with all new homes having to achieve EcoHomes ‘Excellent’ standard. Environmental standards that were above code at the start of Upton have now become the standard level – in part due to the example of projects such as Upton.

It is still early to judge Upton’s success: the stalling of the second phase of Parcel D1 makes it more discontinuous and fragmented than had been intended, dividing the development into a more coherent southern part and less (as yet) coherent west and northern parts, while the delay in developing Parcels F and G means its lacks certain facilities. The early development of the school, together with the sports field and country park, and the green space network based on the SUDS provide recreational opportunities, but it is not yet a rounded neighbourhood. The completion of the community building/interpretation centre will provide an important amenity.

What is most notably missing at present is a convenient corner shop and a coffee shop/cafe. The lack of anything other than housing means it is still a generally car-dependent estate rather than a rounded urban neighbourhood. These facilities will come in time. It does, nevertheless, offer educational benefits in terms of challenging mindsets and perhaps causing mindshift. Upton differs from all other recent developments in Northampton and could begin to break the mould of housing design and delivery in the town. The key place delivery lessons from Upton relate to the use of a combination of instruments and actions, including the use of Enquiry-by-Design charettes, a masterplan, design codes, intelligent land subdivision and parcelling, innovative roads, and the provision of advance infrastructure.
### Table CS.5: Organisational Churn at Upton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place promoter/land developer</strong></td>
<td>The landowner/place promoter is usually continuous. When the place promoter is a state agency, then there can also be change. At Upton, the Commission for New Towns was merged with English Partnerships, which was subsequently merged with the Housing Corporation to become the Housing and Communities Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government ministry</strong></td>
<td>Between 1997 and 2006, the Department of the Environment (DoE) morphed from DoE, to DETR, to DTLR, to ODPM, to DCLG. First, the DoE was merged with transport to form the Department for Transport, Environment and the Regions (DETR). John Prescott was made Deputy Prime Minister and head of the newly-formed DETR. In June 2001, the DETR lost its environment brief to the newly-formed Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and became the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions, (DTLR) under Stephen Byers. In the following month, the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office was established as part of the Cabinet Office under John Prescott’s responsibility. When Byers resigned in May 2002, a dedicated Department for Transport (DfT) was formed, and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) became a department in its own right. Prescott resigned in May 2006, the ODPM became the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), when Ruth Kelly took over Prescott’s responsibilities in the field. Initiatives are launched and then new ones are launched, often with a change of minister and/or a change of government. In England, during the period Upton, for example, the Millennium Communities Initiative was launched, then the Sustainable Communities Initiative, and then the Eco-Town Initiatives. With a change of government or, even simply a change of minister, public policy initiatives can become orphaned. The Millennium Villages initiative was overtaken by the Sustainable Communities Programme and later the Eco-towns Initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local planning authority</strong></td>
<td>At the outset, the planning authority was Northampton Borough Council. In 2006, West Northampton Development Corporation became the development control authority. At Upton, the Council is no longer the planning authority and so is now in a curious position. Although this did not happen at Upton, there might at also be change in the structure of local government, with, for example, a shift from two-tier to unitary authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highways authority</strong></td>
<td>During the period of the project, the highways authority was Northamptonshire County Council. It subsequently became Northampton Borough Council. Later highways responsibilities were returned to the County Council.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table CS.5: Organisational Churn at Upton (cont)

| Consultants/partners | Consultants also tend to come-and-go over the duration of a project. At Upton, the key consultants/advisors had initially had been The Princes Foundation; the consultant engineers were Alan Baxter Associates and Pell Frischmann. The consultants who have been most continuously involved in the development are EDAW (now AECOM). |
| Parcel developers | Where a parcel release system is adopted, then developers/housebuilders are typically in/out, working on a single development parcel – though a particular developer/housebuilder may build an earlier and a later parcel. |

However, an issue shown particularly strongly at Upton is the institutional churn and the significance of the (or lack of) continuity of key personnel and organisations. Institutional, organisation, regulatory and personnel change and churn proves problematic for the place delivery process even on relatively straightforward greenfield sites and in strong, relatively favoured development markets (such as Upton). It must be even more problematic therefore on brownfield/regeneration sites with relatively weak, less favourable development markets (such as Allerton Bywater). Table CS.5 above summarises some of the churn of organisations involved in Upton.
Case Study 7: Upton, Northampton, England

Another layer of churn is that of people within those organisations. As well as a change of organisations, there is also often a change of personnel. Councillors on planning committees change; members of communities/community representatives change – all need to be brought up to speed. The turnover of personnel can mean a loss of institutional knowledge of the project’s history and development of the project and perhaps a loss of the project principles. New personnel know their phase but may not know the whole project, and might, for example, seek to change or dilute the code. There is also a danger of drift and dilution rather than evolution and improvement. Erica Davies identifies ‘hold-the-flame’ – determination among those who have worked on Upton to ensure it remains a high quality exemplar project. There is concern that if the project team were diluted or dissipated, then the exemplar project ethos would be lost. During 2009, for example there was the recession/economic change and also through organisational change resulting from the merging of English Partnerships with the Housing Corporation to create the Homes and Communities Agency. These factors made it difficult to maintain the Upton Place Vision.

Another source of change is that of regulatory systems, as design and development standards and expectations become more exacting. Standards that were innovative and above code at the outset in Upton, were the norm by its later stages.

“It’s very fragile. Projects can easily fall to bits. In fact, more likely to fall to bits than stay together. It is only really Erica who is carrying the flame. Peter Springett was but he’s retired. New directors have been educated, indoctrinated perhaps, but it’s not their project. It’s not their baby, they are inheriting it. They’ve got their own babies to look after.”
Development consultant (AECOM)

The inevitability of this change creates a need for flexibility in, for example, development agreements, legal agreements, planning agreements, which need to be able to change as the world changes, otherwise the place delivery process will come to a halt or be open to legal challenge downstream.
### Assessment of Upton according to Scottish Government’s ‘Designing Places’ criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the place have a distinct identity?</td>
<td>Yes – three-storey terraced housing on relatively small plots, at higher densities and with enclosed spaces and cars parked within street blocks, give the development a more urban character, which contrasts with Northampton’s standard suburban development. SUDS with swales are a signature element.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place have spaces that are safe and pleasant?</td>
<td>Yes – consistent use of street blocks with public fronts and private blocks means streets are overlooked and surveyed by ‘eyes-on-the-street’. Swales means that main streets are wider and greener, giving a pleasant appearance. The perimeter block layout establishes a clear front/back distinction and provides doorways and windows onto the public areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the place easy to move around (especially on foot) (‘permeable’)?</td>
<td>Yes – the consistent use of block structure makes the street pattern very legible; pavements are comfortably sized, while swales means wider streets. Neighbourhood is quite compact – through relative shortage of places/destinations worth walking to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place make visitors feel sense-of-welcome?</td>
<td>Yes – though quiet during the day, apart from opening and closing times of the school. Neighbourhood presently lacks amenities. Central square has been laid out and public realm installed, but no development around it yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will the place adapt easily to changing circumstances (‘robust’)?</td>
<td>Houses are low-rise and could be converted to other uses. Those on main spine avenue have higher ground floors to allow for later conversion to business premises. Houses have small gardens, and therefore opportunities for extensions are limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place make good use of scarce resources (‘sustainable’)?</td>
<td>All housing achieves EcoHomes ‘Excellent’. Development appears quite car dependent (Northampton is also very car dependent). Bus routes/stops are clear and convenient; intensity of buses and bus usage may increase other time. Elements of mixed use development are in the pipeline.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Case Study 8: Vauban, Freiburg, Germany

1. Development Opportunity

The Vauban site was originally developed as a military camp in 1936, housing the German army and later, after 1945, the French army. After the end of the Cold War, the French left and ownership reverted to the German Federal Government in 1992, yielding a windfall site 3 km from the city centre, which Freiburg City Council had not previously considered and which had not been bought up by developers. The City acquired the 40-hectare site from the Federal Government for DM 40 million, and the question became what to do with it?

In the interregnum between the site losing its primary use and plans for its future being developed, some of the vacant barrack buildings were occupied by squatters. The squatters eventually won legal rights to four of the original twenty barrack buildings, becoming an alternative co-housing group, the Self-organised Independent Settlement Initiative (SUSI), which created ecologically sustainable, low-cost living space in the barracks. Some former residents of the other barracks subsequently took up residence in old cars and vans, forming Wagenplatz.

A further six barrack buildings were subsequently given to the University of Freiburg Students’ Organisation. Rooms for 600 students were created in the barracks and in three new buildings. This, and SUSI’s earlier refurbishment, constituted the first phase of development and gave the area a set of alternative communities whose presence contributed to Vauban’s eventual character.

2. People and Organisations

At the heart of Vauban’s development is the partnership between Freiburg City Council and a citizen’s organisation, Forum Vauban, who jointly produced the place vision and saw it through to completion.

Freiburg City Council wanted to use the site to develop a new residential neighbourhood for young families within the city and to counteract suburbanisation. Its vision was for a high-density development, with low energy houses, green spaces, good transport access (including a new tram line) and other necessary infrastructure, such as kindergartens and a primary school. The Council also had experience of developing an earlier city extension at Rieselfeld during the mid-1980s, where it had explored the potential of small development plots, with development by Baugruppen (owner...
In 1993 an architecture student (Matthias-Martin Lübke) and a public transportation advocate (André Heuss) had discussed the City Council’s acquisition of the Vauban site and the possibility of ecologically-friendly development, public engagement and low-car living. In December 1994, with five others, they founded ‘Forum Vauban’ as a non-profit organisation, to be financed through membership fees, donations, public grants and some earned income. Within months, it had grown to 60 members and was actively lobbying the Council with its vision for a sustainable neighbourhood.

Forum Vauban’s advocacy broadened the project, especially in terms of a low-car concept. It was also pushing against an open door because the City Council had green leanings, the roots of which stemmed from the energy crisis of the 1970s.

In response to the expected shortage of oil, the Länder (regional) Government had planned a nuclear power station 40 kilometres from Freiburg. A campaign of opposition began, led by a small number of activists. Over time, the activists gained wider political buy-in with the city and region subsequently becoming a world centre for environmental research, developing an impressive profile as Europe’s Solar Capital and being a stronghold of green politics.

A key action with regard to Vauban was the City Council’s 1992 resolution that land sold by it could only be developed with low-energy buildings. The Council had also resolved that all major residential developments in the City would have a tram connection. Rebuilt following wartime bombing in 1945, Freiburg city centre had a tram threaded through its old streets, becoming the City’s backbone; the medieval centre remained low-car and congestion charging was subsequently introduced.
3. The Overall Vision

3.1 Spatial development framework

The Vauban place vision was for a ‘model sustainable district’ with four key reinforcing drivers:

* A low-energy, ‘green place’.
* A low car place, encouraging car-free living, with priority given to pedestrians, cyclists and public transport.
* A ‘district-of-short-distances’, with a full range of facilities and employment opportunities within easy walking and cycling distance.
* Division of the land into small development plots, with preferential allocation to Baugruppen (small, self-development, housing ownership co-operatives).

Vauban’s spatial development framework/masterplan took the form of a Bebauungsplan (B-Plan). B-Plans are a detailed design code, together with a regulating plan, which places legally binding constraints on development. Although the local authority must follow set procedures for public and stakeholder consultation and for formal adoption by elected members, approval of planning applications is thereafter an administrative procedure – checking for compliance against it and against technical building regulations.

After the decision to prepare a B-Plan was taken, the City announced an urban design competition for the site. Design teams were invited to submit proposals in accordance with a brief written by the City with a jury selecting the best submission, which provides the basis for the B-Plan.

Development of the B-Plan started in 1995, and was finally approved in July 1997. The City then completed the sale of development plots, with construction beginning in 1998 for the first phase of new build development. Planning of more detailed concepts, such as the car-free living project which required some legal obstacles to be overcome, was undertaken between 1997 and 1999.

As built, Vauban consists primarily of two- to four-storey row houses and walk-up apartments, at a net density of 90 to 100 units per hectare. The neighbourhood’s central feature and armature is Vaubanallee, along which runs the trams with three stops. Vaubanallee is also the site of many of the neighbourhood’s facilities and amenities.

One of Vauban’s major achievements is the uptake of low energy design. All buildings in there meet – and in some cases substantially undercut – the ‘Freiburg Low-Energy Standard’ (pioneered in Rieselfeld), which, at the time, capped the permissible heating energy need of new housing development at 65 kW (234 MJ)/m² pa. (This is about two-thirds that of the average newly built house.
of the same period (100 kWh/m²pa), and about one-third of that of older houses (200 kWh/m²pa). From 2001, these standards applied throughout Germany. The B-Plan also set out ecological requirements and higher standards were implemented voluntarily by many of the Baugruppen and by the co-operative (Genova and SUSI) projects.

Nearly 100 units have been designed to Passivhaus ultra-low energy standards (15 kWh/m² pa) – the heat requirements of which are almost entirely covered by internal gains, passive-solar gains and a heat recovery system – are located within the main new build areas. Solar collectors and PVs are common on the district’s roofs, while a co-generation plant (CHP) operating with wood-chips (80%) and natural gas (20%) has operated since 2002 and is connected to the neighbourhood’s heating grid, providing hot water and electricity.

Vauban also has a number of PlusEnergy houses located in the Schlierberg solar district. Arranged in two- and three-storey terraces aligned to the south, the district consists of nearly 60 homes built to PassiveHaus standards. Shielding the settlement from the main road is the ‘Sonnenschiff’ (Solar Ship) – a mixed use, retail, office and residential building. PV facilities on the buildings’ roofs generate more energy than the inhabitants consume (thereby making them PlusEnergy homes). The surplus energy is fed into the general electricity grid, with electricity companies required to buy it at a minimum set price. With a different character to the rest of Vauban, housing provided in the solar district is less attractive than the Baugruppen housing. Two-thirds of the site was sold for conventional apartment development.

3.2 Stakeholder Engagement

In 1994/5 Freiburg City Council announced an extended citizen engagement process – Erweiterte Bürgerbeteiligung – for the Vauban site. Forum Vauban applied to coordinate this and in 1995 the City made it the official body for the consultation process. From 1999, it also became responsible for community development (soziale Quartiersarbeit) within the new neighbourhood. Amid allegations of misuse of public funds and corruption, Forum Vauban was subsequently shut down due to bankruptcy in November 2004, when the European Commission sought to reclaim research money although the project had been finished and finally accounted. A new neighbourhood association thereafter took on some of Forum Vauban’s role.
Forum Vauban’s role was both joint place promoter and critical support to the City: its activism and energy pushing the City’s officials and politicians further that they would otherwise have gone:

* Without Forum Vauban, the legal hurdles to parking-free and car-free living may have deferred them. Indeed, according to Jan Scheuerer (Institute for Sustainability and Technology Policy (ISTP), Murdoch University, Australia), it was Forum Vauban’s meticulous liaison work with prospective residents that built the necessary support for some of Vauban’s most conspicuous innovations – such as the parking-free/car-free living, the widespread emergence of Baugruppen as non-profit developers and the implementation of low energy concepts in excess of the already stringent legal requirements.

* Equally accounts that emphasise Forum Vauban’s autonomy and self-direction also understate the Freiburg City Council’s support and assistance, especially the energy and vision of the City’s Chief Planner, Wulf Daseking and his team.

The City adopted a ‘Learning while Planning’ (‘planning-that-learns’) approach, designed to allow flexibility to react to and incorporate new ideas and proposals. Within the City Council, Project Group Vauban (Projektgruppe Vauban) was formed as a dedicated local authority officer team, with financial control, to work with a special City Council committee – City Council Vauban Committee (Gemeinderäteliche Arbeitsgruppe Vauban) consisting of elected members. Forum Vauban and the City established a platform to exchange information and to negotiate different concepts and viewpoints to find the optimum collective solution.

Combined with a publicity campaign, the participation process mobilised prospective residents to meet, to contribute their ideas, and to form Baugruppen. As few people actually lived in Vauban an initial community-of-interest would, over time, become a community-of-place.

As well as through newsletters and general public activism, citizen engagement was organised through a series of workshops and study visits. Between 1996 and 2000, 40 major workshops were organised, ranging across a variety of topics, including energy and green issues, Baugruppen, design, mobility, community development, and others.
Case Study 8: Vauban, Freiburg, Germany

4. Development Process

4.1 Land ownership and assembly
Freiburg City Council acquired the 40-hectare site from the Federal Government for DM 40 million.

4.2 Infrastructure provision
With a B-Plan, local authorities typically provide infrastructure in advance of plots being developed. Funds to remediate the area and to develop the infrastructure came from the State’s redevelopment fund (US$5,000,000 @ 5.9%) and from credits raised by the City Council. Funds were controlled by Project Group Vauban. All credits had to be repaid through selling building lots and, due to the need to repay these credits, the Council had to keep to a development timetable. The project received no further subsidies – though builders and Baugruppen were eligible for Federal and State support and tax breaks.

The main piece of physical infrastructure was the tram line – 30% of which was funded from revenue from land sales. The main pieces of social infrastructure were the primary school, plus two kindergartens and a community centre. These were funded by the Council and built at the same time as the new build housing.

In terms of commercial faculties, there are existing shopping facilities within walking distance, in the neighbouring municipality of Merzhausen. A supermarket has located in the ground floor of one of the community car parks near the neighbourhood’s eastern edge.

4.3 Land release and development procurement
What is particularly unusual and distinctive about Vauban is that the majority of development was by Baugruppen. Baugruppen are small owner-cooperatives, typically comprising fewer than 20 households and often smaller. They are self-selected groups, who want to develop and own their own houses. Part of the attraction is the opportunity, in contrast to standard speculative development, to influence the design of their residential environment before moving in.

As landowner and land developer, the Council was responsible for Vauban’s planning and development. It divided land into small plots and allocated it preferentially to Baugruppen and small/local builders, with bids also being assessed against criteria favouring families with children, older people, and Freiburg residents. The land marketing process thus also demanded a high input from the Council staff.

The B-Plan’s mandatory small plot sizes were significant because these allowed small developers to become involved: the largest public sector developer in the first new build phase, for example, built less than 10% – and the largest private sector developer built less than 13% – of the units. Interest among Baugruppen in the sites along the central avenue, where ground floor non-residential uses were mandatory, was limited and these tended to be developed by commercial developers with rental housing above.
Compared to conventional housing developers, the Baugruppen approach has several distinct advantages:

It overcomes the producer-consumer gap inherent to speculative housing and the short-termist ‘in/out’ of conventional developers. Combining developer and owner development roles means that the balance between upfront capital costs and longer term running costs makes energy-efficient and low-energy design more attractive. Overall costs are also lower, since Baugruppen appropriate the developer’s and, in part, the funders’ profit.

* The Baugruppen promote community-building, cooperation and common activities between future neighbours, and enable conflict-testing in a community.
* The small development plots and the large proportion of new residential development built by Baugruppen (and designed by a wider variety of architects) generates a more architecturally diverse district, with the individually-designed façades creating genuine rather than artificial diversity in terms of visual character.

Baugruppen, however, needed support from the City Council’s planning department and from independent consultants, and also more time to work up their proposals. Forum Vauban ran workshops and also formed a technical support unit, Bergerbrau Arbeitsgruppe. In both cases this increases the start up and transaction costs of the Baugruppen approach. A further downside of Baugruppen is the difficulty of developing social housing. Developers building social housing get financial support from the City Council and State, but Baugruppen are less likely to incorporate social housing. Due to cutbacks in the State housing programme, an initial target for 25% social housing was reduced and less than 10% of the housing is for social rent. Housing for social rent is mainly provided by SUSI and Genova Housing Association. Founded in 1997 and originating from within Forum Vauban, Genova Housing Association built a community-oriented project of 36 units in the first new build phase, and a further 40/50 units in the second.
Case Study 8:
Vauban, Freiburg, Germany

Once the B-Plan and land sales had been completed, Vauban’s build-out was rapid. The first new build phase was developed on the eastern half of the site and consisted of 422 housing units of which 233 were private build (185 in Baugruppen), 36 by Genova Housing Association, and 153 by development companies. Approximately two-thirds of this was parking-free. Detailed planning of the first public green spaces took place in 1998/99 in association with the new residents.

In summer 1999, the City began the sale of land for the second new build phase. Developed on the western half of the site, this phase consisted of approximately 645 housing units. Construction started in late summer 2000 and was completed by 2001/2002. A further new build phase also started in 1999 – the Schlierberg solar district, on the barrack’s former sports field to the east of the earlier developments.

A final phase to the north is being developed incrementally, and will integrate residential with commercial/light industrial uses. Vauban’s anticipated 600 jobs and 5,000 population constitute a start at establishing a mixed-use district, but is still someway from employment self-sufficiency (which would suggest a need of some 2,000 jobs), but such correspondence will take time to emerge.

4.4 Design control

The Vauban B-Plan – supplemented in some cases by additional City guidelines/restrictions attached to land sales – established a clear set of rules for development but leaving developers and designers free to work within those rules. The B-Plan therefore provides predictability in terms of overall urban form, but allows diversity in the individual parts. The rules included:

- Setting out the general urban structure, broadly following the geometry of the original barracks blocks and some of the pre-existing infrastructure, with Vaubanallee as the development’s spine (armature).
- Setting out the Baufenster – the ‘footprint’ within which any development has to be located.
  The Vauban B-Plan uses the more-prescriptive Baulinie ‘build-to’ line (i.e. the line on which a building has to be located) along the main avenue, with a more flexible Baugrenze ‘build-behind’ line (i.e. the maximum footprint the building may occupy) elsewhere.
- Identifying green spaces – the creek and its banks; the 60-year trees along the central spine; the undeveloped area to the west end; and a set of green corridors extending northwards from the creek.
- Setting out a market place and neighbourhood centre and other measures enabling the creation of a ‘district-of-small-distances’.
- Prohibiting detached houses (thus ensuring a compact and continuous urban form).
- Setting a maximum building height, not exceeding four-storeys.
Case Study 8: Vauban, Freiburg, Germany

- Setting out regulations for ecological building (Higher standards were actually implemented voluntarily by many of the Baugruppen and by the co-operative (Genova and SUSI) projects).
- Setting out parking-free areas.
- Sub-dividing the land into small development plots.
- Identifying areas where priority would be given to developers intending to PassivHaus standard (see below).

5. Quality Appraisal

Vauban is a child- and family-friendly neighbourhood. By January 2002, more than 20% of the inhabitants were children under 10 years old; almost 50% of residents were under 18 and less than one quarter of households is adult-only. This is not surprising: new districts are often ‘young districts’, while car-free housing developments both attract households with children and are a haven for them. It has, however, led to some problems: the primary school has been expanded, and a third kindergarten is needed. Furthermore, while there are a number of facilities for small children, with many households containing teenagers, facilities for teenagers are needed.

The stand out feature of Vauban is that it is a low-car neighbourhood, which underpins much of its character. Vauban promotes ‘parking-free living’ and ‘car-free living’. For large parts of the residential area, the B-Plan prohibits building private parking spaces (though outside these areas there are conventional units with basement car parking). On-street parking is only allowed on Vaubanallee. Some qualifications should be made. Rather than parking-free living, it is ‘free of doorstep parking’, since cars can enter the parking-free areas for deliveries and collections (i.e. to drop off ‘grannies and groceries’), but are not permitted to stay for any extended length of time; residents can own cars but must park them in a community car park located at the periphery. Similarly, rather than car-free living, it is ‘living-without-an-owned-car’, since residents can be members of a car-sharing club and have access to a car when required.

Clearing the legal hurdles to enable parking-free and car-free living took several years. Before parking-free development was permissible, State planning law, which required builders to provide a dedicated on-site parking space for each residential unit, had to be changed to allow residential development without an on-site parking space and with parking provision in a community car park within walking distance.
Car-free living is a stage beyond parking free-living. For this the law had to be changed to allow residential development without on-site car parking provision and no current provision of parking space elsewhere. The revised law requires residents to commit to not owning car (and therefore does not require them to buy a space in the community car park) and to join a Car-Free Living Club. The Club, in turn, is required to own land for future development of parking spaces – though until required for parking, the land can be used for any purpose that the Club chooses (e.g. a sports field or community garden) – measures that, amongst other things, highlight the opportunity cost of parking spaces.3

Rather than a car-free enclave, the aim was to create a low car use/low car dependency neighbourhood for wider community benefit. To further enable low-car ownership, Vauban was developed as a ‘district-of-short-distances’ with facilities and amenities within walking distance. Car dependence is further reduced by provision of alternative forms of mobility such as good public transportation and car sharing. Not surprisingly, Vauban has Freiburg’s city-wide car sharing club’s greatest concentration of members. Two bus routes connect Vauban to the city centre and the main railway station. But, perhaps more importantly, Freiburg’s public transportation system is built around a tram network and a tram line running down Vaubanallee with three stations, including two with interchange opportunities with buses was designed into the original plan with. Service commenced in 2006, trams now run 8 to 10 times per hour during peak times, with access to the city centre in 13 minutes and to the central train station in 18 minutes. There are also plans to create a regional commuter rail stop at Vauban’s western end.

3 In conventional (suburban) development, the cost of parking is bundled with the total housing cost. At Vauban, housing units are sold without a parking space, and a parking space or membership of the Car-Free Living Club becomes an explicit separate cost. The 2006 price of a space in one of the community parking garages was €17,500; Club’s 2006 membership fee was €3,700 - significantly cheaper than the cost of constructing a parking space.
Vauban’s car ownership is low: as of 2009, around 70% of households had chosen to live car-free. Parking- and car-free living is possible due to the supports provided – good public transport, a convenient car sharing system, a ‘district-of-short-distances’ – and is tolerated for the wider benefits it offers (i.e. a higher quality of living). The benefit gained by inconveniencing (rather than banning) car owners and shifting the priority towards walking and cycling, is a low-car environment and higher quality-of-life.

Low-car ownership and limited car use allows shared space street design, with streets and other public spaces becoming places for social interaction and playgrounds for children. The streets also blend into other open areas, such as playgrounds, public gardens and the widened sidewalks along Vaubanallee surrounded by preserved old trees. The main street – Vaubanallee – has a speed limit of 30 km/h (20 mph), elsewhere cars should not drive faster than ‘walking speed’ (5 km/h). Most of Vauban’s residential streets are Stellplatzfrei – ‘free-from-parking-spaces’ – and most are also Spielstrassen (play streets). Derived from the Dutch woonerf concept and similar to the UK’s Homes Zones, these are streets designed as a shared space for all users. The bicycle plays a part in Vauban’s everyday life.

The car-free/parking-free system largely depends on social consensus, and there are some problems with enforcement and issues of safety in the community car parks at night, and of convenience regarding shopping and managing children. But, more generally, car-free/parking-free living is uncontroversial: residents knew what to expect, many choose Vauban because of it and all but a very marginal group support it. Complaints are about its operation, rather than the principle.

Ultimately Vauban provides an example of what can be done, such as enabling low car lifestyles and a low car use neighbourhood. While there may be doubts about whether it is repeatable, the message is to learn from it rather than to try to copy it.
Assessment of Vauban according to Scottish Government’s ‘Designing Places’ criteria

- **Does the place have a distinct identity?**
  Vauban has a distinct identity and character. Its signature area is Vaubanallee, with its 60-year old trees, its mall-like green space, swale, public spaces and amenities. The Solar Settlement has a more visually distinctive character but is less appealing than the Baugruppen areas.

- **Does the place have spaces that are safe and pleasant?**
  The spaces between the buildings are pleasant and leafy. It is a family and child-oriented neighbourhood, with many people walking and cycling about the neighbourhood, and a strong, but not invasive sense of ‘eyes-on-the-street’.

- **Is the place easy to move around (especially on foot) (‘permeable’)?**
  Due to restricted car access, the neighbourhood is readily accessible and has high permeability. All the streets have low car density and usage, and are used as social spaces.

- **Does the place make visitors feel sense-of-welcome?**
  People, especially children are using the streets and public spaces, the train comes on a frequent routine and there is a sense of life, activity and community within the neighbourhood.

- **Will the place adapt easily to changing circumstances (‘robust’)?**
  The neighbourhood consists of low-rise, shallow buildings with multiple points of entry possible, and so are robust and adaptable. The neighbourhood has well-developed social capital, through the Baugruppen and other organisations.

- **Does the place make good use of scarce resources (‘sustainable’)?**
  The neighbourhood is strongly low car, promoting parking-free and car-free living, which is ecologically sustainable. It is also designed as a ‘district-of-short-distances’, and so many facilities are within easy walking distance. All houses meet the higher than code Freiburg energy standard; a good number of properties also meet Passivhaus and EnergyPlus standards.
Below is a short description of terms used in the Guide. Most have relevance in wider contexts but in some cases they have particular meaning here and where this is the case we highlight this accordingly.

**After care** – ensuring that someone takes the responsibility for taking good care of the facilities and resources after the work to create or renew them has been completed. Particularly important when these are in common as opposed to individual ownership. (See also stewardship.)

**Asset (or value) growth** – in this context, ensuring that the value of physical assets (for example, housing and other public and privately owned buildings) as well as financial assets (including the amount of money spent and retained in the community) continues to grow and enable the area to prosper and be attractive to others as a place to live, work and invest in.

**Baugruppen** – a form of co-operative in which people organise their business on a collective basis. In this context, this refers to new residents working together to design and build their own homes in Vauban in Germany.

**B–Plan** – plans prepared in Germany generally for inner city areas, areas of change where development pressure is high or where there is a need to stimulate development. They designate urban development, acceptable land uses and development form, and make provision for infrastructure. They are prepared by local authorities themselves or in partnership with private developers and they are legally binding for any landowner who seeks planning permission.

**Brownfield** – this is previously developed land that is unused or may be available for development. It includes both vacant and derelict land and land currently in use with known potential for development.

**Charettes** – usually referred to as a design charette. An intensive, hands-on workshop that brings people from different disciplines and backgrounds together to devise a vision and explore design options for a particular area or site. They can include public workshops with community members, design professionals, and other project staff and take place in a single session or be spread out among two or three workshops.
Creating markets - developing an understanding of the causes of, and potential solutions to, market failure from a sub-regional to local community level. Using that knowledge to develop proposals that will create places where people will want to remain or choose to live, work or invest in. This will involve linking decisions on housing to those about public transport, provision of public services (schools, transport, primary healthcare), the development of an overarching place strategy for the area and providing appropriate support and resources to enhance the capacity and skills within those organisations charged with delivery.

Design codes - a document that sets rules for the design of a new development. It is a tool that can be used in the design and planning process, but goes further and is more regulatory than other forms of guidance commonly used in the planning system over recent decades. They have the potential to deliver consistency in quality to ensure that the aspirations sought by the place promoter and other agencies are actually realised in the final scheme.

Design Review – the Design Review process, through appraisal and evaluation, assists those responsible for the development of the built environment by offering informed advice on the design quality of proposals. There will usually be a panel with a diverse range of professional skills and experience in the built environment. The panel will often consider proposals for projects of all types and sizes, but generally they will be projects which are significant because of size or public impact, their location or set new standards for the future.

‘Detailed Plans’ – in Hammarby, these relate to the smaller details of a project, such as building lines, heights, roof pitches, the location of gardens. Enforcement of these by the Council creates certainty for developers particularly in high density developments where they will want to be sure that later developments will not adversely affect their own.

Development Plan – a document that sets out how places should change and what they could be like in the future. It says what type of development should take place where, and which areas should not be developed. It sets out the best locations for new homes and businesses and protects places of value to people or wildlife. It also helps development to take place quickly by describing how any new or improved facilities, such as roads, schools and parks, will be provided. Councils and national park authorities must prepare a development plan for their area at least every five years.
**Enquiry by design** - a planning tool that brings together key stakeholders to collaborate on a vision for a new or regenerated community. Very similar to the “charette” process, it would normally run for five working days and be proceeded by preparatory sessions to explore key issues and familiarise participants with the process ahead.

**Greenfield** – a term used to describe undeveloped land in a city or rural area. It may be currently used for agriculture or landscape facilities or left to evolve naturally. These areas of land are usually agricultural or amenity properties being considered for urban development.

**Infrastructure** - the basic facilities, services, and installations needed to support the functioning of a community or a large scale housing or commercial development. Some aspects will be site specific such as water and power, transportation and communications lines; other aspects will be “off site” such as schools, post offices, health service provision.

**Leverage ratio** – in this context it refers to the way in which organisations share potential risks and rewards from a development where the returns are variable or uncertain. Each organisation uses its initial investment, credit, or borrowed funds to gain a higher return in relation to that investment. It can also be used where an organisation wants to control a much larger investment or to reduce its own liability for any potential future losses arising from that investment.

**Market transformation** – a strategic process of intervening in markets to alter people’s behavior as consumers or suppliers. In this context, creating a place vision that encourages developers to build homes, safe in the knowledge that people will want to buy them, not just for the quality of the house itself but for the ease of access to other high quality amenities and services.

**Masterplan** – usually a plan that describes and maps an overall development concept, including present and future land use, urban design and landscaping, built form, infrastructure, circulation and service provision. It is based upon an understanding of place and it is intended to provide a structured approach to creating a clear and consistent framework for development.
New urbanism - a movement, also known as Traditional Neighbourhoods Design (TND), which reflects a growing interest in making places that put a sense of community high on the list of desirable attributes. It aims to create housing developments that embody some of the spirit of older neighbourhoods and are walkable. Features include narrower streets that encourage people to get to know their neighbours, front porches, corner stores, and plenty of mature trees to make the place feel rooted, as though it’s been there for a while.

Patient equity - where an investor (public or private) provides finance for a project, usually in return for a degree of ownership and influence over its implementation, with the advantage of lowering the risk factors and the improving prospect of better mid- to long-term returns.

Placemaking - an approach which is not just about design. It involves understanding the bigger story about a place, as well as being attentive to the small but important details. It involves taking care of what is there already, and anticipating what is still needed to make a place work. The focus is also on ensuring that places can adapt easily to changing circumstances and are sustainable and successful in the longterm.

‘Quality Programmes’ - in Hammarby, these follow on once ‘Detailed Plans’ are finished (see above). They are similar to design codes and produce a very detailed specification of how each building will look. This also forms part of the planning permission for the building and will have been discussed amongst planners, architects, builders and the planning enforcement team beforehand.

Real estate development - a process that encompasses activities where (typically) developers purchase land, determine the marketing of the property, design and implement the building programme, obtaining the necessary public approvals and creating, controlling and orchestrating the process of development from the beginning to end. Developers usually take the greatest risk in the creation or renovation of real estate and receive the greatest rewards.

‘Red Carpet’ system - in Ijburg, this was the name given by the city’s Projectbureau to the project co-ordinating the constructing bridges, cables and pipes. The essential idea was to ensure a continuing dialogue between the Projectbureau and the multitude of utilities companies so that the installation of services infrastructure would be smooth and straightforward.
**Serviced plots** - bare land where civil engineering works have been carried out to provide access to essential services such as gas, electricity, water, main drainage, street lighting and sewerage.

**Social capital** – in broader societal terms, this refers to the combination of networks, norms, relationships and values that shape the quantity and co-operative quality of a society’s social interactions. It can be measured using a range of indicators but the most commonly used measure is trust in other people. In this context, we refer to the ability of partner organisations to use their combined knowledge, expertise and resources collectively to create higher quality places than they could separately in their own ‘silos.’

**Spatial frameworks** – in this context, a generic term used to describe a focus on a geographic place and the way in which a strategy or plan can be developed for that place. In formal terms this may the Development Plan but may also embrace a more specific place based masterplan.

**Stewardship** – Ensuring that someone takes the responsibility for taking good care of the facilities and resources after the work to create or renew them has been completed. Particularly important when these are in common as opposed to individual ownership.

**Sustainable Urban Drainage System (SUDS)** – these are a sequence of water management practices and facilities designed to drain surface water in a manner that will provide a more sustainable approach than what has been the conventional practice of routing run-off through a pipe to a watercourse. Practices involved are ‘good housekeeping’ or ‘best management practices’ which can include reduction of polluting activities and materials and water harvesting. And facilities, usually requiring to be constructed, can include things like permeable surfaces, underground storage and wetlands.