The impacts of migrants and migration into Scotland

PEOPLE, COMMUNITIES AND PLACES
Acknowledgements

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Contents

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. 6

The evidence review ............................................................................................................ 6
An overview of the evidence base ......................................................................................... 6
Impact of migration on the labour market ........................................................................... 7
Impact of migration on public finances .............................................................................. 7
Impact of migration on public services .............................................................................. 8
  Impact of migration on health and social care services .................................................... 8
  Impact of migration on housing services .......................................................................... 9
  Impact of migration on education services ...................................................................... 9
  Impact of migration on crime and justice services .......................................................... 10
Migrant integration and culture ......................................................................................... 10
Gaps in the evidence base ............................................................................................... 11

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 12

Background ......................................................................................................................... 12
Table 1.1: Scotland’s population in 2001 and 2011 ............................................................. 12
Table 1.2: The top 20 sources of migrants to Scotland 2001 and 2011 ............................ 13
The evidence review ......................................................................................................... 14
Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 15
Definitions ............................................................................................................................ 16
Structure of the report ........................................................................................................ 17

2. An overview of the evidence base ................................................................................. 18

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 18
About methodologies ........................................................................................................... 19
About data sources ............................................................................................................. 19
About migrant groups .......................................................................................................... 20

3. Economic impact of migration ....................................................................................... 21

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 21
Impact of migration on the labour market ........................................................................ 22
  Migrants’ education levels .............................................................................................. 23
  Migrant employment ....................................................................................................... 24
Table 3.1: Economic activity among those of working age (per cent) .............................. 25
Chart 3.1: Occupations of people working in the UK ......................................................... 27
  Employers ......................................................................................................................... 28
Impact of migration on the wages and employment of UK-born workers ...................... 31
Impact of migration on public finances .......................................................................... 35
Migrant contributions to public finances .......................................................... 36

Table 3.2: Estimates of the fiscal effects of immigration for the fiscal years 1995-2011 and 2001-2011 (billion, 2011 GBP equivalent) .......................................................... 37

Social Security .................................................................................................. 37

Migrants’ contribution to GDP ........................................................................ 40

4. Impact of migration on public services ....................................................... 41

Public services (general) ................................................................................ 41

Table 4.1: Aggregate expenditure on state education and public services, 2009-10 (UK) ................................................................................................................. 43

Health and social care ................................................................................... 44

Demand for health services ........................................................................... 45

How migrants use health services ................................................................ 45

Public health impact of migration ................................................................... 46

Migrants working in the health and social care sector ....................................... 47

Table 4.2: Sector of employment – Human health and social work – Scotland-born and all migrants aged 16 to 74 in employment ........................................... 48

Housing ............................................................................................................. 48

Housing sector .................................................................................................. 49

Housing conditions .......................................................................................... 51

Migrants working in the construction industry .................................................. 52

Education ............................................................................................................. 53

A possible increase in pupil numbers resulting from migration ....................... 54

The demands and benefits of migration for schools ......................................... 54

The response of schools to migration .............................................................. 55

Migrants working in the education sector ........................................................ 56

Table 4.3: Sector of employment – Education – Scotland-born and all migrants aged 16 to 74 in employment .......................................................... 56

Crime and justice services .............................................................................. 56

Criminal activity by migrants .......................................................................... 57

Criminal activity perpetrated against migrants ............................................... 59

Migrant workers in the crime and justice sector ................................................. 60

5. Migrant integration and culture ................................................................. 61

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 61

Social and cultural networks ........................................................................... 63

Language .......................................................................................................... 67

Religion ............................................................................................................. 68
Executive Summary

The evidence review

The aim of this review is to summarise and evaluate the recent literature on the impacts that migrants and migration have had on Scotland’s economy, labour market, public services, communities and culture. Where information is available, the review also explores ways in which the impacts of migrants and migration have been experienced differently in Scotland from the rest of the UK. The focus is on economic migrants, students, and those who accompany or join family members. It does not cover refugees or asylum seekers, or second or third generation migrants, except where people in these groups are not distinguishable from other categories of migrant. The review also examines the scope, scale and quality of the existing evidence and identifies gaps in the evidence base.

An overview of the evidence base

Migration is the most difficult component of population change to estimate. There is no comprehensive system which registers migration in the UK, including migration to or from overseas, migration to or from other parts of the UK or migration within Scotland. Therefore, estimates of migration have to be based on survey data and administrative data. The National Records of Scotland (NRS) website includes a section on the availability and sources of migration data, and a spreadsheet detailing the strengths and weaknesses of different sources. The quality of migration data is a long running issue (at both UK and Scotland level) and has been examined several times, most recently by the UK Government Public Administration Committee in 2013. Improvement work is ongoing and ONS are taking forward work to link data sources to look at the characteristics of migrants.

Scotland-specific evidence on the impacts of migrants and migration is, generally, limited. However, a good deal of relevant research has been carried out since the last review of this type was commissioned by the Scottish Government in 2009. This includes literature reviews, quantitative analysis of national survey data and a number of qualitative research studies, although the latter are based in, and relate to, particular locations with specific socio-economic characteristics. As such, while they provide a rich picture of impacts at a local level, findings are unlikely to be representative of Scotland as a whole.

The evidence base relating to labour market impacts is more developed than evidence on public services, social and cultural impacts. In particular, in the discipline of economics, there has been extensive work in recent years on the fiscal impacts of migration, although this research is all at the level of the UK. Most recent research in Scotland relates to migrants from countries that joined the European

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1 Undocumented migrants were included in the scope of the review. However, no material was identified that focused specifically on this type of migrant
Union in 2004, primarily Poland. There is little or no research in Scotland which explores the impact of migrants from the rest of the UK.

Information on migrants’ contribution to the provision of public services in Scotland is sparse. However, individual studies are beginning to fill the gaps in the evidence base, both at the UK and Scotland level.

**Impact of migration on the labour market**

Migrants tend to be young and economically active. In general, they arrive with qualifications, so have the potential to complement the stock of human capital in the host country. However, qualifications are often not fully recognised or utilised in host countries and some migrants with higher level qualifications are working in jobs of low skill and minimum wage rates. At the UK level, there is some evidence that qualification/occupation mismatches are associated with country of origin, with migrants from countries that joined the EU from 2004 onwards doing less well than those from Northern Europe.

Several studies in Scotland and the UK have found a ‘U-shaped pattern’ of wage distribution among migrants, with employment concentrated at the top and bottom of the occupational distribution curve.

A body of Scotland-specific evidence exists on the use of migrant labour. Migrants, particularly recent EEA migrants, tend to be concentrated in hospitality and catering; in agriculture; and in food processing sectors. In general, migrants meet demand for low-skilled labour, and address sector-specific skills shortages at the higher end of the labour market. In addition, migrants act as a flexible supply of labour when demand exceeds local labour supply. However, in sectors such as agriculture, where employers find it difficult to source labour regardless of prevailing economic conditions, demand for seasonal migrant labour remains more constant.

Migration does not appear to have had a statistically significant impact on the average wages and employment opportunities of the UK-born population in periods when the economy is strong, although there is some evidence of labour market displacement when the economy is in recession. The available evidence indicates that any adverse wage effects of migration are likely to be greatest for resident workers who are themselves migrants. Evidence also suggests that displacement effects dissipate over time, as the labour market adjusts.

**Impact of migration on public finances**

The impact of migration on the public purse is complex and difficult to measure. Much depends on the characteristics of migrants, their impacts on the labour market and the characteristics of the social security system. Several relevant papers have been published in recent years, although this evidence is at the level of the UK.

There are major variations in recent estimates of the fiscal contributions made by migrants. While the evidence is contested, research indicates that EEA migrants, in
particular those who entered the fiscal system after 2000, have made a more positive fiscal contribution than non-EEA migrants and people born in the UK.

The evidence base on social security receipt by migrants is patchy due, at least in part, to the availability and quality of data. There is evidence that migrants from the EEA are less likely to claim out-of-work benefits, but more likely to claim in-work benefits, compared with people born in the UK. It is likely that there is a connection between the level of in-work benefit claims and the types of low-paid jobs taken by many migrants.

**Impact of migration on public services**

Systematic data and analysis about migrants’ use of public services is limited, and there is even less information about the value of migrants’ contribution to the provision of public services. However, individual studies are beginning to fill the gaps in the evidence base, both at the UK and Scotland level.

At the UK level, aggregate expenditure on state education and public services (health and personal social services) in the UK was calculated using 2009-10 data. Analysis indicated that an estimated 12.5 per cent of total expenditure on state education and public services was allocated to non-UK migrants and their children. As migrants made up 13 per cent of the population as a whole at the time, this was slightly less than their share.

**Impact of migration on health and social care services**

Health services in Scotland need to accommodate the needs and expectations of an increasingly diverse population. However, migrants from outside the UK are, in general, young and have low healthcare needs. Consequently, there is little evidence of increased demand for health services resulting from migration into Scotland. Where evidence on specific demand exists, it is associated with social deprivation, poor language skills and, possibly, lack of knowledge of the health system, rather than migration *per se*.

The literature indicates relatively low rates of GP registration among migrants. While some studies have stated that there may be a connection between low GP registration rates and the use migrants make of Accident and Emergency departments for primary healthcare needs, there is no robust evidence of this.

Available evidence indicates that uncertainty over entitlement to health care and treatment, differences in provision and approaches to treatment in Scotland and in their country of birth, and language barriers, all contribute to low levels of migrants’ trust and willingness to access health services.

Evidence relating to migrants’ general health is sparse, and literature addressing the mental health and wellbeing of migrants does not distinguish between migrant groups and length of residence in the UK. However, there is evidence that the demand for health services is likely to increase as migrants age, and as their health behaviours change (in relation to alcohol use, smoking behaviour and eating habits, for example) the longer they stay in the UK.
As in the rest of the UK, health services in Scotland are reliant on migrant labour, particularly the labour of recent migrants from non-EEA countries. Twenty per cent of recent non-EEA migrants who were in employment at the time of the 2011 Census worked in human health and social work. This compares with 15 or 16 per cent of adults born in Scotland, the rest of the UK, EEA established and non-EEA established migrants.

**Impact of migration on housing services**

There is little systematic evidence that allows the direct and indirect impacts of migration on house prices, rents and social housing to be assessed at national and local levels. Much of the evidence available relates to housing choices and housing conditions of migrants and, at the Scotland level, a number of small, qualitative studies have examined housing choices and housing conditions for particular migrant groups in specific locations. Findings are not generalisable, but there is some evidence that moving migrants into the available housing supply can enable them to live independently and make improvements to their accommodation. On the other hand, evidence suggests that migrants may pay higher than average rents for poor quality accommodation in areas of social deprivation.

Among migrants to the UK, there are lower rates of home ownership, and greater representation in the rental sector. Recent migrants are also less likely than the UK-born population to be accommodated in the social housing sector. As would be expected, the available evidence indicates that, the longer migrants live in the UK, the more likely they are to become owner occupiers, and the less likely they are to be in the private rented sector.

**Impact of migration on education services**

The majority of evidence on migrants’ use of education services is at the UK level. The main focus of research has been the impact of recent migration, particularly from Eastern Europe, on schools in the UK. Data limitations have restricted the scope, scale and robustness of the research, although in Scotland, at least, the way data are collected and reported has been improved in recent years, which should support more detailed analysis.

A number of studies (in the UK and in Scotland) have examined additional demands on schools arising from the needs of some migrant pupils. These include translation and interpreting services. There is some evidence to suggest that school performance and pupil achievement may be enhanced by the presence of non-UK migrants in schools. However, the relationship between the number of migrants in schools and performance is not clear cut, and it is often the case that the schools receiving the highest number of migrant children are in some of the most deprived areas.

This review was unable to find any research focusing specifically on migrants as providers of education services. However, analysis of 2011 Census data found that approximately one in ten non-EEA recent and established migrants and established EEA migrants in employment were working in the education sector, compared with 8 per cent of people born in Scotland.
Impact of migration on crime and justice services

The evidence base on the relationships between migration and crime/justice has been strengthened in recent years, although research relates to the UK as a whole, rather than Scotland. Researchers have identified a number of difficulties in interpreting the available data: arrest/conviction rates may be affected by migrants committing crimes that are easier/harder to detect; police and court services may allocate resources differently and be more/less ready to arrest and convict migrants; and there may be differences in the willingness of migrants and UK-born individuals to report criminal activity.

The relationship between migration and crime and justice can be looked at in two ways: the contribution of migrants to criminal activity; and criminal activity perpetrated against migrants. Several studies at the UK level have shown that there is no consistent relationship between crime and migration, with most studies finding only small and insignificant effects. Where it has been possible to distinguish between groups of migrants, evidence has generally been consistent with the standard economic model of crime: groups with strong labour market attachment are less likely to be associated with criminal activity. In addition, models of individual crime participation tend to show that migrants are less likely to commit crime than observably similar people who are born in the UK. This review found no academic papers relating specifically to the impact of migration in terms of criminal activity in Scotland.

Migrants appear to be less likely to report being victims of crimes than people born in the UK although, as time in the country increases, migrant experiences of crime tend to mirror those of the UK-born population. Analysis of survey data indicates that there is lower reported crime and self-reported victimisation in neighbourhoods with a higher share of migrants in the local population than in similar neighbourhoods with lower migration densities. This suggests some measure of protection from crime for local populations living in areas with higher numbers of migrants.

Migrant integration and culture

The experiences of migrants, and the ease or difficulty with which they can integrate into local communities may be key to whether they decide to stay or leave. ‘Integration’ can be used as an umbrella term for different models of migrant incorporation, and includes a number of dimensions. In relation to cultural and civic integration, there is generally insufficient evidence in the existing literature to allow impacts to be defined and accurately measured.

In rural Scotland, qualitative research highlights the pressures faced by migrants to assimilate to the norms of the dominant majority, and the difficulties in maintaining their distinct cultural identity, especially in the absence of co-ethnic groups within reasonable distance. In the urban context, several quantitative and qualitative studies have established that factors such as the ability to speak English without difficulty, employment and educational qualifications all have a significant impact on migrants’ ability to develop a social support network and access social amenities within the community. The longer that migrants live in the same area, the more likely they are to feel integrated in the community.
The importance of language in relation to migrant integration has been emphasised in several qualitative studies conducted in Scotland. It affects access to information, employability and engagement; the ability to make friends, adapt to new environments and deal with loss and loneliness. The process of learning a language in itself encourages mutual adaptation of migrants and the host society. However, there is a wider range of evidence to indicate that migrants are often defined as being out of place in their new environment, despite being multilingual.

This review found little research relating to potential impacts on Scotland of religions unfamiliar to people born in Scotland, or the arrival of large numbers of people practising specific religions. A study exploring the impact of Polish migrants on Catholic parishes found a range of both positive and negative effects.

The process of adaptation and integration involves both new and host communities and cultures, so the attitudes of host communities are important. The evidence base relating to public attitudes to migration, both in the UK and in Scotland, is substantial. Data at the UK level indicate that, the greater the ethnic diversity of neighbourhoods, the less likely it is that people think levels of migration should be reduced. Research also suggests that people differentiate between types of migrant, being more likely to favour reducing the number of low-skilled workers than skilled migrants and students. There appears to be a difference between attitudes in Scotland and the rest of the UK, with people in Scotland generally more positive. However, attitudes to migrants are mixed and fluid, and data suggest that in Scotland, as in the rest of the UK, a majority want to see an overall reduction in migration.

Gaps in the evidence base

Given that the evidence base in Scotland is weaker than the UK as a whole, and that Scotland’s experience of migration is relatively recent, it is important to gain a better understanding of the dynamic of migration in Scotland. This is particularly the case in the following areas:

- Public services (particularly migrants’ contribution to public service delivery)
- The impact that migrants from the rest of the UK have on Scotland
- Measuring the cultural and civic integration of migrants
- The impacts of migration on the Scottish economy.

Looking ahead, changes to the legislative landscape in Scotland and the devolution of additional powers and responsibilities to Scotland warrant appropriate investment in strengthening the evidence base.
1. Introduction

Background

Scotland, like many countries, is projected to experience a significant demographic shift over the next few decades, leading to an increase in the average age of the population. Since 2007, Scotland has had a population growth target: ‘to match average European (EU15) population growth over the period from 2007 to 2017, supported by increased healthy life expectancy in Scotland over this period.’

The Scottish Government’s Economic Strategy explicitly links population growth with economic growth. Scotland’s approach to delivering sustainable economic growth is characterised by four key priorities, one of which is ‘an international outlook and focus, open to trade, migration and new ideas’ (2015a:10).

Scotland’s population increased by more than 230,000 between the Censuses of 2001 and 2011. Although this was partly due to changes in birth and death rates, the key driver of demographic change has been migration. Between 2001 and 2011, the total number of people living in Scotland who were born outside Scotland (including the other parts of the UK) increased from 651,600 to 883,500. As a percentage of Scotland’s total population, this was a change from less than 13 per cent to almost 17 per cent. Table 1.1 provides a breakdown of the population.

Table 1.1: Scotland’s population in 2001 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>Number of people</th>
<th>Percentage of Scotland’s total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total born in Scotland</td>
<td>4,410,400</td>
<td>87.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total born in the rest of the UK</td>
<td>460,040</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total born outside the UK</td>
<td>191,571</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL POPULATION</td>
<td>5,062,011</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scotland’s Census 2011 – NRS, Country of birth (detailed), all people; Scotland’s Census 2001 – NRS, Reference Volume, Table CAS 015

Table 1.2 provides more detail about Scotland’s migrant population:

- The biggest change between 2001 and 2011 relates to the number of migrants who came to Scotland from the countries that acceded to the EU between April 2001 and March 2011, particularly Poland (approximately 55,000 people).
- Other major changes included increases in the China-born population (more than 15,300 people born in China were living in Scotland in 2011, 12,000 more than in 2001) and migrants born in India (an increase from 10,500 to 23,500 between 2001 and 2011).

3 http://www.gov.scot/About/Performance/scotPerforms/purposetargets/population
4 Accession countries are Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Malta, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus
Table 1.2: The top 20 sources of migrants to Scotland 2001 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Migrants to Scotland 2001</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Migrants to Scotland 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 England</td>
<td>408,948</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>459,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Northern Ireland</td>
<td>33,528</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>55,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Republic of Ireland</td>
<td>21,774</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>36,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Germany</td>
<td>18,703</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>23,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Wales</td>
<td>16,623</td>
<td>Republic of Ireland</td>
<td>22,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Pakistan</td>
<td>12,645</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 United States of America</td>
<td>11,149</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>20,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 India</td>
<td>10,523</td>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>17,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Canada</td>
<td>8,569</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>15,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 South Africa</td>
<td>7,803</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>15,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Australia</td>
<td>7,555</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>10,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Hong Kong</td>
<td>7,068</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>9,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Non-EU countries in W Europe</td>
<td>4,943</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>9,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Italy</td>
<td>4,936</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>8,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 France</td>
<td>4,850</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>7,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Other S. and E. Africa</td>
<td>4,246</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>7,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Other Far East</td>
<td>4,221</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 New Zealand</td>
<td>3,413</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 China</td>
<td>3,329</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>4,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Other Middle East</td>
<td>3,289</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>4,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of migrants</strong></td>
<td><strong>598,115</strong></td>
<td><strong>761,619</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total born outside Scotland, including the rest of the UK</strong></td>
<td><strong>651,611</strong></td>
<td><strong>883,519</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scotland's Census 2011, NRS, Country of birth (detailed), all people. Scotland's Census 2001, NRS, Table UV08, Country of Birth.

The Census 2011 also indicates that migrants are, predominantly, young. The youngest age profile at the time of the Census was Scotland’s Polish population, with 85 per cent aged under 40.

Although migration policy is reserved to the UK Government, the Scottish Government has argued that Scotland’s need for, and attitude to migration is distinct from other parts of the UK. Demographic stability and growth has been positioned as central to sustainable economic growth in Scotland, with migration the chief means through which this can be achieved in the short to medium term. In addition, the issue of migration has not been politicised north of the border to the same extent as it has in the rest of the UK (McCollum et al, 2014:80).

Scotland saw, proportionally, a greater increase in its migrant population than any of the other nations of the UK between 2001 and 2011. However, Scotland’s migrant population remains relatively small and its population density low in comparison with many other parts of the UK (Blinder, 2014:2).

The narratives around the issue of migration developed by the Scottish and UK Governments have become increasingly distinct over the last few years. In the 2013 white paper Scotland’s Future, the Scottish Government stated that ‘Scotland has a different need for immigration than other parts of the UK’ (2013:267) and that
'the current UK immigration system has not supported Scotland’s migration priorities’ (ibid:268). However, since 2010, the UK Government has adopted increasingly restrictive immigration policies which it cites as ‘economically and socially necessary’. Therefore, Scotland is significantly constrained in the migration policies that it is able to implement under the current constitutional settlement.

It is also worth noting that, in Scotland, the narrative about the benefits of migration focuses exclusively on population growth. It does not highlight the importance of migration for addressing skills and occupational shortages, or the idea of human capital as a driver of productivity and growth. Reports from OECD exemplify the broader labour market oriented approach. For example, the policy brief ‘Matching economic migration with labour market needs in Europe,’ September 2014, emphasises the importance of policies and practices to make sure that economic migration and free movement contribute to meeting labour market shortages, and ensuring a better use of the skills, both of migrants and their children raised in the destination country.

The evidence review

The aim of this review is to summarise and evaluate the recent literature on the impacts that migrants and migration have had on Scotland. The review also examines the scope, scale and quality of the existing evidence and identifies gaps in the evidence base.

The review focuses on the impacts that migrants and migration have had on Scotland’s economy, labour market, public services, communities and culture. Where possible, it also explores ways in which the impacts of migrants and migration have been experienced differently in Scotland from the rest of the UK. The intention is to consider both the short and longer term impacts of migration.

The review includes economic migrants, students, those who accompany or join family members, and (where possible) undocumented migrants. It does not include refugees or asylum seekers, or second or third generation migrants, except where people in these groups are not distinguishable from other categories of migrant. The focus is on all migrants to Scotland, including migrants from the rest of the UK (see ‘Definitions’ section below).

The intention is to update and extend the scope of an earlier review of the evidence base commissioned by the Scottish Government (Rolfe and Metcalf, 2009). For this reason, the Rolfe and Metcalf work is referenced throughout this report. However, there are differences between the remit of the two reviews. Rolfe and Metcalf were asked to focus specifically on migrants from the EU accession countries, and to examine the impacts of recent migration on employment and public services, without a broader focus on economic affairs. Their review also assessed data sources on migrant stocks and flows, following consultation with Scottish local
authorities and other key stakeholders. This is beyond the scope of the present review.

In a 2010 report on the extent and impact of migration in Scotland, the Scottish Parliament Equal Opportunities Committee commended the 2009 research and noted that it highlighted the positive impacts made by migrants in Scotland. It noted, however, that ‘few studies have assessed the impact of migration on services which means that any additional costs that arise are largely unknown. The Committee recommends that the Scottish Government should undertake further research in this regard’ (2010, para 131). This review is intended to go some way towards addressing these matters.

Methodology

This report has been produced by the Scottish Government’s Strategic Analysis Team. The original literature search was conducted by researchers at Glasgow Refugee, Asylum and Migration Network (GRAMNet). To ensure the quality of evidence included in the review, the focus of the GRAMNet search was on papers published in peer reviewed academic journals. Search terms used by GRAMNet, and developed through their understanding of the scope and broad themes of the research, were supplemented and refined as the review developed, and were used to search a range of established and scientifically recognised online databases (see Annex 2).

The initial scoping phase of the GRAMNet study indicated that the evidence base was substantial, so a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria was agreed with Scottish Government officials and applied in order to focus on evidence of the impacts of migration likely to be most useful for policy development. However, detailed examination of those papers that satisfied the agreed criteria made it clear that Scotland-specific evidence relates mainly to migrant experiences. Impacts are difficult to assess from the findings reported, or the focus of research is on impacts on migrants themselves, rather than impacts on Scotland as a receiving country.

In the second scoping phase, Scottish Government analysts revisited the annotated bibliography produced by GRAMNet, and conducted further assessment of the papers, to ensure a refined focus on migration impacts. A supplementary literature search was then undertaken, using Web of Science and Google Scholar, and additional studies were accessed via the reference sections of relevant papers.

Although the peer review process is the gold standard for publication in academic journals, the second search made it clear that, to assess the evidence on migration impacts, it would be necessary to look across a wider range of publications. This included the publications of organisations specifically dedicated to migration research (and those academics writing for them), along with relevant Government publications. Most of these papers will not have been subjected to a formal peer review process; however, they may be early versions of papers for academic journals and/or use material published in peer reviewed journals. In one or two instances, the review also includes papers which, although less robust, offer useful contributions to the debate. Appropriate caveats are highlighted in relation to the interpretation of these data sources.
One advantage of looking beyond peer reviewed literature is that there is likely to be a substantial time lag between the research process, writing up, review and publication. Including work with a faster turnaround time allows this review to be as up to date as possible. However, it is also important to acknowledge that work that has not been subject to the peer review process is likely to have more limitations and may be less impartial in content.

The review did not consider unpublished papers or work in progress.

The reference section lists all papers included in the review. Footnotes throughout the review relate to clarification of issues and links to supplementary sources of information.

Definitions

When counting migrants and analysing the consequences of migration, it is important to determine who is and is not a migrant. There is no consensus on a single definition of a ‘migrant.’ Some of the considerations, the different definitions used in analyses of different datasets, and the consequences of differences in definitions are explored in a Migration Observatory paper by Anderson and Blinder (2015). The authors note that differences in definitions may translate into different estimates of migration stocks and flows, as well as the impacts of migration (2015:6-7). However, while acknowledging the complexity of definitional issues, it is beyond the remit of this report to investigate the topic any further.

The starting point for this review is the United Nations definition of a migrant as a ‘person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence.’ The review interprets the ‘country other than the country of usual residence’ as being Scotland, not Britain, or the rest of the UK. This means that, for the purposes of this review, people from other parts of the UK are also included as migrants.

Focusing only on migrants resident in Scotland for longer than a year could miss important aspects of the impacts of migration, including temporary and circular migration, which are of particular relevance to some Scottish regions and economic sectors. For this reason, the UN definition was relaxed to some extent during the literature search although, in practice, it was often not possible to tell whether the focus of papers was on migrants of more or less than a year’s duration of stay.

Studies use the terms ‘migrants,’ ‘immigrants’ and ‘in-migrants.’ For consistency, the term ‘migrant’ is used throughout this review, except in the titles of papers which use different terms, and direct quotes from those papers. The term ‘migrants’ includes different groups in different studies: this is highlighted where it is possible to make such distinctions.

6 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/migration/migrmethods.htm
7 This is not a conventional application of the term: for the UN definition, the assumption is that ‘country’ is an internationally recognized independent state
It has not been possible to interpret definitional issues lying behind the data sources used by individual studies (for example whether migrants are defined as ‘foreign-born’ or ‘foreign-national’).

The review uses ‘Scotland-born’ or ‘UK-born’ rather than ‘native’ or ‘native-born’ although, as above, direct quotes and titles of papers have not been altered.

Studies refer to EEA, EU, EU15, A8, A10, A2 migrants, terms which overlap. Annex 1 gives a full list of definitions, but terms are used in the review as they have been in individual papers. This may lead to some differences when interpreting findings; where possible, these are highlighted.

**Structure of the report**

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the evidence base, the key studies that form its backbone, methodologies, migrant groups and an indication of the evidence in relation to each key impact area.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 investigate the evidence on Economic Impacts, Public Service Impacts and Migrant Integration and Culture. At the beginning of each chapter section, key findings are summarised in a shaded box.

Chapter 6 includes a short discussion section and highlights gaps in the evidence base.
2. An overview of the evidence base

Introduction

Scotland-specific evidence on the impacts of migrants and migration is somewhat limited. Research tends to be descriptive and/or theoretical and, as noted in Chapter 1, to focus on the needs and experiences of migrants, or particular populations of migrants, rather than their impacts on Scotland as a receiving country. The evidence base has, however, been strengthened in recent years, and a number of studies are relevant to this review.

While there are relatively few academics publishing in the field of migration impacts in Scotland, several experts have published widely. In addition, organisations such as the Economic and Social Research Council-funded Centre for Population Change have produced a number of useful studies at the Scotland level.

Work by the Scottish Parliament Equal Opportunities Committee in 2010 (Inquiry into migration and trafficking) explored the impact and contribution of migrant populations to Scottish society. The Committee’s report noted that, while migration is a reserved issue, the ‘Scottish Government must have a role in formulating and developing migration policy given the impact on devolved responsibilities such as healthcare, education and the justice system’ (2010: para 685). A range of experts, including academics, gave evidence to the Committee. Throughout this review, relevant opinions and experiences offered to the Committee are included in boxes to supplement the text.

The evidence base relating to economic and labour market impacts is more developed than evidence on public services, social and cultural impacts. In particular, there has been a good deal of work in recent years on the fiscal impacts of migration. At the UK level, researchers at the University of Oxford’s Migration Observatory have conducted a range of relevant studies, and identified problems in the evidence base as part of that work. This review will not examine these studies in detail, but will locate the Scottish evidence base within the UK evidence base where possible. Several Migration Observatory briefing papers focus specifically on Scotland.

Information on migrants’ contribution to the provision of public services in Scotland is still scarce. However, individual studies are beginning to fill the gaps in the evidence base, both at the UK and Scotland level.

The most comprehensive body of work to be conducted on the impacts of migration since 2008 is a study by the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), published in 2012. This included six specially commissioned research projects, workshops with academics, government officials and public sector bodies, and a stakeholder panel. Several of these projects make specific reference to Scotland. The focus of the study (and most of the contributing research projects) is on non-EEA migrants and, in particular, skilled workers and students. However, it is relevant to both economic and public service impacts, so will be referred to throughout this review. The focus on non-EEA migrants is also important in the context of the increased numbers of
migrants to Scotland from India, Pakistan and China between the 2001 and 2011 Censuses (Table 1.2).

The 2009 review of the literature by Rolfe and Metcalf is referenced by many of the more recent Scotland-specific studies, so it is important to consider the evidence base in relation to the previous study commissioned by the Scottish Government. Although the scope, scale and focus of the earlier report was slightly different from the present review, the work of Rolfe and Metcalf will be referenced where it is helpful to do so.

**About methodologies**

There is a link between the scope and scale of research and the choice of research method. Large studies, which explore the extent of impacts across populations, tend to favour quantitative methods, while smaller studies use qualitative methods, or a combination of both. A number of studies include useful literature reviews.

Valuable insights on impact may be drawn from small research projects which explore the depth of experience in key populations or localities. Such studies involve migrants whose characteristics, experiences and motivations for migration are not necessarily shared by others, and may be specific to time and place. A number of informative qualitative studies have been conducted at a local level, with Glasgow and rural Scotland being particularly well represented.

**About data sources**

There is an identified and ongoing need for better data relating to migrants, both at the Scotland and UK level. However, as acknowledged by the National Records of Scotland (NRS), migration is the most difficult component of population change to estimate. There is no comprehensive system which registers migration in the UK, including migration to or from overseas, migration to or from other parts of the UK or migration within Scotland. Therefore, estimates of migration have to be based on survey data and the best administrative data that exist. The NRS website includes a section on the availability and sources of migration data, and a spreadsheet detailing the strengths and weaknesses of different sources.*

The issue has been examined several times, most recently in 2013 by the UK Government Public Administration Committee. (See also the UK Government’s response and the response from the UK Statistics Authority.) Work continues to improve the availability and sources of data, and ONS are taking forward work to link HM Revenue and Customs and Department of Work and Pensions data to look at the characteristics of migrants.

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9 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpubadm/523/52303.htm
10 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpubadm/1228/122804.htm
The review did not set out to examine the data sources used in the studies in the evidence base. However, data source deficiencies are highlighted by researchers in a number of areas and, while these have not been explored further as part of this review, it is worth noting that they exist. For example, migration inflows to the UK from EEA and non-EEA countries may be examined using National Insurance Number (NINo) registration datasets maintained by the Department of Work and Pensions. However, NINo data have shortcomings: they do not record the date a migrant arrives, but only the date they register onto the NINo system, in order to work or claim benefits. Research has indicated that more than a quarter of NINo registrations in 2010-11 took place more than two years after migrants arrived in the UK (Saggar et al, 2012).

The Annual Population Survey (APS) is used by many of the studies to gain a better understanding of migrant experiences in the host country. The APS is a continuous household survey, covering the UK, with the aim of providing estimates between censuses of key social and labour market variables at a local area level. The APS is not a stand-alone survey, but uses data combined from two waves from the main Labour Force Survey (LFS) with data collected on a local sample boost. Apart from employment and unemployment, the topics covered in the survey include housing, ethnicity, religion, health and education12.

The LFS is used by many of the studies that have aimed to gain a better understanding of migrant experiences in the labour market. However, in addition to issues relating to small sample sizes for migrants, the survey excludes short-term migrants and those who do not live in households. It also excludes halls of residence, thus missing many international students who may be legally working in the UK. Consequently, there are limitations to the way the data can be interpreted (Vargas-Silva, 2013:6).

**About migrant groups**

The studies included in this review recognise that migrants are not and should not be considered as a homogenous group, although it is not always possible to distinguish between migrant groups when findings are reported. Most recent research in Scotland relates to A8, primarily Polish, migrants. Some studies focus on all migrants, generally meaning ‘all non-UK’ migrants. Individual research projects also focus on specific communities (such as the Roma population in Govanhill).

The review excludes evidence relating to refugees and asylum seekers. Where studies include groups of refugees and asylum seekers in addition to other types of migrant groups, only data which relate to the in-scope groups are reported, at least as far as it is possible to disaggregate findings.

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12 [https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/qmis/annualpopulationsurveyapsqmi](https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/qmis/annualpopulationsurveyapsqmi)
3. Economic impact of migration

Key points
- The fiscal and economic impacts of migration are complex and many separate strands need to be analysed in the process of assessment.
- The topic has received a good deal of academic attention in recent years. However, the majority of the evidence is at the level of the UK, rather than Scotland.

Introduction
An accurate understanding of the fiscal and economic impacts of migration is essential to inform public debate. However, measurement is a complex task, and many separate strands need to be analysed in the process of assessment. These strands include migrant employment rates, the extent to which they pay taxes and receive government benefits, and their contribution to an economy’s capacity for innovation (OECD Policy Brief, 2014:1).

The body of evidence on the impact of migration on the UK’s economy is large and growing. The two areas that attract the most attention are effects on the labour market and public finances (Lisenkova and Sanchez-Martinez, 2016:4). The sections below consider the evidence relating to each of these areas.

The Rolfe and Metcalf review noted that ‘research on the macroeconomic effects of migration is UK-wide. Studies which focus on the economic impact of migration into Scotland address concerns at demographic change and the tightening of the labour market which is projected to follow population decline. Research has identified in-migration as the demographic variable with the biggest economic impact’ (2009:3.3).

In general, this assessment of the evidence base still holds. The continuing UK-wide focus of evidence relating to migration and the economy might be expected, given that neither policy nor policy levers relating to migration are devolved to Scotland. Rolfe and Metcalf also identified a continuing preoccupation with demographic considerations as the way in which the migration narrative is framed in Scotland, rather than labour market needs, or the benefits of attracting human capital, for example. Again, this has not changed since 2009.
Impact of migration on the labour market

**Key points**

- The majority of migrants are young and economically active. Many are highly qualified, although qualitative research has indicated that there may be difficulties comparing qualifications across countries.
- Several studies have found a ‘U-shaped pattern’ of wage distribution among migrants, with employment concentrated at the top and bottom of the occupational distribution curve.
- From the perspective of employers, migrants are a flexible supply of labour to be drawn on when the economy is strong, or when labour demand exceeds local supply. However, agriculture is one area where overseas workers form an important part of the workforce, regardless of economic conditions.
- Migration does not appear to have had statistically significant impacts on the average wages and employment opportunities of the UK-born population in periods when the economy is strong, although there is some evidence of labour market displacement when the economy is in recession.
- The available evidence indicates that any adverse wage effects of migration are likely to be greatest for resident workers who are themselves migrants.

Migration can have many economic benefits. The international evidence indicates that skilled migrants can boost innovation, stimulate economic growth and encourage the local labour force to invest in training to take on and specialise in jobs in which the nation or region has a comparative advantage (Bell *et al*, 2014:311).

A central question for any cost-benefit analysis is whether migrants compete with workers in the host country, or whether they are complementary to them (Springford, 2013). If they are complementary, migrants will make the host population more productive, by doing work that others do not want to do, or do not have the skills for, or by introducing new ideas or technology. In practice, inevitably some workers will lose out. ‘But if immigrants are on average complementary, it makes economic sense to let them in, as it will raise the productivity, and thus the average income of the host population’ (2013:2).

In an examination of the economic and demographic consequences of large-scale migration for the UK, Rowthorn (2014) concludes that large scale migration can help to rejuvenate an ageing UK population by importing a large number of young migrants. Providing migrants are able to find jobs without displacing people who are UK-born, and providing they are sufficiently productive and well-paid, ‘this will increase GDP per capita and generate a fiscal surplus for the government.’ However, if migrants fail to get jobs, end up in low-skilled jobs, or displace UK-born workers, ‘large-scale immigration will have a negative impact on GDP per capita and on government finances’ (2014:66).
Key issues to consider, therefore, are the skills that migrants bring to the country; the type of employment they obtain and how they are viewed by employers; and the impact of migration on the wages and employment of UK-born workers. In the sections below, the evidence relating to each of these areas is considered in turn.

The labour market is one area where, in addition to a volume of work at the UK level, there is a substantial amount of Scotland-specific research. In recent years, several large quantitative studies have focused on specific aspects of the labour market in Scotland.

**Migrants’ education levels**

The skills of migrants coming in to a country, relative to people born in that country, are important in determining the potential contribution they can make to the economy. Educational attainment is a useful proxy for skills (Saleheen and Shadforth, 2006:379), and the evidence indicates that, in general, migrants are more likely to have educational qualifications than the UK-born/Scottish-born population.

At the UK level, Wadsworth et al (2016) examined the impact of migration in the context of the referendum debate on the UK’s membership of the EU. The study used Centre for Economic Performance analysis of the 2015 Labour Force Survey (LFS). The researchers found that EU migrants are, on average, more highly educated than the UK-born population: about 43 per cent have some form of higher education, compared with only 23 per cent of the UK-born. Only 15 per cent of EU migrants left school at 16, compared with 44 per cent of the UK-born population (2016:4).

In Scotland, the 2014 study by Bell et al, which explored migration policy in relation to alternative constitutional outcomes for Scotland, involved secondary analysis of Annual Population Survey (APS) data from 2009-2012 to examine labour market characteristics of the migrant population. 2012 APS data show that 13.1 per cent of the Scottish-born workforce in Scotland are graduates, and that this is a lower percentage than any migrant group. Examples given in the paper are 18.6 per cent (people born in Poland) and 49.1 per cent (Indian-born migrants) (2014:318). The authors found that the selectivity effect of migration policy has resulted in ‘Scotland’s immigrant population adding to the country’s human talent by comparison with the Scots-born population’ (2014:318).

Analysis of 2011 Census data by Scottish Government analysts indicates that almost half (48 per cent) of people who migrated to Scotland from EEA countries in the ten years prior to the Census have degree-level qualifications, as do 60 per cent of recent migrants from non-EEA countries. Approximately 40 per cent of EEA and non-EEA migrants who have lived in Scotland for more than ten years, and migrants born in the rest of the UK, are graduates. This compares with 22 per cent of people born in Scotland. Census data also indicate that approximately 10 per cent of recent EEA and non-EEA migrants have no qualifications, compared with about a quarter of established EEA and non-EEA migrants and 29 per cent of people born in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2016a:23).
Although the percentages vary, depending on the data sources used, and the ways in which migrant groups are disaggregated, it is clear that the majority of non-UK migrants arrive with qualifications and skills. However, the measurement of migrants’ education levels is often complicated by the comparison of educational qualifications across countries (Nickell and Saleheen, 2008:3).

This difficulty is highlighted by Moskal in a qualitative study of new labour migration from Poland to Scotland (2013). The author found that, for people coming to Scotland with higher levels of educational and professional qualifications, the possibility of transferring formal qualifications may be a problem because ‘this form of institutional cultural capital is often not recognised in the new society and thus devalued.’ Moskal points out that many Polish migrants are working in jobs below their education levels, a situation they accept only because it is seen as temporary (2013:370). In a qualitative study of Polish migrants working in low-skill jobs in Scotland, Weishaar (2008) also found that respondents with post-school qualifications felt overqualified for the jobs they were doing, including ‘cleaning, babysitting and catering.’ Weishaar draws attention to the frustration migrants in the study felt because they were not able to work in the job for which they had spent many years studying (2008:1253).

The Scottish Parliament Equal Opportunities Committee 2010, charged to explore the impact and contribution of migrant populations within Scottish society, summarised the evidence considered in relation to the qualifications and skills of migrants:

‘The Committee was told by a number of witnesses that many migrants who arrive in Scotland possess the relevant skills, experience and qualifications to enter more highly skilled jobs, but that qualifications obtained abroad are not recognised by employers or educational institutions. Some migrants therefore gave up pursuing a particular career and either take up employment in unskilled jobs or they may decide to leave Scotland altogether and take their skills and expertise with them’ (SPEOC, 2010: para 236).

Migrant employment

There is a good deal of recent, robust evidence relating to migrant employment. The key finding is that the majority of migrants to Scotland and the rest of the UK are in some form of employment. However, they may not be in employment that is a good fit for their skills and qualifications.

In relation to the contribution of migrants, the Scottish Parliament Equal Opportunities Committee (2010) heard evidence that:

‘Many jobs would not be done without migrant workers. They keep public transport running, provide badly needed health care; and without their work, many farms and factories could not produce the goods they sell. Migrants in the health service and social care services make a critical contribution to Scotland. Many sectors could not function without us’ Overseas Nurses and Careworkers Network (SPEOC, 2010: para 120).
Scottish Government analysis of Census 2011 data found that 72 per cent of recent EEA migrants to Scotland were in employment (full- or part-time or self-employed), at the time of the Census, along with 56 per cent of established EEA migrants. 50 per cent of non-EEA recent and 60 per cent of non-EEA established migrants were in employment. This compares with 57 per cent of people born in Scotland and 60 per cent born in the rest of the UK (2016a:24).

The Bell et al (2014) study discussed earlier in this chapter included analysis of economic activity among four population groups: those born inside and outside the UK, those resident in Scotland and the rest of the UK. As Table 3.1 shows, more than 68 per cent of Scotland’s non-UK migrant population were employed at the time data were collected (2009-12). However, in both Scotland and the rest of the UK, the proportion of the working age population in employment was higher among the UK-born than among those born outside the UK. The authors suggest that part of the explanation lies in the greater numbers of non-UK migrants who are students: they make the point that international students are a relatively more important source of migrants to Scotland than to the rest of the UK, as can be seen in the table.

Table 3.1: Economic activity among those of working age (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rest of the UK</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK-born</td>
<td>Foreign-born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ‘inactive’</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Inactive’ student</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Bell and colleagues suggest that international students have economic significance in terms of their contribution to Scotland’s exports, to future trade linkages, and to enhancing Scotland’s productive potential, if they choose to stay in Scotland when they have finished their studies. This provides an argument for some differentiation policy (as was the case with the ‘Fresh Talent’ initiative which ran from 2005 to 2008 and offered overseas graduates from Scottish universities the opportunity to stay on for two years following graduation to seek employment) (2014:318). Bell et al argue that, since international student entry to the UK has been included on the UK Government-imposed cap on migrant numbers, UK policy is currently holding Scotland back (ibid:319); see also Tindal, Findlay and Wright, 2014:11).

Several detailed assessments of the impact of migration on the labour market in the UK (and Scotland) have been conducted in recent years. Spreckelsen and Seeleib-Kaiser (2016) used LFS data from 2004-2014 to examine the UK labour market integration of recent young EU migrant citizens (aged 20-34). The authors found that young EU migrants appear well integrated in terms of employment, with higher employment rates than their UK peers. However, young migrants work, on average, longer hours than their UK peers and are less likely to work on permanent
contracts, indicating that they are less well integrated in terms of job security and quality (2016:26).

Work by the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) in 2014 specifically examined the growth of EU and non-EU labour in low-skilled jobs, and its impact on the UK. The MAC analysis was based on a combination of desk-based research and evidence gathered from a range of sources, including the APS and the LFS. Findings indicate that, in 2013, there were around 13 million people in low-skilled jobs in the UK, of whom 2.1 million were foreign born, and one million of whom had come to the UK within the last ten years. Almost sixty per cent of migrants in low-skilled jobs in the UK had come from non-EU countries (2014:6-7).

Although not mentioned in the MAC report, it should be noted that non-EU migrants are unable to obtain working visas in low-skilled occupations and, where migrants in this group are found to be in low-skilled work, it is because they have been granted indefinite leave to remain in the country, or have achieved citizenship, or have come to the UK on non-working visas. (See Annex 1 for a full definition of the tiers in the points-based visa system which operates under the UK’s current migration regime.)

Another examination of migrants in low-skilled employment was carried out by Rienzo in 2015, using LFS data from 2014. The study found that, in 2002, there was only one low-skilled occupation (food preparation trades) in the list of top ten occupations with the highest share of non-UK born workers. In 2014, there were 'at least five low-skilled occupations on this list.' These included elementary process plant; cleaning and housekeeping; and assemblers and routine operatives (2015:4).

Rienzo’s work does not differentiate between groups of migrants. However, Springford (2013) also used LFS data to examine the proportion of UK-born, Western Europeans and A8 nationals in different occupations. Chart 3.1 below (reproduced from Springford’s report (2013:3)) shows that Western Europeans, tended to be working in more highly skilled jobs than the average person born in the UK. By contrast, a high proportion of A8 nationals were working in skilled and elementary trades, manufacturing, and elementary services jobs.

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13 Many of the findings in the report relate to England and Wales only; however, these statistics appear to relate to the whole of the UK.
In Scotland, Scottish Government analysis of Census 2011 data showed a similar pattern, with recent EEA migrants (the A8 group) most likely to work in elementary occupations (30 per cent of adults in employment) and established EEA migrants and people born in the UK more likely to be employed in jobs at the higher end of the occupational spectrum. Data are disaggregated slightly differently, so are not directly comparable, but the findings relating to recent EEA migrants is particularly striking (2016a:26).

Findings from two further studies of migrant employment outcomes in Scotland are similar to evidence from the UK as a whole in relation to the concentration of migrants at the top and bottom of the occupational scale. Vargas-Silva used LFS data up to 2012 to provide an overview of the characteristics and labour market outcomes of migrants in the Scottish labour market (2013). The author found that non-UK-born workers in Scotland tend to concentrate more in professional occupations (such as chemists, electrical engineers, pharmacists, solicitors) and elementary occupations (farm workers, cleaners, messengers and car park attendants, for example) relative to workers born in the UK (2013:5).

As Vargas-Silvas points out (2013) the sample of non-UK workers in the LFS who are resident in Scotland is small and, although the characteristics of all non-UK workers living in Scotland ‘are inferred from the responses of those non-UK-born Scotland residents who are interviewed,’ the estimates are still subject to ‘substantial margins of error’ (2013:2). However, because findings relating specifically to Scotland are similar to findings for the whole of the UK, it is likely that they are relatively robust.

The study by Bell et al (2014), also using LFS data up to 2012, found no substantial differences between the earnings of the UK-born and foreign-born residents in the rest of the UK. However, while the UK-born living in Scotland had a broadly similar income distribution to that in the rest of the UK, the foreign-born working in Scotland earned less than the other three groups ‘from around the fourth to the eighth income decile.’ The authors suggest this indicates that relatively few foreign-born workers are working in ‘middle level’ occupations in Scotland (2014:319-320).
In recent years, several qualitative studies have focused specifically on the labour market in remote and rural areas of Scotland, although these have generally addressed the experiences of migrants, employers and service providers rather than specific impacts of migration. De Lima (2012) found that Central and Eastern European workers are predominantly employed in hospitality, agriculture and food (2012:208). This study develops themes identified in an earlier study by De Lima and Wright (2009), who noted that the impact of migrant workers in rural areas has been primarily in low-skilled sectors, where the flexibility displayed by migrant workers is seen (presumably by the researchers) ‘as an example of the labour market working well’ (2009:393).

Research by Findlay, Geddes and McCollum (2010) examined differences in the use of migrant labour (particularly A8 migrant labour) following the onset of the recession. They used Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) data (2004-09), ONS quarterly Employee Jobs Series, 2009, and primary research involving interviews with 60 employers of migrants. The authors found that A8 migrants tend to be concentrated in particular sectors of the Scottish labour market, with over half of all WRS registrations in hospitality and catering, agriculture, and food processing sectors (2010:306). Findlay et al report that ‘A8 migrants make up a much larger proportion of the workforce in agriculture than they do in any other sector in Scotland’ (2010:314/315).

A study by Vergunst (2009) focused on specific jobs within the agricultural sector in Scotland. The author points out that the majority of migrants are engaged in seasonal agricultural work, and that migrant labour ‘is a prerequisite for financial viability of the ‘other crop’ sectors, encompassing soft fruits, vegetables for human consumption, and flowers and bulbs’ (2009:261). However, in addition to seasonal jobs, some migrant workers undertake all-season agricultural work in the poultry and pig sector, for example (2009:261).

This section has focused on the work that migrants are employed to do. It is worth contextualising this by highlighting that migrants often fill labour market gaps created by a mismatch of skills, a mismatch between the types of jobs that unemployed people are willing to take on, and existing vacancies in the region, or/and information deficits which fail to match people with appropriate qualifications with relevant existing vacancies (Boswell et al, 2004).

**Employers**

This section of the chapter examines the evidence on migrant employment from the perspective of employers. It is an area where there is robust evidence, using a range of methodological approaches, relating specifically to the labour market in Scotland.

In their 2009 review, Rolfe and Metcalf reported on a body of Scotland-specific evidence to suggest that employers value migrants for the positive traits they bring to the workplace. These include punctuality, reliability, flexibility, productivity, work ethic, their willingness to accept low pay, poor conditions and fluctuating hours,
their active approach to seeking work and positive integration with the existing local workforce (2009: para 3.8).

It is worth emphasising that while migrants’ willingness to take lower wages and, potentially, accept poor working conditions, might be appreciated by employers, such willingness may not be good for migrant rights, or for the UK-born workforce, who may risk being undercut. The 2009 research by Vergunst, mentioned above, also focused on the preference for migrants expressed by employers in low-skilled sectors, while noting that migrants are likely to move into higher skilled, better paid jobs than seasonal agriculture, if and when these exist (2009:262). The Vergunst study emphasises the view of industry experts that, with improving economies in accession countries, the economic incentive to work in Scottish agriculture is likely to dwindle (2009:261).

The 2010 research by Findlay, Geddes and McCollum, discussed above, examined differences in the use of migrant labour following the onset of the recession. The researchers conclude that differences between agriculture and other sectors of the economy suggest that A8 migration serves two different functions in the Scottish labour market:

- Migrants act as a flexible supply of labour to be drawn on in times of economic boom, when labour demand exceeds local labour supply. In sectors where this is the main role for migrants (construction, for example) demand for migrant labour is likely to be cyclical and highly sensitive to economic cycles. Inflows of migrant labour would drop substantially during recession, when migrants are no longer required to boost the labour supply.
- In sectors such as agriculture, where employers find it difficult to source local labour, regardless of prevailing economic conditions, overseas workers form a more important part of the workforce. In the main, demand for this seasonal migrant labour remains steady during recession (2010:317).

More recently, research by McCollum et al (2015) used a literature review, interviews with a small number of employers and an online survey completed by more than 700 employers to examine the preferences and role of employers in the political economy. As in earlier studies, McCollum and colleagues found that migrants were seen as useful to fill labour shortages, especially in rural areas and where local labour was considered to be of poor quality. At the higher end of the labour market, migrants were described as being essential to address sector-specific skills shortages (such as healthcare, and oil and gas) and to act as a catalyst for growth for multinational companies with operations in Scotland (2015:10).

Qualitative research by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) in 2015 investigated the ways in which migrants contribute to the performance of the individual businesses they work for. The research interviewed 80 businesses across the UK and identified four key impacts:

- **Skills** – the skills held by migrant workers allowed businesses to expand their workforce, to fulfil existing contracts and take on more work.
Employees with skills that go beyond the role in which they are employed bring additional benefits

- **Innovation** – migrants can facilitate innovation in business, particularly in sectors which generate creative products and in professional services where higher skilled employees frequently face new technical or creative challenges
- **Knowledge sharing** – this was found to impact directly, through the upskilling of co-workers and expansion of a business’s knowledge base, and by facilitating other impacts such as training, innovation and international connections
- **Migrants’ connections** – used to drive expansion in new and existing markets and improve client and customer relationships.

However, some businesses reported challenges relating to language and integrating migrants with UK-born co-workers in teams (2015:4-8).

The BIS research does not distinguish between migrant groups. However, Shubin and Dickey’s 2013 study explored theoretical and practical issues in relation to the integration of Eastern European migrants in North East Scotland (Aberdeenshire). Aberdeenshire was selected for its prosperity, the fact that Aberdeen is ‘widely acknowledged to be the European capital of the oil and gas industry’ and because Aberdeenshire ‘has experienced the highest rate of net in-migration from outside Scotland, as a proportion of the resident population, of any British county’ (2013:2962), although the researchers’ sources are not identified.

The research included in-depth interviews, public meetings and a survey of migrants which received over 200 responses, and a range of urban and rural locations. Shubin and Dickey found that the ‘ready availability of a migrant workforce has transformed local employment landscapes’ in North East Scotland. Migrants are treated by many Scottish employers as temporary workers to be hired as flexible labour through employment agencies, ‘using a ‘try-before-you-buy’ approach’ (2013:2973). The authors claim that their study endorses earlier findings that successive waves of migration have changed work organisation and employment relations in the host communities. As noted earlier, this is not necessarily a beneficial form of flexibility.

Research in 2014 by Tindal, McCollum and Bell explored the question ‘to what extent does UK immigration policy currently meet the needs of Scottish employers?’ Analysis drew on primary data from an online survey of employers (over 700 responses), and interviews with employers and industry representatives in key economic sectors in Scotland. Employers were ‘emphatic’ that Scotland’s needs are not different from the rest of the UK, but that the rest of the UK (including Scotland) is different from London and South East England (2014:25).

The study by Tindal and colleagues includes a focus on the upper end of the skills spectrum. It highlights the observation by the director of a recruitment firm that the harmonisation of regulation across EU member states has allowed employers to access skilled labour which is in short supply in Scotland. The example given is that Romania has the same standards of dentistry as the UK. ‘Now Romanian
universities have taken the London University course and exams and it’s totally replicated. It’s a five year course and every person speaks English for that five years. So when they come out, academically they are absolutely 100 per cent fit for the role’ (2014:21).

The research identifies three overlapping ways in which the freedom of EU citizens to live and work in the UK without restriction have benefited Scottish employers:

- Policies have allowed employers to recruit in great enough numbers, without restriction, from the EU, and expand their businesses
- Migrant labour is mobile and can be used to meet short-term labour demands
- Employers are legally able to recruit directly from the EU and move labour where it is needed (2014:26).

It also highlights ways in which UK immigration policies have restricted employers:

- Along with other Temporary Migration Schemes, the long-running Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme ensured a guaranteed labour force for agriculture; its termination (in 2013) means that employers need to rely on migrants wanting to come to the UK, and to work in specific sectors and in particular businesses
- There is uncertainty about whether companies will be able to recruit the same numbers in the future as in the past
- When applying quotas, the immigration system fails to recognise the specialist nature of particular jobs and mobility within organisations (2014:28-29).

Impact of migration on the wages and employment of UK-born workers

In addition to the skills and qualifications that migrants possess, the impact of migration on the labour market depends on the skills of existing workers, and the characteristics of the whole economy. As Ruhs and Vargas-Silva argue in a 2015 Migration Observatory briefing paper, it is important to distinguish between the effect of migration on the ‘average wage of all workers in the economy, and on the wages of different groups of workers along the wage distribution’ (2015a:2).

The 2012 MAC report on impacts of migration includes a useful summary of the empirical studies that have estimated the impact of migrants on UK average wages and the UK wage distribution (2012:66/67). The MAC report concludes that studies estimating the impact of migrants on UK wages have generally found little or no impact on average wages. Results from Dustmann et al (2005), Dustmann et al (2008), Lemos and Portes (2008), Nickell and Saleheen (2008), Reed and Latorre (2009) and Nathan (2011) suggest that an increase of 10,000 in the number of migrants in the UK changed average wages by between -£2 and +£2 per year (2012:59). In terms of wage distribution, the MAC report notes that in the majority of these studies, migrants were found to increase wages at the top of the UK wage distribution and reduce wages at the bottom (2012:59).
The available research indicates that any adverse wage effects of migration are likely to be greatest for resident workers who are themselves migrants. This is because the skills of new migrants are likely to be closer substitutes for the skills of migrants already employed in the UK than for those of UK-born workers (Ruhs and Vargas-Silva, 2015:4). Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) conducted detailed analysis of data on wages, employment and education levels using the LFS and General Household Survey (mid-1970s to mid-2000s). Their aim was to gain a better understanding of why the significant rise in migration to the UK over that period had no appreciable effect on the average wages and employment of UK-born workers. The authors found that ‘within narrowly defined age-education cells, immigration depresses the earnings of previous immigrants relative to the native-born, suggesting imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants in production’ (2012:145). Thus, the main impact of increased migration in the UK appears to be on the wages of migrants who are already here.

As noted above, Spreckelsen and Seeleib-Kaiser (2016) used LFS data from 2004-2014 to investigate the labour market integration of recent young EU migrant citizens and the potential effects of the post-2008 economic downturn. They found that migrants from the EU accession countries have, on average, lower gross hourly wages than their UK peers (about 20 per cent less). However, Bulgarian and Romanian EU migrants have higher hourly wages than migrants from the other accession countries. The authors argue that this is possibly due to transition arrangements restricting the freedom of movement largely to high-skilled workers and the self-employed from Bulgaria and Romania until the end of 2013 (2016:18/19). The authors conclude that ‘across our analyses there seems to be little change other than the compositional change, between the pre-/post-crisis labour market integration of youth migrants’ (ibid:27).

In a Centre for Economic Performance briefing on policy issues in the May 2015 General Election, Wadsworth investigated Annual Population Survey data between 2004 and 2012 to explore the impact of the recession. He did not find a robust correlation between changes in wages of the UK-born (either all or just the less skilled) and changes in ‘local area immigrant share over this period’ (2015:9).

The subsequent 2016 paper by Wadsworth et al highlights the body of research examining the effect of migration on jobs and wages in the UK, and the shared conclusion that the large increase in migration ‘has not significantly harmed the job and wage prospects of UK-born workers.’ However, the authors acknowledge that much of the work was conducted prior to the ‘most severe economic downturn for 80 years.’ Wadsworth and colleagues used analysis of the LFS up to 2015 to conclude that most people’s wages fell during the recession and that the fall happened while EU migration was rising, ‘but equally the big gains in real wages for UK workers were experienced at a time when EU immigration was also rising. So the cause of the fall of wages is the impact of the Great Recession – not immigration’ (2016:6).

At the Scotland level, Pouliakas et al (2012) modelled the effects of migration on regional economic performance and wage distribution. This research includes the
East Highlands of Scotland as one of three distinct remote regions of the EU. The authors argue that small regional economies lack flexibility and tend to be less diversified in their productive activities relative to a national economy. The Scottish region’s exports, for example, are ‘dominated by a particular manufacturing activity’. They found that an increase (decrease) in total labour supply is associated with a reduction (rise) in the region-wide wage of labour. So the substitution effect is stronger when there is less diversity. Specifically, a 10 per cent increase in labour decreases the wages of both skilled and unskilled workers, by 9-12 per cent in the Scottish region (2012:14).

There is relatively little evidence that migration has caused statistically significant displacement14 of the UK-born population from the labour market in periods when the economy has been strong. However, a literature review carried out by economists from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Home Office (Devlin et al, 2014) found evidence of some labour market displacement in recent years when the economy has been in recession. Displacement effects were also more likely to be identified in periods when net migration volumes are high. In addition, where displacement effects were observed, these tended to be concentrated on the UK-born with low levels of skills. Evidence also suggests that where there has been a displacement effect from a particular cohort of migrants, this dissipates over time – that is, any displacement impacts from one set of new arrivals gradually decline as the labour market adjusts (2014:4).

As part of the analysis for the 2012 MAC report on the impacts of migration, researchers examined the association between migration and the UK-born employment rate, using data from the LFS between 1995 and 2010. The study found that a one-off increase of 100 in the inflow of working-age non-EU migrants was associated with a reduction in the employment of 23 UK-born workers over the period, although no statistically significant effects were found in relation to EU migrants. The authors point out that, although they controlled for differences in the UK-born employment rate across regions, which might affect the location choices of both UK-born people and migrants, results may still be influenced by a number of factors such as regional labour demand shocks and measurement error. Bearing in mind these caveats, they stress that their findings should be considered ‘as estimating an association between migration and the native employment rate rather than the impact of migration on the native employment rate’ (2012:62). They do not comment on the difference in findings relating to EU and non-EU migrants, which appear somewhat counterintuitive, given that non-EU migration is expected to be more selective based on skills and occupational shortages in the labour market.

The MAC analysis also suggests that the likelihood of a negative impact of migration on the employment of UK-born workers is greatest during economic downturn. In addition, findings suggest that it is only recent migrants (in the UK for less than five years) who are associated with the possible displacement of UK-born workers (2012:63).

14 Comparing how labour market outcomes across a number of groups experiencing different degrees of net migration vary with changes in net migration in these groups, and controlling for other factors
Lucchino et al (2012) provide a useful summary of the literature on the impact of migration on ‘native labour market outcomes.’ They note that a popular strand in the literature compares employment changes across local areas with different migrant shares, to identify the impact of migration. The papers mentioned are all from 2005-2008, so are not investigated again in this review. However, the authors assess that there is no strong evidence of an overall effect of migration on aggregate employment and unemployment, and no significant effect of migration from A8 countries on either unemployment or wages (2012:3).

The authors also highlight that papers have tried to identify the impact of migration by splitting the population into segments based on workers’ characteristics (such as age, gender and skill levels) in order to estimate the impact of migration by comparing changes in employment across segments of the population with different migrant inflows. However, they argue that this methodology rests on the assumption that migrant and native workers in each segment are substitutes. ‘This is a central consideration, as the impact of immigration on the labour market outcomes of a given segment of the native population is likely to be more adverse (beneficial) the greater the substitutability (complementarity) between migrants and workers in that same segment’ (ibid:3).

Lucchino et al contributed to the existing body of evidence by using data on National Insurance Number (NINo) allocations to adult overseas nationals entering the UK as a measure of migrant inflows. The authors claimed theirs was the first empirical paper to make use of these data to examine the employment effects of migration and, by using NINo registration data up to 2010/11, they hoped to shed light on the impacts of the recession. Findings confirm the general lack of an aggregate impact of migration on unemployment, supporting previous findings in the literature. In addition, by using more recent data, Lucchino et al found no evidence for a more adverse impact of migration during the recession. However, there are difficulties associated with conducting analysis on migrant economic activity using NINo data, as illustrated by a study by Saggar et al (2012). The authors investigated the time between arrival and registration for migrants registering in 2010/11 by world region of origin and found that 8 per cent of EEA and 18 per cent of non-EEA migrants registered more than two years after they arrived in the UK (2012:42).

In a study of the economic and demographic consequences of large-scale migration for the UK, Rowthorn (2014) makes the point that between the first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2010, the number of UK-born people in employment fell by 700,000, or nearly 3 per cent. During the same period, the number of ‘foreign-born workers’ in employment remained virtually constant. Taking a longer view, he notes that, despite ‘strong overall employment growth,’ the number of UK-born people with a job in early 2014 was still below its 2005 peak, while the number of non-UK born workers in employment had increased by around 1.5 million. Rowthorn concludes that, although such aggregate comparisons do not prove definitively that migrants have displaced UK-born workers, ‘they do suggest there is a case to answer’ (2014:23-24). However, Rowthorn’s work does not differentiate between migrant populations or length of time in the UK.
Ruhs and Vargas-Silva provide a summary of relevant evidence at the UK level in their 2015 Migration Observatory paper. Findings from their research concur with those of other authors, in that they did not find a significant impact of overall migration on unemployment in the UK, although evidence suggests that migration from outside the EU could have a negative impact on employment of UK-born workers, especially during an economic downturn. The authors conclude that for both wages and employment, short-run effects of migration differ from long run effects: ‘any declines in the wages and employment of UK-born workers in the short run can be offset by rising wages and employment in the long run’ (2015:2).

**Impact of migration on public finances**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key points</th>
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<tr>
<td>• There are variations in estimates of the fiscal contributions made by migrants. Although the evidence is contested, research indicates that those from EEA countries, particularly those who came to the UK after 2000, have made a more positive fiscal contribution than non-EEA migrants, and people born in the UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Migrants from the EEA are less likely to claim out-of-work benefits, but more likely to claim in-work benefits, compared with people born in the UK. There is likely to be a connection between the level of in-work benefit claims and the types of low-paid jobs taken by migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work in the UK and the 27 OECD countries has estimated that, where migrants have had a fiscal impact, it has rarely exceeded plus or minus 0.5 per cent of GDP.</td>
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Measuring the impact of migration on the public purse is a complex task. The net fiscal impact is typically estimated as the difference between the taxes and other monetary contributions made by migrants to public finances and the costs of the public benefits and services they receive. However, this impact depends on the characteristics of migrants, their impacts on the labour market, their engagement with (and the characteristics and rules of) the social security system, among other factors. In addition, existing estimates of fiscal impact are limited due to a lack of accurate data on non-monetary contributions (such as the provision of ‘free’ caring and support services by family members). A significant number of assumptions must be made, and results tend to change based on these assumptions (Vargas-Silva, 2015a:2-3). In addition, as noted by Vargas-Silva (2015) migrants deliver public services as well as consuming them. The author argues that ‘it may be possible to deliver services in the public sector at a lower cost because of the availability of migrants willing to work at a lower wage’ (2015:8).

A number of relevant papers have been published in recent years, although the evidence is all at the UK level. It is difficult to draw consistent messages from findings from individual studies, however, as these have often been contested. This section provides a brief summary of the available evidence. While it is not possible to conclude whether the fiscal impact of migration is generally positive or negative, there are indications that recent EEA migrants are the most likely to have
a positive fiscal impact, and that all non-UK migrants are likely to make a more positive contribution than people born in the UK.

**Migrant contributions to public finances**

There are two main approaches to conducting analysis of migrant contributions to public finances: static – based on a single year and using historical data; and dynamic – providing a forward-looking perspective over the lifetime of migrants. In the UK to date, all significant studies have used a static approach (Vargas-Silva, 2015a:3-4). However, one recent study claimed a dynamic approach to its analysis of historical data (1995-2011). Findings indicate that migrant contributions are positive, particularly in relation to EEA migrants who have entered the fiscal system since 2000 (Dustmann and Frattini, 2013).

The assumptions made by the authors in their calculations (in relation to the allocation of revenue streams, for example) were challenged by two subsequent studies. The (anonymous) authors of a paper by Migration Watch (2014) examined the claims made by Dustmann and Frattini, and suggested that they had exaggerated the revenues the Government obtains from migrants and underestimated the cost of benefits and tax credits provision to migrants (2014:49).

Because the author(s) of the Migration Watch study are not named, and because Migration Watch is not itself a research organisation, it is difficult to gauge the robustness of the analysis. However, Rowthorn (2014) also assessed that the estimates of migrant-generated revenue by Dustmann and Frattini were too high. He argued for the inclusion of a British worker displacement adjustment, on the basis that migration had at least a temporary impact on the level of ‘native employment’ during the recession of 2007-11 (2014:53).

Dustmann and Frattini responded with an update to their analysis (2014). They also provided a further breakdown between A10 countries and the rest of the EEA. The authors estimated that recent EEA migrants (A10 and other EEA) made a net fiscal contribution of approximately £20 billion between 2001 and 2011. This compared with a negative fiscal contribution of approximately £616.5 billion by people who were UK-born, over the same period.

Dustmann and Frattini also calculated that, even throughout the years of greatest economic instability (2007-2011) recent A10 migrants made a net contribution of almost £2 billion to UK public finances, while recent migrants from other EEA countries made a positive contribution of £8.6 billion (2014:620/21).

However, as Table 3.2 indicates, there is still a major variation in estimates of fiscal contributions that have been made in recent years.
Table 3.2: Estimates of the fiscal effects of immigration for the fiscal years 1995-2011 and 2001-2011 (billion, 2011 GBP equivalent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Net fiscal impacts</th>
<th></th>
<th>Recent migrants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK-born</td>
<td>All migrants</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>Non-EEA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dustmann and Frattini (2013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995-2011</td>
<td>-604.5</td>
<td>+8.8</td>
<td>-104.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2011</td>
<td>-624.1</td>
<td>+9.0</td>
<td>-86.8</td>
<td>+22.1</td>
<td>+2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dustmann and Frattini (2014)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995-2011</td>
<td>-591.5</td>
<td>+4.4</td>
<td>-118.0</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2011</td>
<td>-616.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+5.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2011 (A10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+4.9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2011 (rest of EEA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+15.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Migration Watch UK (2014)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1995-2001</td>
<td>-565.3</td>
<td>-13.6</td>
<td>-134.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2011</td>
<td>-586.2</td>
<td>-13.4</td>
<td>-116.8</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-27.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowthorn (2014)</td>
<td>(Not shown)</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-29.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vargas-Silva, C (2015a) The fiscal impact of immigration in the UK, The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, 27 March 2015, page 6, Table 2. ‘UK-born’ column from the original publications

Finally, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) examined statistics relating to recently arrived non-UK EEA nationals subject to income tax and national insurance contributions, or receiving HMRC administered benefits. Based on the 2013-14 tax year, the 2016 work estimated that migrants in this group were subject to £3.11 billion income tax and national insurance contributions and received £0.56 billion in tax credits or child benefit, leading to a net fiscal contribution of £2.54 billion (2016:6).

Social Security¹⁵

One of the negative perceptions of migrants is that they are more heavily dependent on social security payments than people born in the host country. However, while there is a good deal of evidence relating to this issue, it is difficult to draw any consistent messages from the findings from individual studies. Drinkwater and Robinson (2013) summarise the international literature and highlight mixed results across a range of countries. The authors used LFS data (2004-09) to focus on the types of benefits that migrants to the UK tend to claim, as well as examining differences by area of origin (disaggregated by three European and four non-European categories). The research focused on country of birth as the defining variable although, as the authors pointed out, this necessarily includes both migrants who are recent arrivals and those who settled more than 50 years ago (substantial levels of migration from the West Indies during the 1960s, for example).

The research concludes that social security claims vary considerably by migrant group as well as by the type of benefit claimed in the UK. The authors found that Australasian, American and A8 migrants were the least likely to claim benefits, a finding they suggested could, to some extent, be explained by the characteristics of

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¹⁵ Descriptors of these systems have changed over time. In this report, the term ‘social security’ is used. However, where studies refer to ‘welfare’ this has been adhered to in the text.
individuals from these groups, especially those from accession countries, who are more likely than people born in the UK to be in employment (2013:109). Drinkwater and Robinson also found that ‘non-white migrants’ were ‘disproportionately more likely to claim welfare benefits.’ They suggest that there may be ‘cultural explanations’ for this, but that ‘an element of discrimination cannot be ruled out given the consistent findings across all groups’ (ibid:109). However, the paper does not make it clear what the authors mean by this.

Drinkwater and Robinson also argue that the relationship between migrants and welfare participation is not static: ‘welfare payments will certainly have been heavily influenced by the recent recession and the subsequent impact on government finances. However, it is unclear what effect the recession will have had on the relative levels of welfare participation by immigrants in the coming years’ (ibid:109). In addition, the authors point out that their research was carried out too soon to detect the impact of the points-based system of migration, introduced in the UK in 2008.

A body of work by Dustmann and colleagues has investigated the topic of welfare receipt by migrants as part of their broader research on the fiscal impacts of migration. Dustmann, Frattini and Halls (2010) found that A8 migrants who arrived after EU enlargement in 2004 had a 59 per cent lower probability of being in receipt of welfare assistance than people born in the UK (decreasing to 49 per cent for those in the UK for longer than two years). The authors conclude that, even if A8 migrants were identical to UK-born people in their educational background, age and gender composition and number of dependent children, they would still be 13 per cent less likely to receive benefits (2010:15).

A later paper (Dustmann and Frattini, 2013) included slightly different figures, without referencing the earlier calculations: the researchers argued that recent migrants were 45 per cent less likely to receive state benefits or tax credits than people born in the UK. The authors acknowledge that this may be partly explained by migrants’ ‘more favourable age-gender composition.’ However, even when compared to UK-born people with the same demographic characteristics, recent migrants were 21 per cent less likely to receive benefits. The authors also found differences between EEA and non-EEA migrants, with recent EEA being more than 50 per cent less likely than people born in the UK to receive state benefits or tax credits, compared with a 43 per cent lower likelihood for non-EEA migrants (2013:27-28).

This claim that recent EEA migrants are only half as likely to claim benefits or tax credits was challenged by the Migration Watch study which examined the findings of Dustmann and Frattini (2014). The study argues that in the context of establishing the fiscal cost, what matters is the amount people receive, rather than the number of claims made, and different benefits pay different amounts to different people. ‘Recent EEA migrants are much more likely to receive tax credits than the UK-born population, and more likely to receive housing benefit, ‘and these are likely to be paid at higher rates in view of their lower incomes’ (2014:49).
More recently, a Migration Observatory report focused on the main policy issues and statistics on EU migrants’ use of social security benefits in the context of the EU referendum of June 2016 (Sumption and Altorjai, 2016). The study analysed LFS and HMRC data to conclude that EU migrants are less likely to claim out-of-work benefits than people who are born in the UK. The authors argue that this is driven primarily by ‘lower use of incapacity benefits (1.7 per cent of claims in February 2015) but also to some extent by lower use of job seeker benefits (4.8 per cent of claims’) (2016:6).

Sumption and Altorjai found that the picture for in-work benefits, such as tax credits and housing benefit, is different. Noting that actual figures vary, depending on the source of data, the authors calculate that it is reasonable to assume that the share of recent arrivals from EU countries receiving tax credits in early 2014 was ‘between 10 per cent and 20 per cent’ (ibid:9). (The share of UK-born people receiving tax credits was 10 per cent.)

The authors acknowledge that administrative data on housing benefit recipients ‘are extremely limited.’ However, they estimated that the number of EEA-born people who reported receiving housing benefit in 2015 was lower than the number who reported receiving tax credits (198,000 and 305,000 respectively) (ibid:9).

The research commented on a statement made by the UK government in November 2015:

‘… [in March 2013] between 37 per cent and 45 per cent of the EEA nationals (excluding students) who were resident in the UK having arrived in the preceding four years were in households claiming either an in-work or out-of-work benefit or tax credit’ (Department of Work and Pensions, 2015:7).

The authors highlight that this estimate is higher than other available statistics. Their analysis of LFS statistics found that approximately 22 per cent of recently arrived EEA adults reported receiving a form of state benefit in early 2013. By 2015 this had fallen to 18 per cent. In other words, the DWP analysis suggested a rate of benefit receipt for recent EEA migrants ‘about double the share found in the LFS’ (ibid:10).

The Sumption and Altorjai study also found that more than half of EEA-born adults who reported receiving tax credits in 2015 were working full time, with median earnings of £15,600; the largest numbers were employed in wholesale/retail trade, manufacturing and hospitality (ibid:11/12).

Sumption and Altorjai drew attention to the most recent estimate from the UK government (DWP and HMRC analysis of 2013-14 data): that £2.5 billion or 10 per cent of in-work tax credit and housing benefit expenditure was on claims involving EEA nationals. Out-of-work expenditure on claims led by EEA nationals made up £886 million, or 3 per cent of the total DWP out-of-work benefits bill (ibid:15).
Although there are no Scotland-specific calculations of levels of benefits, a few qualitative studies have highlighted particular perspectives associated with social security benefit receipt. McGhee et al (2013) considered the implications for Polish migrants who move into areas already experiencing multiple social problems. In an estate where many people were described by Polish study participants as ‘life-long welfare dependents,’ the research found that Poles were often viewed in a positive light by resident Scots for their contribution to the labour market and associated taxes paid from wage labour. Consequently, Poles were not seen as competitors for jobs or houses, but were viewed as workers and payers of taxes, while their Scottish neighbours on the estate ‘get the benefits’ (2013:335).

One of the findings from Shubin and Dickey’s qualitative work in relation to Eastern European migrants in Aberdeenshire (2013) was that many Eastern European migrants reject the idea of any state support in Scotland, because they see it as the sign of their lack of success. ‘For many Eastern Europeans state support in their home countries was very limited, and using government help was linked to marginalisation. Consequently, migrants often reject any routes to success that are state sponsored – including job search in job centres and employment support by local government’ (2013:2973).

**Migrants’ contribution to GDP**

Work by the OECD indicates that migrants have had a broadly neutral impact in the 27 OECD countries over the past 50 years. In other words, the cost of whatever state benefits they received was largely covered by the taxes they paid. Where migrants did have a fiscal impact, it rarely exceeded plus or minus 0.5 per cent of GDP (OECD Policy Brief, May 2014). Using data from 2007-09, published by OECD, Vargas-Silva reported that the fiscal impact of migration in the UK over that period (+0.46 per cent of GDP) was more positive than the fiscal impact of migration in 16 other OECD countries (2015a:8).

In their work on fiscal impacts, neither Dustmann and Frattini nor Migration Watch included a calculation of the implications of the cost/contributions of migration in terms of GDP. However, commenting on findings from the 2013 Dustmann and Frattini study, Rowthorn estimated that, although the total net contribution assessed by the authors between 2001 and 2011 are ‘large numbers in absolute terms’, the net fiscal contribution is in the range of -0.7 to +0.3 per cent of GDP, depending on how it is measured. Rowthorn advised that the Dustmann and Frattini finding that post-2000 migrants from the EEA have generated a large fiscal surplus should, therefore, be seen in perspective (2015:68).
4. Impact of migration on public services

Public services (general)

Key points

- Systematic data and analysis relating to migrants’ use of public services is limited. However, individual studies are beginning to fill the gaps in the evidence base, both at the UK and Scotland level.
- Aggregate expenditure on state education and public services in the UK has been calculated using 2009-10 data. Analysis indicates that an estimated 12.5 per cent of total expenditure was allocated to non-UK migrants and their children: less than their share as a proportion of the UK population.

Any increase in population, such as Scotland has experienced in recent years, increases the number of potential users of public services. In their 2009 literature review, Rolfe and Metcalf pointed out that ‘migration is likely to have particular impacts because of the nature of migrant populations. These include their social characteristics such as age and family structure, their English language skills and expectations of public services. Migration impacts are also dependent on length of stay, with temporary stays placing different demands on services than long-term settlement’ (2009: para 4.1). However, there are two dimensions to understanding the impacts of migration on public services, since migrants are also providers of services. This review attempts to gain a better understanding of both dimensions.

In 2011, a report by researchers at the Migration Observatory noted that, while there is considerable anecdotal evidence, little systematic data and analysis exist about migrants’ use of public services. This lack of systematic evidence is mainly due to the fact that migration status is recorded inconsistently (or not at all) when public services are provided (Blinder et al, 2011:10).

The authors state that there is ‘even less information about the value of migrants’ contributions to the provision of public services in the UK’ (ibid:10). They argue that migrants contribute to the provision of public services by providing skills that are not available or in short supply in the UK, and by facilitating the provision of public services at a cost that is lower than would be the case if those services were dependent on the supply of British workers. ‘Immigration is thus a form of “subsidy” to public services that benefits service providers, consumers and the taxpayer’ (ibid:10).

The programme of research reported in the MAC Analysis of the Impacts of Migration (2012) includes six commissioned projects on various public service and social impacts. These will be considered in the specific sections of this chapter. However, their conclusion is that ‘the consumption of public services, crime and transport congestion are the areas where there is greatest scope for … improved data collection and for analysis to lead to reasonably robust monetary estimates of the impacts of migration’ (2012:10-11).
There is even less Scotland-specific research. Studies that have been conducted are relatively small and specific to local areas (North East Scotland; Glasgow; rural Scotland) and particular population and demographic groups. Research by Sime and Fox (2015) drew on concepts of social capital and social networks to specifically examine migrant children’s access to a range of services. The authors conducted focus groups with Eastern European migrant children (most of whom were new arrivals) and subsequently developed over 20 in-depth family case studies. They found that where services are ‘mainly suited for the native population,’ cultural differences may put migrants at a disadvantage and place a heavier burden on children to assist with parents’ decisions and actions.

Sime and Fox argue that migrant children play a crucial role in ‘mediating their families’ engagement with statutory services’ because they have better English skills and more exposure to local contacts through school and inter-ethnic friendships (2015:531). Although the focus of the research is specifically on children’s access to services, a subject that the authors acknowledge has received little research attention, it raises questions about the nature of services and how they are designed and delivered, particularly in areas where non-UK migrants form a small part of the local population.

A study by Kay and Morrison in 2012 examined localised social and cultural impacts of migration. The work focused on Glasgow and, although it did not focus on particular groups of migrants, specific reference is made by the authors to the Roma population in Govanhill. Kay and Morrison argue that the focus on Glasgow gave the study ‘a particular “flavour,” given not only the city’s unique experience of dispersal, but also its longer history of immigration and greater diversity of second and third generation migrant communities from Ireland, Italy, South Asia and elsewhere’ (2012:2).

The research by Kay and Morrison involved interviews with more than 20 stakeholders from a range of organisations and services working with migrants. Interviewees noted that the arrival of significant numbers of East European Roma in Govanhill, in particular, put considerable strain on statutory and voluntary services in the area (schools, healthcare, police services, social work) as migrants brought new levels of poverty and deprivation to the area. Services struggled to cope, especially in the first years, due to lack of adequate planning and resources. The study also found that a subsequent flow of money and resources to the area, and an upsurge in third sector activity, added to tensions within the community, because local residents felt that longstanding needs for regeneration and development in the area were being overlooked. ‘The challenge … was how to make those benefits spread across the community, across everyone …’ (2012:7).

In a paper published in 2009, De Lima and Wright explored EU labour migration in rural Scotland, drawing on findings from an empirical study of migrant workers in the Grampian region which included interviews, focus groups and postal questionnaires with 61 employers from a range of sectors. The study, which was carried out in 2006, found that service providers in rural areas often lack the necessary experience, skills and resources to address the requirements of growing and culturally diverse migrant populations. Issues of distance and lack of
Economies of scale were also found to pose challenges for service delivery in rural areas (2009:398). Although the study is not recent, the focus on how public sector agencies might improve their response to migrant workers makes a useful contribution to the evidence base. Given that rural Scotland accounts for 98 per cent of the land mass of Scotland, and that nearly a fifth of Scotland’s population is resident in rural and remote areas, the scale of the challenges faced by service planners and providers in relation to increasingly diverse migrant populations is evident. The most recent data available (Annual Population Survey, 2013, published in Rural Scotland Key Facts 2015) indicates that non-UK migrants now make up 5 per cent of the population in remote and 4 per cent in accessible rural areas.

At the UK level, research has estimated public expenditure on state education and public services (personal social services and health) for migrants and non-migrants. Detailed calculations conducted by George et al (2011) as part of their work for MAC are useful to consider, as this review was unable to find any such research relating specifically to Scotland. The summary figures from their calculations (using Annual Population Survey data) are included below (Table 4.1). The authors also provide numerous disaggregations of data but, because any Scotland-specific analysis is limited to particular migrant groups (compared with ‘all others,’ including non-migrants) its usefulness is likely to be limited. As George et al point out, ‘the impact of migrant groups at a local level may differ from the national picture, due to concentration of migrants in some localities placing pressure on resources at a local level’ (2011:35).

The authors note that an estimated 12.5 per cent of total expenditure on state education and public services in the UK in 2009-10 was allocated to migrants and their children. As migrants made up 13 per cent of the population as a whole at the time, this was less than their share. Therefore, spending per head on migrants was less than on people born in the UK (ibid:45).

**Table 4.1: Aggregate expenditure on state education and public services, 2009-10 (UK)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£ million</td>
<td>£ per head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole population</td>
<td>223,192</td>
<td>3,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrants</td>
<td>195,398</td>
<td>3,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All migrants</td>
<td>27,793</td>
<td>3,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant in last 10 years</td>
<td>9,736</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant in last 5 years</td>
<td>4,458</td>
<td>2,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EEA economic migrant</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>2,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1 or 2 migrant</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>2,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 4 migrant</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>2,571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Health and social care

Key points

• Health services in Scotland need to accommodate the needs and expectations of an increasingly diverse population. However, migrants from outside the UK are, in general, young and have low healthcare needs.
• Where evidence exists in relation to increased demand for health services resulting from migration, it is associated with social deprivation, poor language skills and, possibly, lack of knowledge about the health system.
• The literature indicates relatively low rates of GP registration among migrants.
• Demand for health services is likely to increase as migrants age, and as their health behaviours change. Several studies have shown that migrants’ health can deteriorate the longer they stay in the UK, in relation to alcohol use, smoking behaviour and eating habits, for example. Therefore, the low impact on health services may dissipate over time.
• Health services in the UK are reliant on migrant labour, particularly that of non-EEA migrants.

In 2009, the Rolfe and Metcalf review concluded that ‘there is little evidence of any increased demand on health services resulting from in-migration. Research suggests that migrants make few demands on health services because they are, on average, younger, in employment and without children. It is generally agreed that this will change as migrants begin to settle but precisely how is currently not known’ (2009: para 4.42).

One of the specially commissioned research projects to feed into the MAC review of the impacts of migration in the UK provides a useful summary of the literature relating to migrants’ consumption of health services. The main focus of the review (George et al, 2011) is on migrants with Tier 1, 2 and 4 visas (i.e. non-EEA). However, the review is in fact more comprehensive, with findings relating specifically to non-EEA migrants noted separately. The authors draw attention to the fact that: ‘although there is evidence that some migrants do place greater demands on parts of the health service, this is associated with social deprivation (e.g. a higher incidence of TB), poor English language skills and, possibly, lack of knowledge of the health system.’ George et al note that these issues are unlikely to relate to Tier 1 and 2 migrants, ‘many of whom work in UK-based companies, originate from English speaking countries and are disproportionately in professional roles’ (2011:vii).

The authors found that there is ‘very little research which looks directly at the impact of migration on public services. The focus of much of research is on migrants’ access to and use of services … Its emphasis is on whether migrants are aware of and make use of services to which they are entitled and may need, rather than on the impact on services they may access. This approach is found particularly in research on health’ (2011:7).
The main areas of interest included in the literature relating to migration and health services (as assessed by George et al) are:

- The effect of migration on levels of demand for health services
- How migrants use health services
- Public health impacts arising from migration.

These will be considered in turn below, with Scotland-specific research highlighted where applicable. It should be noted that most of the Scotland-specific evidence on health services comes from local studies that focus on migrant experiences. However, the work is useful in relation to the impact on health services of differences in patient needs (especially in relation to communication and expectations of the service).

**Demand for health services**

Research has largely been based on levels of demand from EU migrants and migrants in general. George et al found no research focused on demand from non-EEA economic migrants (2011:8). The authors cite a number of regional studies on the demand for primary and secondary health services. This includes the conclusion of the 2010 Scottish Parliament report, that there is 'little evidence of increased demand for health services resulting from migration into Scotland. Focusing on the impact of A8 migration, its report cites evidence provided by NHS Lothian that migrants are mostly in their 20s and 30s with low healthcare needs. A distinction is made between these, economic, migrants and asylum seekers and refugees who have more significant and specific health needs.’ However, the authors also note that a number of researchers have stated that it should not be assumed that levels of demand for health care from migrants will necessarily remain low (2011:9).

**How migrants use health services**

The review by George et al reported that a number of studies have looked at migrants' levels of registration with GP practices and dentists and their use of hospitals, particularly Accident and Emergency services. The literature indicates relatively low rates of GP registration among migrants, although rates have been found to be higher among migrants who live with a partner, children or parents. George et al provide a summary of possible reasons for low registration rates:

- Lack of knowledge and understanding of primary and secondary healthcare systems in the UK
- Language barriers
- Taking time off work for appointments
- GP practice opening hours (2011:11).

George et al note that a number of reports have stated that there may be a connection between low GP registration rates and the use that migrants make of hospital Accident and Emergency departments for primary healthcare needs. The authors only cite one study, a survey of patients presenting at the Emergency
services of a London hospital. This found that a number of factors were associated with not having a GP; these included being aged 35 or under, being male, living in the UK for less than five years. However, there is no indication of the survey’s sample size or when it was conducted. George et al highlight three separate studies that have found ‘little evidence of strain on Accident and Emergency departments resulting from inappropriate use by migrants’ although none of these is more recent than 2010 and one relates specifically to Wales. George et al assess that the evidence that does exist is ‘largely second-hand and anecdotal’ and so, presumably, is not robust (2011:12).

A qualitative study which highlights that Scotland’s health service needs to adapt to accommodate the needs of an increasingly diverse population was conducted by Sime (2014). The study involved interviews and focus groups with service providers, children and their families, and explored the experiences of the children of East European migrant workers in urban and rural Scotland. The study identifies a number of underlying barriers to accessing health services:

- Uncertainty over their families’ entitlement to health care and treatment
- Differences in provision and approach to treatment, affecting levels of trust in the system

Findings from the study indicate that migrants take an active role in making decisions about the use they make of health services, rather than being passive receivers of the services that are available, especially when it comes to children’s health. Sime found that migrants often sought confirmation from doctors in their country of birth, or reassurance from members of their family or diaspora community (ibid:91). The author concludes that the evidence suggests that, contrary to public speculation about ‘health tourism’ to abuse the NHS system in the UK, migrants are more likely to distrust provision and to rely instead on transnational access to health care or informal networks of support (ibid:92).

Another aspect of the stress experienced by migrants in the health system is highlighted by Bray et al in a retrospective audit of obstetric case records of new European migrants giving birth in Lothian hospitals (2010). The study focused on over 80 per cent of a total of 136 obstetric case records. The authors found substantial evidence that language barriers adversely affected access to healthcare, quality of care, patient satisfaction and health outcomes, in all hospital services (2010:27). The recording of use of interpretation services was poor, and use of interpretation services ‘also appeared to be selective.’ Staff were distressed by poor communication and were ‘aware of the ethical and practical shortcoming of pragmatically using inappropriate interpreters’ such as patients’ children, or partners who lack understanding of procedures (2010:28).

Public health impact of migration

The review by George et al found that a number of studies have noted the absence of readily accessible data on the health of new migrants and the lack of clarity
about health issues and healthcare needs. ‘However, a key message from research on migration and health impacts is that economic migrants are generally healthy, because they are generally young and are less likely than non-migrants to have disabilities affecting their daily lives’ (2011:12). The authors found little published research that has surveyed migrants about their general health. Literature has addressed mental health and wellbeing among migrant groups, but much of this research does not include analyses by migrant status or length of residence in the UK and uses terms such as ‘ethnic minority’ and ‘immigrant’ imprecisely (ibid:13). However, the authors note that several studies have shown that migrants’ health can deteriorate with length of stay within the UK, for example in relation to alcohol use, smoking behaviour and eating habits. Research findings suggest UK Indian male migrants, especially Sikhs, show rates of alcohol abuse and related problems of liver cirrhosis considerably higher than English males; other research refers to increases in cardiovascular problems and cancer. George et al note that the costs of this and other hazardous behaviour in relation to medical interventions and healthcare have not been calculated (ibid:13).

The MAC research that the work by George et al contributed to focused on Tiers 1, 2 & 4 of the Points Based System (see Annex 1 for definitions). On the basis that these migrants ‘tend to be young, healthy, highly educated, highly skilled and in employment,’ they were likely to consume ‘below-average levels of health and social care services relative to the average existing UK resident, at least in the short term.’ The MAC report noted that migrants’ consumption of services is likely to be strongly influenced by the number and age of any dependents they may bring to the UK, and that this will not necessarily be known at their time of arrival. However, because these migrants ‘tend to earn good incomes and have above average propensity to be employed by multi-national firms suggests that at least some of these migrants and their dependents are likely to consume privately- rather than publicly-provided health & education services’. The MAC discussion concludes that the impact on the consumption of public services by these migrants could be offset by their contribution to the exchequer (2012:84-85).

**Migrants working in the health and social care sector**

Health services are heavily reliant on migrant labour. Dustmann and Frattini (2011) report that, in 2005, 38 per cent of the medical staff in the NHS came from outside the UK. The period 1999-2005 saw a major international recruitment drive as a response to the need for additional staffing for the UK’s health sector, although the expansion in the NHS workforce came to a halt when funding shortages surfaced (2011:20). Dustmann and Frattini’s research also found that non-EEA migrants are more strongly concentrated in the health sector than EEA migrants. The authors report that the concentration of non-EEA migrants in the health sector has increased over time: between 1994 and 1996, 36 per cent of non-EEA migrants in the public sector worked in the health sector. This increased to 41 per cent over the period 2008-2010 (ibid:43).

Research by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) in 2014 summarised the existing evidence on the impacts of migration on British public services. The summary of each public service area is brief, but it notes that in 2008, migrants
comprised 19 per cent of carer and 35 per cent of nurse roles in older adult care, and that the number of foreign-born care workers has been increasing at a faster rate than both migration in general, and the size of the care workforce in general. The IPPR report argues that ‘this, combined with an ageing population, means that the role of migrants in holding together a fragile social care system is extremely significant’ (2014:25).

Analysis of the characteristics of EEA and non-EEA migrants in Scotland by the Scottish Government (2016a) using 2011 Census data differentiated between recent migrants (those who had been resident in Scotland for less than ten years at the time of the 2011 Census) and established migrants. This work included a focus on sector of employment. Approximately 15 per cent of people in each population group who were in employment were working in the ‘human health and social work’ sector. The percentage was highest for recent non-EEA migrants. However, just 8 per cent of recent EEA migrants (in employment) were working in this sector. See Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Sector of employment – Human health and social work – Scotland-born and all migrants aged 16 to 74 in employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Born in Scotland</th>
<th>Born in rest of UK</th>
<th>EEA recent</th>
<th>EEA established</th>
<th>Non-EEA recent</th>
<th>Non-EEA established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human health &amp; social work</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Taken from Scotland’s Census 2011 – NRS: Table AT_084b_2011.

Housing

Key points

- On the evidence available, it is difficult to assess the direct and indirect impacts of migration on house prices, rents and social housing. However, there is a body of research relating to the housing choices and housing conditions of migrants.
- A number of small, qualitative studies have examined housing choices and housing conditions for particular migrant groups in specific locations in Scotland. Findings are not generalisable, but there is some evidence that bringing together migrant housing need with available housing supply can enable migrants to live independently and make improvements to their accommodation. On the other hand, evidence suggests that migrants may pay higher rents for poor quality accommodation in areas of social deprivation.
- Recent migrants are less likely to be home owners, and more likely to be accommodated in the private rental sector. This changes over time; by the time migrants have been in the UK for 20 years or longer, more than 70 per cent are owner occupiers and less than 10 per cent are in privately rented accommodation.

17 Standard Industrial Classification 2007
This section of the review explores the impact of migration on public and private housing. The Rolfe and Metcalf review found there was limited data relating to migrants’ access to housing and that, from existing data sources relating to tenure, it was not possible to distinguish recent migrants from others who migrated to the UK at an earlier stage of their lives. The authors reported that ‘some studies which look at a range of services have identified housing as a key area in terms of migrants’ needs. Others have a specific focus on housing, usually within a defined geographical area. Some research has looked at the impact of particular groups’ (2009: para 4.11).

Available evidence indicates that, in general, this assessment remains true. In 2011, researchers at the Migration Observatory included ‘impact on housing’ as one of the ‘Top ten problems in the evidence base for public debate and policy-making on immigration in the UK’ in their report of the same name (Blinder et al., 2011). There is little systematic evidence that allows the direct and indirect impacts of migration on house prices, rents and social housing to be assessed, at national and local levels (2011:11).

**Housing sector**

In their report, Blinder et al note that much of the research evidence relates to the housing choices of migrants (renting private accommodation, home ownership and social housing). Quantitative studies generally use data from the UK’s Labour Force Survey (LFS), which contains information about housing sector choices of both migrants and UK-born individuals. This has allowed researchers to conclude that people from outside the UK have lower ownership rates than the UK-born and greater representation in the rental sector (2011:11). Research by Vargas-Silva (2015b) using LFS data from the same year, found that the longer migrants live in the UK, the more likely they are to become owner occupiers, and the less likely they are to be in the private rented sector, as might be expected. For those in their first five years living in the UK, Vargas-Silva found that approximately 13 per cent were owner occupiers and almost 75 per cent were living in the private rented sector. For those who had been in the UK for more than 20 years, more than 70 per cent were owner occupiers and less than ten per cent were in privately rented accommodation (2015b:3).

There is much less evidence on the ways that migration impacts (directly and indirectly) on house prices, rents, and social housing at national and local levels (Blinder et al, 2011:11). As the authors state, positive net-migration leads to an increase in the demand for housing, which can impact on house prices and rents. However, the nature of these impacts depends on the responsiveness of the supply of housing to changes in demand. There can also be ‘important inter-relationships’ between the owner occupier sector and the private rented sector; for example if increased demand for rented accommodation encourages investors to enter the buy-to-let market, which in turn ‘could increase house prices’ (ibid:11).

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18 The supply of public sector housing impacts on private sector, so the focus of this section of the chapter is broader than the others
On the other hand, Vargas-Silva (2015b) highlights research by Sa in England and Wales in 2015, which found that migration has a negative effect on regional house prices. Sa estimated that a 1 per cent increase in the migration share of the population in an area reduces house prices by almost 2 per cent, and found that this effect is particularly strong in areas with a large concentration of low-educated migrants. Sa suggests that the dynamic is the result of UK-born residents moving out of areas with increasing migrant concentration (2015b:5). As the research was conducted in England and Wales, findings are not necessarily applicable to Scotland. However, it is likely that a similar dynamic operates in areas with large migrant populations and, although the majority of non-UK migrants are well educated, analysis of the Census 2011 indicates that more than one in four EEA established migrants and more than one in five non-EEA established migrants has no qualifications (Scottish Government, 2016a:23).

Blinder et al note that there is more evidence on social housing, although this is still limited. Recent migrants are less likely than the UK-born population to be accommodated in the social housing sector, but the propensity of migrants to be in social housing increases over the length of time they remain in the country. However, there is no research about the indirect effects of migration on the relationship between social housing and the private rented sector. The researchers argue that even if migrants themselves do not use social housing, migration may still change the demand for social housing indirectly by driving up rents in the private sector and making more people dependent on social housing. The costs of social housing provision may also rise because of increased competition for properties from the private rented sector (2011:11).

At the Scotland level, the evidence base comprises small, qualitative studies. One of the projects commissioned to feed into the MAC Analysis of the Impacts of Migration in 2012 (Whitehead et al, 2011) included a qualitative element focused on Aberdeen, as a contrast to the main focus on London, and involved a web-based survey and interviews with companies and estate agents. Aberdeen was selected because of a high concentration of Tier 1 and Tier 2 migrants, due to the demand for skilled employment in the oil industry. In Aberdeen, as in London, estate agents reported reduced availability of suitable rental properties, and resulting competition between potential tenants. The authors point out that such competition and the shortage of suitable property coming forward for renting leads to larger deposit requirements to secure a property, and ‘anecdotal reports of rent for a year or more being paid up front’ (2011:41). Although the research focused on Tier 1 and Tier 2 migrants, it is, of course, unclear whether interview participants would have been able to differentiate between types of migrant, so findings may be more widely applicable. In addition, the study does not record how many estate agents were interviewed in Aberdeen, or whether the report of reduced availability of rental properties came from all, most or just a few of the participants.
Housing conditions

A study by De Lima and Wright (2009) included employers from a range of sectors, migrant workers and service providers in rural Scotland. The study found a difference in perceptions – one local authority in the Grampian area perceived the allocation of 'low demand' housing to migrants as a success; however, migrant workers expressed concerns about being housed in 'undesirable areas' (2009:398). The study also claimed that motivations for migration impact on migrants' housing preferences: migrants hoping to earn and save as much money as possible often opt to live in homes of multiple occupation (ibid:398/399).

In 2013, McGhee et al conducted a small qualitative study focusing on Polish families taking up tenancies in particular parts of Glasgow. The study also drew on recent articles and reports that examined A8 or post-accession Polish housing and accommodation in the UK. The authors included an extract from an Audit Commission report from 2007 stating that: ‘Glasgow is a city well known for bringing together a ‘housing need’ with a ‘housing supply. Post-accession Poles are the most recent population to fill the ‘void’ in Glasgow’s ‘unpopular’ and therefore low-demand housing in areas of social deprivation’ (2013:331).

The research found that the common housing objective for participants was to live independently as a couple or family unit, and the ability to do this was a major factor in ‘many of our participants’ “settlement discourses.” For a number of our participants, returning to Poland would mean returning to ‘extended-family’ living, which they see as a major step backwards’ (ibid:332).

This new version of ‘housing normality’ was found to extend beyond the quality and quantity of accommodation in Scotland to a sense of security that tenancy and access to other benefits provided for them and their families in the UK (ibid:332/333). The study also reported research conducted for Glasgow Housing Association in 2008, which found that some housing associations in Glasgow have viewed the arrival of A8 migrants into the city as a potential opportunity to let properties that have been difficult to let in the past, and to add more working households to the tenant base. Participants in the study suggested that housing associations are actually using ‘refurbishing Poles’ to redecorate and improve flats that are in poor condition (at their own expense). However, the researchers found that some housing associations were employing ‘specific workers,’ (presumably with proficiency in relevant languages), having tenancy agreements translated into A8 languages and organising open days for A8 nationals (ibid:337).

Evidence to the Scottish Parliament Equal Opportunities Committee (2010) also highlights concerns about the poor standards of accommodation in which many migrants live, and ‘a number of studies which report poor quality accommodation and problems which include high rents and deposits, poor cleanliness, lack of furnishings and overcrowding.’
Migrants working in the construction industry

There is little recent evidence on migrant contributions to the construction industry. An IPPR report by Chappell et al in 2008 investigated the role of migrant workers in UK construction. Published in December 2008, the research captures the economic downturn, although the work was too early to examine the full impact of global recession, and the study’s usefulness is likely to be limited as a result. The report emphasised the important role played by migrants in the construction industry, filling employment gaps in an industry that is ‘naturally itinerant’ (‘Workers have always moved to where the work is, because the work moves around’) (2008:6). The authors conclude that increased mobility can be viewed as an opportunity, resulting in greater economic dynamism for the industry and the consumer, although this depends on appropriate training structures within UK construction, and Government ensuring fair competition within labour markets by tackling exploitative employers (ibid:6).

Chapter 3 of this review included the policy brief by Springford (2013) on the costs and benefits of Britain’s membership of the EU. Springford’s work, using LFS data from 2004-12, found that a higher proportion of A8 national work in skilled trades (especially construction) than people born in the UK (see Chapter 3, Chart 3.1). The work also examined demographic change in the UK labour market and the sectors where workers will be most needed to replace ‘baby boom generation’ retirees. ‘Skilled trades’ is one area where the author’s research indicates demand for workers to replace retirees will be strong (2013:6).

The 2016 Scottish Government analysis of migrant characteristics includes a specific focus on the construction industry. This work found that 6 per cent of recent, and 5 per cent of established, EEA migrants in employment were working in construction at the time of the 2011 Census. Percentages were lower for non-EEA migrants (2 per cent for recent and 4 per cent for established migrants) (2015b:29). Nine per cent of the Scotland-born population and 5 per cent of people born in the rest of the UK (in employment) were working in the construction industry (2016a:25).
Education

Key points

- The majority of evidence on migrants’ use of education services is at the UK level. The main focus of research has been the impact of recent migration, particularly from Eastern Europe, on schools in the UK.
- Data limitations have restricted the scope, scale and robustness of the research, although in Scotland, at least, the way data are collected and reported has been improved in recent years.
- The needs of some migrant pupils place additional demands on schools (translation and interpreting services, for example). However, there is some evidence that pupil performance among English-speaking pupils is positively correlated with the presence of pupils who do not have English as a first language.
- In Scotland, approximately 10 per cent of migrants in employment are working in the education sector, compared with 8 per cent of people born in Scotland.

The Rolfe and Metcalf review noted that ‘little research has been carried out on the impact of migration on education and schools services in Scotland’ and that ‘with regard to education, analyses of impact have relied on statistical data, while recognising its problems and limitations’ (2009: para 4.24).

The paper which focuses on problems in the evidence base (Blinder et al, 2011) claims that there is limited information on the number of migrants’ children in UK schools, because enrolment data do not record nationality, country of birth or migration status. The authors state that ‘in Scotland, unlike England, data are not collected on the number of children receiving support for learning English as an Additional Language. Consequently, much of the debate is based on anecdotal evidence provided by service providers and other stakeholders’ (2011:10). However, this statement no longer holds true. Data on pupils with English as an additional language (EAL) are published in the annual Pupil Census, and have been since 2006, when just 360 pupils with EAL needs were recorded. By 2015, the number was 22,00019.

In Scotland, a number of localised, qualitative studies offer valuable insights and some evidence on the impact of migration on education services. It should be noted that findings are likely to be place- and context-specific, and therefore do not represent the impact of migration on education services in Scotland as a whole; however, information is included and discussed in the section below where findings are relevant.

At the UK level, the George et al (2011) study that fed into the MAC Analysis of the Impacts of Migration concludes that research on education has focused on three

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main issues. Although some of the studies included in the work by George et al are now more than ten years old, the key findings and the typology are still relevant. Current evidence relating to each of the three issues identified by George et al is summarised, briefly, below.

**A possible increase in pupil numbers resulting from migration**

The main focus of research has been the impact of recent migration (particularly from Eastern Europe). A number of studies have sought to estimate the number of migrants in UK schools, but have encountered problems in identifying migrant children from the data. Data on school capacity indicate that many schools are under-subscribed and would benefit from an increase in applications, including from migrant families. However, undersubscribed schools may not be in areas where migrants live. George et al note that some reports argue that the impact of migration on schools, particularly A8 migration, has been limited because many migrants are young and single, or come to the UK alone rather than with families. However, the impact of migration is expected to increase as migrants settle permanently and, with additional dependents, make demands on the infrastructure associated with population growth (2011:20).

**The demands and benefits of migration for schools**

George et al report that a number of studies have described the additional demands on schools arising from the needs of some migrant pupils. They summarise requirements leading to higher costs of education provision as including: translation and interpreting services, numeracy and literacy of young children who have not received formal education, understanding of cultural differences by staff, and lack of records and assessment (2011:20). It is not clear from the research quoted by the authors whether these are additional significant pressures that many schools are unable to meet, light pressures from a handful of children at a few schools, or something in between. However, the authors quote some specific examples, including an estimate by Edinburgh City Council from 2008 that the cost of an English as an Additional Language teacher to provide support to 50 pupils was approximately £33,000 per annum (ibid:21).

George et al make the point that research on education impacts of migration ‘rarely distinguishes between groups of migrants and sometimes makes assumptions that all migrants have similar needs.’ However, they suggest that the children of Tier 1 and Tier 2 migrants would be ‘unlikely to require assistance with translation and interpreting because, in many cases, they originate from countries where English is the official language’.

Statistical data on performance, and individual research studies suggest that school performance and pupil achievement may be enhanced by migration. Pupil performance among English-speaking pupils appeared to be positively correlated with the presence of pupils with English as an additional language. However, the authors note that ‘the causal mechanism is unclear’ (2011:20-22).

In Scotland, the study *Evidencing the social and cultural benefits and costs of migration* (Kay and Morrison, 2012) examined the localised impacts of migration in
Glasgow. Based on semi-structured interviews with more than 20 stakeholders from a range of organisations and services, and a facilitated workshop, the study found that migrants had had a number of positive effects on schools and education services in study areas. Summarising their findings, the researchers report that ‘as well as the development of international links, opportunities for intercultural learning and extracurricular activities, there were felt to be advantages and benefits relating more broadly to teaching practice and schools’ openness to learning from one another, and from the experience developed in specialist support units’ (2012:8).

Although Kay and Morrison’s study did not focus on specific migrant groups, what little research that exists on the impact of migration on education services in Scotland has tended to focus on migrants from the A8 countries and, in particular, on Polish migrant groups. Studies have highlighted the effect that the demand for language support has placed on services for children and their parents.

Research by Moskal (2016a) focused on the experience of Polish migrant children in schools in Scotland. The research combined ethnographic observation and interviewing techniques to examine the extent to which schooling practices in Scotland are, or are not, being adapted to meet the needs of migrant children. Moskal interviewed young people and their parents/carers, as well as teachers, school managers and principals from primary and secondary schools in different parts of Scotland (urban and semi-urban centres and rural towns).

The study found evidence of increased demand for English language tuition to enable Polish pupils to access the school curricula. While some schools were able to provide interpreters for parents who lacked English language skills, others were not able to prioritise the resources to do so, often leaving migrant children to act as facilitators in processes of settlement and community building. Teachers in the schools surveyed raised concerns about the lack of specialist in-school language support available. In some schools, classroom teachers and those specifically appointed as language assistants also expressed concerns about the lack of appropriate training they had received. Moskal’s study concludes that ‘language may constitute a barrier to the equitable benefits of education’ (2016b:99).

Although the studies above offer valuable insights and contribute to our understanding of the impact of migrants and migration on primary and secondary education services in Scotland, overall, the evidence base is limited. There are no recent quantitative studies to offer robust data at a national level, and the qualitative studies discussed focus on specific migrant groups and/or particular locations. Given these caveats, the studies should be considered as illustrative rather than representative of the impact of migration on education services in Scotland.

The response of schools to migration

The ways in which schools are able to respond to the arrival of migrant children may be of crucial importance to the achievements of both migrant and non-migrant pupils. The arrival of migrant children within the school year, once resources have been allocated to schools, and the effect of transient life-styles among some migrants, resulting in ‘churn’ among the pupil population has been identified as a problem for some schools. George et al found that a number of studies have
pointed out that pupil mobility has impacts which are different from those of migrant entry to schools, although these studies come from the early 2000s and/or relate to specific areas of England. The relationship between the number of migrants in schools and performance is not clear. The authors point out that schools receiving the highest numbers of migrant children are in some of the most deprived areas and also already experience high levels of churn, so it is not possible to determine whether, or how far, migration is having any additional impact (2011:22-24).

Migrants working in the education sector

This review has been unable to find any research that focuses on migrants as providers of education services. The work by Springford (2013) which examined the occupations of migrants in the UK does not disaggregate between ‘health, education, fire, police and military.’ However, the 2016 analysis of 2011 Census data by the Scottish Government found that approximately one in ten people in employment in each of the population groups was working in the education sector. However, this percentage was lower for recent EEA migrants (6 per cent). See Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Sector of employment – Education – Scotland-born and all migrants aged 16 to 74 in employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Born in Scotland %</th>
<th>Born in rest of UK %</th>
<th>EEA recent %</th>
<th>EEA established %</th>
<th>Non-EEA recent %</th>
<th>Non-EEA established %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Taken from Scotland’s Census 2011 – NRS: Table AT_084b_2011.

Crime and justice services

Key points

- The evidence base on the relationship between migration and crime/justice has been strengthened in recent years, although research relates to the UK as a whole, rather than Scotland.
- Where evidence of criminal activity exists in relation to migrants, it is generally consistent with the standard economic model of crime: strong labour market attachment tends to be associated with lower levels of criminal activity.
- Models of individual crime participation tend to show that migrants are less likely to commit crime than observably similar people born in the UK.
- Migrants appear to be less likely to be victims of crime than people born in the UK although, as time in the UK increases, migrant experience tends to align with that of people born in the UK.

The relationship between migrants and crime, and the impact of migration on justice services, had received relatively little academic attention at the time of the Rolfe and Metcalf review in 2009. This evidence gap was noted by the authors, although they acknowledged that criminal activity by migrants has been ‘an area of much speculation and anecdote’ (2009:para 4.65). The Rolfe and Metcalf review
noted the two perspectives that need to be addressed when examining the relationship between migration and crime/justice: the contribution of migrants to criminal activity; and criminal activity perpetrated against migrants. The authors found little robust evidence concerning the impact of migration on crime, particularly in relation to migrants as offenders (2009:para 4.62).

In the following section, the two perspectives will be considered in turn. In general, this is an area where the evidence base has been strengthened in the past few years, although research is all at the UK-level.

**Criminal activity by migrants**

UK-level MAC research on the impacts of migration (2012) includes a section on the impact of migration on crime. Drawing on commissioned research by Bell and Machin, the MAC report found that there was *no statistically significant relationship between recent inflows of skilled migrants and violent crime per capita. Recent inflows of skilled migrants were found to have lowered the rate of property crime per head because these migrants are less likely to commit property crime than the average UK-born individual: a one per cent increase in the proportion of the UK population that are work permit or Tier 2 migrants was estimated to lead to an approximate 0.1 per cent fall in the per capita rate of property crime (for the whole UK population, including migrants’* (2012:82).

In their report for the MAC, Bell and Machin (2011) include a review of the empirical literature on crime and victimisation. The authors argue that the more convincing studies show *‘little consistent relationship between crime and migration’* with most studies finding small and insignificant effects. Where it was possible to disaggregate between groups of migrants, they found that those with poor labour market opportunities were more likely to be associated with property crime. The authors also found that models of individual crime participation tend to show that migrants are less likely to commit crime than observably similar people born in the UK (2011:5).

The 2011 study by Bell and Machin focused on migrants from A8 accession countries as well as the Tier 2 migrants who were of primary interest to the MAC. In both migrant groups, the researchers found *‘no evidence of any link between migration and violent crime.’* In addition, findings indicated that rising shares of A8 or work permit and Tier 2 migrants in an area were associated with *‘reduced property crime rates.’* The authors interpreted these results as consistent with the economic model of crime, since migrants in both groups had *‘strong labour market attachment’* (2011:6).

In a Migration Observatory Briefing in 2013, Bell and Machin further investigated the impact of migration on crime in the UK, using Home Office and Police Force data on arrest. As the authors point out, one potential problem in exploring links between migration and crime is that a series of factors might lead to migrants having higher or lower arrest/conviction rates than the UK-born, even if they commit crimes at the same rate. For example, migrants may commit crimes that are easier (or harder) to detect, or police could allocate more (or less) resources to catching
migrant offenders, or courts could be more (or less) likely to convict migrants (2013:3).

Bearing these caveats in mind, findings support the 2011 study in that they indicate a negative correlation between the level of property crime and the ‘foreign-born share of the population’ for the whole of the period under investigation (1983-2011). However, the authors acknowledge that correlation is not the same as causation, and that ‘more detailed studies across a range of countries do not find evidence that the rise in migration caused the crime rate to drop’ (ibid:4).

Bell and colleagues Fasani and Machin also examined the empirical connections between crime and migration in a 2013 paper. They studied recent groups of immigrants to the UK, including the post-2004 inflow from EU accession countries. The findings support the standard economic model of crime: that the labour market opportunities on offer in the receiving country are a key determinant of criminal behaviour. As in the other studies reported, the increase in A8 migrant population was associated with a small negative impact on property crime and no significant change in violent crime (2013:1282).

The body of work by Bell and colleagues has also addressed the issue of rates of imprisonment for migrants which, across OECD countries, generally show that those who are not born in the country are ‘disproportionately likely to be in prison relative to natives’ (Bell and Machin, 2011:6). The authors speculate that this could be because migrants are ‘discriminated against at various points in the criminal justice system,’ or may commit ‘more serious offences with longer prison sentences,’ or be associated with types of crime that are given ‘greater focus by the criminal justice system’ (2011:42/43). However, they acknowledge that data on prison populations ‘tends to be quite poor across countries,’ necessarily limiting the sensitivity of potential analysis (ibid:43). Because of this, such hypotheses need to be investigated more thoroughly.

This review found no academic papers relating specifically to migrants in Scotland and criminal activity. However, experts gave evidence to the Scottish Parliament Equal Opportunities Committee on the extent and impact of migration upon crime in Scotland (2010).

- ‘There was a consensus amongst the witnesses that migration had little, if any, impact on policing. It was also suggested by Assistant Chief Constable Ruairidh Nicolson of ACPOS that there was limited evidence of migrants coming to Scotland and becoming involved in criminal activity’ (2010: para 353)
- Where there had been an impact on policing, this was in relation to ‘the provision of interpreting and translation services’ (2010: para 354)
- ACPOS reported that it had seen a three-fold increase in the cost of these services ‘in recent years,’ but that it was ‘a very small cost in the overall policing budget’ (2010: para 356).
Criminal activity perpetrated against migrants

The literature review conducted by Bell and Machin as part of their study for MAC (2011) found little current evidence as to whether migrants are more or less likely to be victims of crime than people born in the UK. The authors highlight that the evidence that exists uses self-reported rates of victimisation or victim reports from the policy, and a consequent problem may exist if migrants have different reporting rates from people born in the UK (2011:39). They noted evidence across countries suggests that ‘violence against migrants is more likely in poor areas in which immigrants have rapidly become a substantial and visible minority in previously homogenous communities’ (ibid:41).

Bell and Machin used data from the British Crime Survey (2005-06 and 2009-10, England and Wales only) and the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey (2003) to explore the extent of victimisation among both migrants and people born in the UK. They found that migrants appeared to be less likely to report being victims of crime than people born in the UK, although this changes ‘rapidly’ as time in the UK increases. For those migrants who had been in the UK for at least ten years, there was no significant difference between their reported experiences of crime and that of people born in the UK (2011:60-61). Naturally, since the data rely on self-report, it is difficult to tell whether migrants who have been in the UK for longer are more likely to be victims of crime or more likely to report crimes against them.

The authors also provide evidence on the importance of neighbourhood effects for crime. In neighbourhoods with higher shares of migrants in the local population, there was lower reported crime and self-reported victimisation than similar neighbourhoods with lower migration densities, indicating that concentrations of migrant populations ‘appear to provide some measure of protection from crime’ (2011:8).

Evidence to the Scottish Parliament Equal Opportunities Committee (2010) included a focus on the importance of gaining trust in the police to make it easier for migrants to report crimes against them.

‘We have concerns about the level of the reporting of crimes against members of that community [migrants], especially with regard to hate crimes or race-related offences that involve people being subject to abuse in the workplace or where they live … We are not saying that there is a vast amount of crime being committed against migrant workers – there is nothing to indicate that there is – but we want to ensure that we are providing the appropriate mechanisms by which crimes can be reported’ (2010: para 360) Inspector Brian Gibson, Strathclyde Police.

Police reported to the Commission that they saw language as a vital ingredient in establishing links and encouraging engagement with migrants. For example, Strathclyde Police had encouraged officers to participate in English language classes as part of their day to day business (2010: para 364). (See also below: Chapter 5.)
Migrant workers in the crime and justice sector

As with education, this review was unable to find any research focusing on migrants working in crime and justice. The work by Springford (2013) which examined the occupations of migrants in the UK does not disaggregate between 'health, education, fire, police and military.' However, it is unlikely that large numbers of migrants in Scotland are employed in this sector. The analysis of 2011 Census data by Scottish Government (2016a) found that between 2 and 6 per cent of EEA and non-EEA migrants (recent and established) were working in 'public administration and defence,' which includes a number of categories in addition to justice and judicial activities, and public order and safety. This compares with 7 per cent of the Scottish born population and 9 per cent of people born in the rest of the UK, who were in employment (2016a:25).
5. Migrant integration and culture

Key points

- The role of social interaction is crucial to the process of migrant integration into the host society. It is through social contacts and the climate created by the possibility of such contacts that people develop a sense of belonging in a particular social space.
- An ongoing debate in the international literature centres on the effects of large-scale migration and increased ethnic diversity in host communities, in terms of the disruption of existing social solidarity and social capital.
- The experiences of migrants, and the ease or difficulty with which they are able to integrate into local communities, may be key to whether they decide to stay or leave.

Introduction

‘Integration’ is understood as a process whereby migrants become successfully incorporated into the host society. Ager and Strang (2004) describe four parts to integration:

- Public outcomes related to employment, housing, education and health
- Social connections with members of their own and other communities
- Personal competencies in language, cultural knowledge and security/stability
- Status, or ‘shared notions of nationhood and citizenship,’ implying membership and identification with the country of residence (2004:5).

Discussions of integration have also highlighted the importance of social interaction between migrants and those born in the host country. However, definitions reflect differing perspectives on the desired end goal: the optimal relationship between migrants and the host society. The assimilation approach focuses on migrants’ one-way adaptation to the values and rights system of the host society; while two-way integration is based on an approach in which both migrants and the host society contribute to a common culture, while a sense of diversity and cultural heritage is retained (see, for example, Spencer, 2006:14; Rudiger and Spencer, 2003:4-7).

Many of the public dimensions of integration have been covered, to some extent, in the earlier chapters of this report. This chapter focuses on elements of social and cultural integration. It also includes a short section on public attitudes to migration, given the importance of the public and private ways in which the host society responds to migrants.

The role of social interaction is crucial to the process of integration. It is through social contacts and the climate created by the possibility of such contacts that people develop a sense of belonging in a particular social space (Rudiger and Spencer, 2003:6). In their 2009 review, Rolfe and Metcalf noted that the
experiences of migrants, and the ease or difficulty with which they can integrate into local communities, may be key to whether they decide to stay or leave (2009: para 4.53). The Rolfe and Metcalf report includes a useful definition of community cohesion, which emphasises the role of both migrants and locals in this process:

‘Community cohesion is what must happen to all communities to enable different groups of people to get on well together. A key contributor to community cohesion is integration, which is what must happen to enable new residents and existing residents to adjust to one another’ (UK Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008, quoted in Rolfe and Metcalf (2009: para 4.52)).

The Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) report on the impacts of migration in the UK (2012) makes the point that, of all the public service and social impacts of migration the Committee addressed, it felt least able to provide a firm conclusion on the overall impact on social cohesion and integration, due to ‘insufficient evidence in the existing literature to enable us to define and accurately measure’ the impacts (2012:91).

An ongoing debate in the international literature centres on ethno-racial diversity and its alleged effects on public trust and cohesion (associated in particular with the work of Putnam, in the United States and Goodhart, in the UK (Putnam, 2007; Goodhart, 2004; Portes and Vickstrom, 2011, for example)). These authors highlight the possible negative impact of large-scale migration and increased ethnic diversity in communities, in terms of the reduction of existing social solidarity and social capital, at least in the short term. Goodhart draws attention to the tension between the aspiration for solidarity (high social cohesion and generous social security) and diversity (equal respect for a wide range of people, values and ways of life), given that solidarity requires the state to be a ‘homogenous society with intensely shared values’ (2004:2).

While acknowledging that ‘locally concentrated surges of migration may have a negative impact on levels of social cohesion,’ (2012:91) the MAC research found that ‘it is economic deprivation rather than ethnic diversity which is negatively related to social cohesion’ (2012:92). The report argues that, ‘according to the main available survey measure of integration’ (it does not specify what these are) ‘some migrants in the UK appear to be better integrated and engaged in society than some members of the UK-born population’ (ibid:91). The research found that, immediately after they arrive in the UK, many migrant groups have more trust in British political institutions, and express higher levels of belonging to Britain than UK-born individuals with no migrant heritage. However, this higher level of trust is not sustained. The report notes that, over time, the attitudes of migrants assimilate to the more negative attitudes of the UK-born population, although migrant minorities tend to retain a higher sense of belonging to Britain even when they are long established in the country (ibid:91). The finding chimes with the literature on ‘segmented assimilation theory’ from the United States. This is based on the recognition that American society is extremely diverse and segmented, with an underclass residing in central cities where new migrant families first settle on arrival. Thus, it is argued that different groups are available to which new migrants
may assimilate, and that as a result they may take divergent assimilation paths (see, for example, Portes and Zhou, 1993; Xie and Greenman, 2005).

Social and cultural networks

Key points

- Qualitative research undertaken in rural Scotland has found that migrants in small rural communities experience pressure to assimilate to dominant cultural norms.
- In the absence of co-ethnic groups nearby, it is difficult to maintain a sense of belonging that includes elements of both the cultures of migrants' country of birth and host country.
- In the urban context, several quantitative and qualitative studies in Scotland have established that factors such as the ability to speak English without difficulty, employment and educational qualifications have a significant impact on migrants' ability to develop a social support network and access social amenities within the community.
- Participation in clubs and sporting activities encourages children to interact together and contributes to the building of social capital. However, low income and narrow networks of support can limit the options available to migrant children.
- Evidence suggest that the longer that migrants live in the same area, the more likely they are to feel integrated in the community.

A number of studies have examined aspects of the social and cultural networks formed by migrants in particular areas of Scotland. In the rural context, de Lima’s work offers insights into processes through which the presence of ‘minority ethnic groups’ disrupts traditional conceptualisations of ‘the rural’ as homogenous and unchanging. In a book chapter on ‘belonging/unbelonging’ in rural Scotland (2012) she used previous qualitative studies to investigate the strong pressures for migrants to assimilate to ‘dominant’ cultural norms in rural areas. De Lima acknowledges that ‘integration’ as a concept is ‘highly contested and has different meanings,’ but focuses on exploring how minority ethnic groups in rural areas negotiate belonging and identity (notions of identity, community, acceptance, affiliation and home making) as they navigate through their daily lives (2012:208).

De Lima's research found that study participants in small rural communities experienced pressure to assimilate to the ‘dominant cultural norms’ and, in the absence of co-ethnic groups within reasonable distance, struggled to maintain a sense of belonging that ‘incorporated multiple places and cultures’ (ibid:212). Her analysis also identified a range of barriers, such as long working hours and living in overcrowded accommodation in order to send money to family living in their country of birth, that limit migrants’ ability to integrate into their host communities.

Identifying gaps in evidence, De Lima concluded her study by arguing that we need a better understanding of the ways in which minority ethnic groups might be transforming the majority communities and cultures, and how the lives and
identities of the majority communities might be transformed through the presence of minority ethnic groups (ibid:215).

In the urban context, a key contribution to the evidence base is Kearns and Whitley’s research (2015) on social integration within communities and the role of functional factors (such as employment, education and language) as potential facilitators. The authors highlight the debate about the role of time, wherein ‘integration’ is a form of acculturation: a learning process of second-culture acquisition by both groups, rather than migrant assimilation of the host culture. This quantitative study was based on two surveys of 1,400 migrants (many of whom were asylum seekers) across 15 Glasgow communities, all of which were within the 15 per cent most deprived in Scotland. The research was conducted in 2008 and 2011, as part of the GoWell study of the impacts of housing investment and regeneration. Kearns and Whitley were anxious to explore the effects of time and place on social integration in Glasgow, given that the city has received many ‘new migrants’ over the past decade, as well as hosting ‘more traditional migrant groups’ (2015:2107).

Findings suggest that the migrants who took part in the study were on the whole ‘less positive than British-born citizens about social integration’ (ibid:2114) (scoring lower with regard to trust, reliance and safety). Differences were greatest in relation to issues of trust in others, with British-born citizens twice as likely as migrants to feel their neighbours were honest, one-and-a-half times more likely than migrants to have social relations with their neighbours, and three times more likely to know people in the neighbourhood. However, this analysis combines recent and established migrants and British non-UK born citizens with asylum seekers and refugees in the migrant group. When the groups were further disaggregated, EU citizens, economic migrants and students tended to have more positive views of their neighbours and safety in the neighbourhood than asylum seekers and refugees (ibid:2114-2117).

Using indicators of trust, safety and reliance, the study established that factors such as ability to speak English without difficulty, employment and educational qualifications have a significant impact on the migrant’s ability to develop a social support network and access social amenities within the community. The study identified that positive social integration generally increased across all three factors the longer time that migrants spent in the UK and, more importantly, within the same area (ibid:2119).

Kearns and Whitley’s findings support earlier research by Shubin and Dickey (2013) who considered ‘integration’ as:

- A ‘two-way relational process and not as an outcome in the form of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ in settling in a new country
- A dynamic process, in order to account for unpredictable trajectories and the potential reversal of integration of migrants
- A changeable process, which changes both the people who are integrating and the societies they are trying to integrate into’ (2013:2961)
Shubin and Dickey’s work focused on the integration of Eastern Europeans into North East Scotland and found that ‘respondents who considered themselves integrated into the local community have been in Scotland for a longer period; have a higher level of education; participate more in local community events; have a good skills match to their current job; had engaged in search activity before migrating; have greater job security; have undertaken training for their current job; have better job prospects with current employer and experience better working conditions than expected before migrating’ (2013:2965).

Crucially, Kearns and Whitley’s Glasgow-based study highlights the importance of the socio-economic characteristics of the areas under investigation. The authors use their findings to argue that living in a ‘regeneration area’ has predominantly negative effects on reports of social integration, although it should be borne in mind that many of the migrants in the study were asylum seekers and refugees subject to dispersal programmes in some of the most deprived areas of Glasgow (2015:2120-21). However, the argument supports findings from Kay and Morrison’s 2012 study of the social and cultural benefits and costs of migration in Scotland, which explored the importance of placement location in debates about the impact of migration. Kay and Morrison used a series of semi-structured interviews and a facilitated workshop with stakeholders from a range of organisations and services to conduct a Glasgow-based research project to explore localised social and cultural impacts of migration. The people interviewed for the study ‘warned against complacency or overly optimistic assumptions that Scotland or Glasgow were ‘naturally’ open or welcoming places for new arrivals’ (2012:4). The authors pointed out that ‘especially when migrants or asylum seekers moved into or were placed in areas with little former experiences of migration and/or where there were pre-existing issues of deprivation, social exclusion and anti-social behaviours, the challenges for both local residents and migrants themselves could be substantial’ (ibid:4).

Kay and Morrison’s research also identified cases where perceptions about the flow of public sector funding and resources to the area, and the upsurge in third sector activity, added to tensions between migrants and the local residents. The latter group felt that longstanding needs for regeneration and development in the area were being overlooked in favour of ‘troublesome’ newcomers (2012:7).

However, the study also found that ‘increased cultural diversity in certain areas of the city has changed the ‘feel’ of the area, softening a tendency for outsiders of any kind to feel vulnerable to attack or harassment and increasing the range of retail and leisure outlets, thus turning rather grim and forbidden streets into much more welcoming places’ (2012:8). An example of the positive impact of an increase in migrants to an area was also reported to the Scottish Government Equal Opportunities Committee’s Inquiry into migration and trafficking (2010).
‘There was an area of the city with lots of empty housing stock that nobody wanted. The houses were given to migrants from the eight 2004 EU accession countries and, as a result, the entire area was regenerated. Businesses sprung up and a new community blossomed.’ Ethnic Minorities Law Centre (2010: para 120).

Sime and Fox’s (2015) study of migrant children, social capital and access to services post-migration further highlights the importance of ethnicity, social class and placement on migrant experiences in Scotland. Their study, described more fully in Chapter 4, found that, among Eastern European migrants, individuals’ participation in clubs and sports activities encouraged people to interact together, and contributed to the building of social capital. This supports Putnam’s argument (2000) that participation in associational activities contributes to social cohesion.

However, findings from the study suggest that ‘access to resources is by no means equal, and class, ethnicity, gender and social capital are bound up with the segregated opportunities that are available to different families, depending on the characteristics of the local area and their families’ resources’ (2015:532). Focusing on child migrants, the Sime and Fox’s research showed that ‘low income after migration and narrow networks of support often limited the use of services important to children’s integration and civic participation’ (2015:532).

Moskal’s study of Circulating capitals between Poland and Scotland: a transnational perspective on European Labour Mobility (2013) makes a further important contribution to the evidence base. This work applied the concepts of social, economic and cultural capital to reflect on gains and losses in capital of Polish migrants in Scotland and in their country of birth. Based on 65 narrative interviews (conducted in 2008 and 2010), a survey of 158 Polish residents and 25 follow-up interviews, the study points to the importance of networks within the receiving country (Scotland).

These networks, Moskal argues, can facilitate the long term and even permanent settlement of migrants (2013:373), although it is important to note that they may be networks of co-ethnics. This is a crucial distinction in the debate relating to the building of social capital: is there a trade-off between social interaction within ethnic groups (bonding social capital) and with non-co-ethnics (bridging social capital) or can the two co-exist or even be mutually reinforcing? The study also found that the ability to speak English and communicate with a diverse range of people is particularly important in gaining a fuller understanding of, and confidence in, British society.
The importance of language in relation to migrant integration is emphasised in several qualitative studies conducted in Scotland. The process of learning a language in itself encourages mutual adaptation of migrants and the host society. However, there is a wider range of evidence to indicate that migrants are often defined as being out of place in their new environment, despite being multilingual.

Moskal found that language was the most evident of many issues faced by migrant youth, affecting their ability to make friends, adapt to the new school and culture, deal with loss and loneliness, as well as racism or anti-migration sentiments. However, the author argues that, although language proficiency is regarded in many countries as a vehicle for integration of migrant children and a necessary part of belonging, it is misleading to simply equate language acquisition with acculturation into a new society (2014:285). While limited language skills prevent Polish migrants from fully participating in the community, and strong social networks with co-ethnics may isolate migrants and lock them into specific ethnic niches (2014:283) there is a wider range of evidence to suggest that migrants are often defined as being ‘out of place’ in their new environment, despite being multilingual. This could be because their ‘particular linguistic competencies do not always fit the norms or expectations of the spaces they inhabit’ (2016b:86). Moskal uses findings from this study to argue that the introduction of discussion in schools about language, identity and social change in Scotland would benefit ‘both native Scottish and immigrant pupils’ (2016b:99).

Two further studies provide evidence of the importance of language in relation to migrant integration. Weishaar’s (2008) small study on stress among Polish migrant workers in Scotland found that communication problems pose barriers to accessing information and are a particular challenge in the workplace and in accessing official services such as job centres (2008:1252). Shubin and Dickey’s (2013) qualitative study on the integration and mobility of Eastern European migrants ‘found a positive and statistically significant relationship’ between English language proficiency and migrant integration. Such proficiency was also found to improve migrant employability and engagement within local labour markets (2013:2973).
The authors also argue that learning a language and cultural practices is not a one way street, but involves ‘mutual adaptation of migrants and the host society’ (2013:2969). For example, new Polish migrants coming to Peterhead were found to learn to speak Russian, rather than English, in order to communicate at work (ibid:2969).

The Scottish Government Equal Opportunities Committee’s Inquiry into migration and trafficking (2010) provided evidence which identified language as a vital ingredient in establishing links and encouraging engagement with migrants, specifically in relation to police officer participation in English language classes as part of their day to day business. (See also above: Chapter 4.)

“They [police officers] join the classes when they are out on patrol and build that into their beat. They have the opportunity to supplement their training and enable the community to meet the police so that we can explain what we do as a police force by engaging in policing by consent. As far as we are concerned, that has been successful as well.’ Inspector Brian Gibson, Strathclyde Police (2010: para 364).

Religion

Key points

- There is little evidence of the impact of migrant religions. However, one piece of research on the arrival of Polish Catholics to Scotland indicates that Catholic parishes have changed and that congregations have become increasingly diverse. This has led to some tensions between migrant and host parishioners and between Polish priests and existing clergy.

This review found little evidence relating to potential impacts on Scotland of religions unfamiliar to people born in Scotland, or the influx of large numbers of people practising specific religions. However, the dynamics of mutual adaptation and migrant integration were explored in detail in Trzebiatowska’s (2010) study of Polish Catholic priests living in the UK. The author drew on a study of Polish Catholics in Aberdeen to examine the complex relations between migrant Polish Catholics and host Catholic Priests and congregations. Using a combination of qualitative methods (participant observation and interviews with clergy and parishioners) the study described ways in which the presence of Polish migrants has significantly transformed Catholic parishes.

The research found that the arrival of large numbers of Polish Catholics has had a positive impact on the size of Catholic congregations in Scotland. However, tensions have arisen between the spiritual and institutional agendas of the Polish priests brought in to help to deal with unexpected pressure on the existing clergy in Scotland and existing Scottish Catholic norms. Trzebiatowska found that this led to a degree of friction between the Polish Catholics and local parishioners, as priests
struggled to reconcile the interests of Polish parishioners with the needs of wider congregations. The study suggests that the practice of offering masses in Polish can have a negative impact on the integration of Polish migrants into their host communities. One example was a church in Aberdeen which, by offering mass in Polish, drew migrants away from another church where a Scottish priest was working towards integration (2010:1063).

Part of Shubin’s 2012 small study of mobility, religion and exclusion of Eastern European migrants in rural Scotland offers further insights into the role of religion in migrant integration. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with Eastern European migrants, rural clerics, and observation and participation in public meetings, the study noted examples of where new informal religious practices were introduced by migrants and accepted by local congregations, contributing to the inclusion of migrants in the local community. Shubin argues that ‘religious beliefs often help migrants in dealing with the trauma and stress of uprooting, migration, and arriving in a new country’ (2012:621) and ‘provide opportunities for migrants’ meditation and escape from the immediate environment of social marginalisation’ (2012:623).

Public attitudes to migration

Key points

- Public attitudes to migrants underpin the empirical evidence on the impacts of migration.
- If migrants are to integrate successfully in host communities, it is important to understand the attitudes of the host society towards migrants, and how these may be influenced.
- The evidence base in this area is substantial, both in relation to Scotland and the rest of the UK.
- Key questions addressed by attitudinal survey data include whether people wish migration to be reduced or stopped (regardless of the effect on the economy); the perceived impact of migration on the labour market; whether greater exposure to migrants increases or decreases negative feelings; attitudes to different groups of migrants; and whether the evidence indicates that attitudes in Scotland are more welcoming than in the rest of the UK.
- Available data indicate that greater exposure to migrants increases tolerance and understanding, and that people in Scotland are, generally, more welcoming of migrants than most other parts of the UK.
- However, attitudes are not fixed, and data suggest that in Scotland, as in the rest of the UK, a majority want to see an overall reduction in migration. In addition, a sizeable minority have concerns about the impact of migration on the labour market in Scotland.

This chapter began by considering the tension between solidarity and diversity. As Goodhart (2004) points out, ‘after three centuries of homogenisation through industrialisation, urbanisation, nation-building and war, the British have become
freer and more varied. Fifty years of peace, wealth and mobility have allowed a greater diversity in lifestyles and values. To this ‘value diversity’ has been added ethnic diversity …’ (2004:1). Greater diversity can produce conflicts of values and interests, and generate unjustified fears. While exposure to a wider spread of lifestyles, greater mobility and better education have all helped to combat some of these fears, ‘feelings of suspicion and hostility towards outsiders are latent in most of us’ (ibid:5).

This conflict of values and interests, and underlying fears and uncertainties, make it important to be aware of public attitudes to migrants and migration. The evidence base on attitudes is substantial, both in the UK and in Scotland. As migration has risen up the UK policy agenda, a number of reports have used social attitudes data to investigate a range of topics in relation to migration and the general public (see, for example, Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014; Blinder, 2014; McCollum et al, 2014). This review, with its specific focus on the impacts of migration, is not the place for a detailed examination of that evidence base. However, because the process of acculturation and integration involves both incoming and host communities and cultures, it is important to include some consideration of the attitudes of Scots to migrants. In addition, there are different implications for the nature and level of public service provision in communities where migrants are, and are not, able to integrate, and implications for the labour market and the economy if migrants choose to return to their countries of origin. For these reasons, a brief summary of the evidence in relation to specific issues is included below.

The most important source of information on public attitudes is national attitudinal survey data, collected via face to face or telephone interviews. The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSAS) and British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) are key data sources, and both are based on samples that are claimed to be representative of the Scottish or British public. Such surveys are methodologically robust, in that they use trained interviewers, generally achieve higher response rates, allow more complex questions to be asked and yield better quality data. The evidence from these surveys will be considered first in the section below. However, such surveys are costly to set up and run, and slow in terms of turnaround. Consequently, the evidence base also includes a number of snapshot online surveys, which will be summarised at the end of the section. Although such surveys have the advantage of being fast turnaround and low cost, they have important disadvantages: for example, they are unlikely to target a representative sample of the population, interviews are not conducted by trained interviewers and data quality may be poor. (For more information about methods of data collection in social surveys, see, for example, Question Bank Factsheet 2, 2007; NatCen, 2015).

Key questions addressed by attitudinal survey data include whether people wish migration to be reduced or stopped, regardless of the effect on the economy; whether migrants take work from people born in Scotland/the UK; whether greater exposure to migrants increases or decreases negative feelings; attitudes to different groups of migrants; and whether the evidence indicates that attitudes in Scotland are more welcoming than in the rest of the UK.
In 2014, Ipsos MORI published a review which aimed to bring together a wide range of attitudinal data relating to the UK in one place. The research draws on a number of different sources, some of which include Scotland (Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014). As part of the work, the authors focused on the 2010/11 Citizenship Survey to examine the attitudes of the white British population and the ethnic diversity of neighbourhoods. They found that, in the 10 per cent least ethnically diverse wards, the proportion self-identified as white British who thought that migration should be reduced ‘a lot’ was 64 per cent. However, this fell steadily as ethnic diversity increased: in the 10 per cent most ethnically diverse wards, it was 44 per cent (2014:21).

The work by Duffy and Frere-Smith also investigated the evidence on attitudes to particular types of migrant (using Ipsos-MORI survey data from 2011). They found that people are least likely to want to reduce the number of skilled migrants and students (approximately a third of those sampled) and most likely to favour reducing the number of low-skilled workers (almost two thirds of those sampled) (2014:77).

Scotland has generally been perceived as having a relatively welcoming view, and is presented as such by politicians and policymakers (McCollum et al, 2014:79). Drawing on data from several years of the methodologically robust Scottish Social Attitudes (up to 2010) and British Social Attitudes (2011) Surveys, McCollum et al investigated attitudes to migration in the context of the independence referendum. The authors pointed out that data support the belief that the Scottish public is more welcoming of migrants than in most other parts of the UK (see Figure 5.1).

**Figure 5.1: Indicators of attitudes towards migration in 2011, by Government Office Region**

![Image of Figure 5.1](image)

**Source:** Analysis of British Social Attitudes Survey 2011, David McCollum, Beata Nowak and Scott Tindal.

The authors suggest that, if accurate, findings could be related to ‘three aspects of Scotland’s distinctive historical and contemporary patterns of migration: historical net losses of population through migration, a relatively small migrant population and reliance on migration for demographic stability’ (2014:88). It is also likely that low
political salience, partly due to broad cross-party consensus on the need for migrants to boost Scotland’s population is a contributory factor.

More recently, September 2016, the Scottish Government published work that explored public attitudes to discrimination and positive action towards different groups of people protected by equalities legislation, using SSAS data from several time points. Most of the analysis relevant to migration focuses on religion, or ethnic background rather than migrants per se. However, findings indicate that respondents to the SSAS are becoming more receptive to the idea of living in an area ‘with lots of different kinds of people’ (47 per cent agreed in 2015; 37 per cent in 2010; 34 per cent in 2006.)

Questions on the impact of migration from particular groups on Scotland’s identity and culture were also included, to further explore attitudes towards diversity. Respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with specific statements (see Table 5.1). There has been a decrease between 2010 and 2015 in the proportion who believe that more people from each of these groups coming to live in Scotland would mean Scotland beginning to lose its identity. However, while there appears to have been a shift towards greater acceptance of diversity, a fairly substantial minority still have concerns about the impact of migration on Scotland’s identity (2016b:18-19).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1: Perceived impact of migrants on Scotland’s identity</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came to live in Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more people from Easter Europe came to live in Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more black and Asian people came to live in Scotland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2015: Attitudes to discrimination and positive action (Scottish Government, 2016). Information taken from Table 5.1 in the report.

On the subject of perceived labour market competition, the study found that the proportion of respondents who believed that people from Eastern Europe take jobs away from other people in Scotland decreased between 2010 and 2015 (from 37 per cent to 30 per cent), reversing an increase between 2006 and 2010. The same pattern was evident when respondents were asked to consider people from ethnic minorities, although the percentages were lower (26 per cent in 2015; 31 per cent in 2010; 27 per cent in 2006). The authors suggest that one reason for the spike in 2010 could be the poor economic situation at the height of the recession. Again, although findings are positive, findings indicate that a sizeable proportion of people in Scotland continue to be concerned about the impact of migration on the labour market (ibid:19-20).

Finally in this section, Table 5.2 summaries findings from recent fast turnaround, online surveys. Three studies were conducted by the international market research organisation YouGov between 2013 and 2015. It should be emphasised that data
are not fully comparable: the YouGov/Channel 5 survey included Scotland in the UK sample, whereas the YouGov/Migration Observatory disaggregated Scotland and England and Wales. The two most recent surveys also included an additional response option: that migration should be stopped completely.

While there does appear to be a difference between attitudes in Scotland and the rest of the UK, with people in Scotland generally more positive, data suggest that in Scotland, as in the rest of the UK, a majority of the general public want to see an overall reduction in migration.

Table 5.2: Attitudes to migrants: Scotland/UK

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% agreeing</td>
<td>% agreeing</td>
<td>% agreeing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of migration should be:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kept at current levels</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stopped completely</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: tables from original surveys
* Option not offered to respondents
6. Discussion

This review set out to summarise and evaluate the recent literature on the impacts that migrants and migration have had on Scotland. It also aimed to differentiate, where possible, between migrant groups and to explore ways in which migrants and migration have impacted differently on Scotland from the rest of the UK.

On balance, the evidence paints a positive picture of the impacts of migration on Scotland, and there is compelling evidence that migrants’ contributions may be welcomed and appreciated. There is no evidence that migrants are a burden on Scotland’s economy and public services.

Although the evidence base is rich and diverse, greater consistency is required across the definitions and classifications used to describe where people come from. At present, it is difficult to draw insights to inform policy in relation to particular groups. Scotland has several scholars specialising on particular aspects of migration, and local studies generate valid insights for those locations and migrants groups examined, but to collate an assessment of national, or generalisable, impacts remains a challenge.

One recurring finding from the review is that migrants tend to become more like the Scotland/UK-born population over time. Although this can be a welcome part of the ways in which migrants integrate into their new communities, it is not always a positive development. Research has identified poorer health behaviours and loss of trust in government among some migrants who have been in Scotland for longer periods of time.

Given that the evidence base in Scotland is weaker than the UK as a whole, and that Scotland’s experience of migration is relatively recent, it is important to gain a better understanding of the dynamic of migration in Scotland. This is particularly the case in the following areas:

- Public services (particularly migrants’ contribution to public service delivery)
- The impact that migrants from the rest of the UK have on Scotland
- Measuring the cultural and civic integration of migrants
- The impacts of migration on the Scottish economy.

Looking ahead, changes to the legislative landscape in Scotland and the devolution of additional powers and responsibilities to Scotland warrant appropriate investment in strengthening the evidence base.
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Annex 1: Definitions

The Points-Based System (PBS)

The UK’s points-based five tier visa system is the main migration route for migrants from outside the EEA to come to the UK to work, study, invest or train. The system separates applicants into five ‘tiers,’ although in practice only four tiers are used. In order to be eligible for a visa in any of the tiers, the applicant must pass a points-based assessment. For work visa applications, points are generally awarded according to the applicant’s ability, experience and age. For some tiers, points are also awarded for specified levels of income, savings and English language ability.

The five tier visa system consists of the following:

**Tier 1:** this visa category is for ‘high-value’ migrants from outside the EEA and covers the entry of entrepreneurs, investors and people of ‘exceptional talent.’

**Tier 2:** this category is for ‘skilled workers’ from outside the EEA with a job offer in the UK from an employer who has a sponsor licence granted to them by the Home Office. It includes skilled workers who are transferred to the UK by an international company, skilled workers where there is a proven shortage in the UK, ministers of religion and sportspeople.

**Tier 3:** this category was designed for low-skilled workers filling specific temporary labour shortages. The UK Government has so far never allocated any visas under this scheme.

**Tier 4:** this category is for students aged over 16 from outside the EEA who wish to study in the UK. Applicants must have a place on a course at a UK educational institution before they can apply. The education institution must have a Home Office sponsor licence. Tier 4 is also for children between the ages of 4 and 18 who are studying at independent fee-paying schools in the UK.

**Tier 5:** this category contains six sub-tiers of temporary worker including creative and sporting, charity, religious workers, approved Government Authorised Exchange Schemes, and the youth mobility scheme which enables over 65,000 young people every year to work in the UK, in any job for a maximum of two years. The visas are awarded to young people from countries that have reciprocal arrangements with the UK.

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## Countries in the EU and EEA (2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition²², ²³</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>The 28 EU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Republic of Ireland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Economic Area (EEA)</td>
<td>The EEA includes EU countries and also Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. It allows them to be part of the EU’s single market. Switzerland is neither an EU nor EEA member, but is part of the single market. This means Swiss nationals have the same rights to live and work in the UK as other EEA nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 countries</td>
<td>Romania and Bulgaria, countries which joined the EU in January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A8 countries</td>
<td>Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, countries which joined the EU in May 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A10 countries</td>
<td>Accession 8 countries, plus Malta and Cyprus, which joined the EU in January 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15 countries</td>
<td>Countries which were member of the EU before May 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²² [https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea](https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea)

²³ [http://england.shelter.org.uk/get_advice/eu_nationals/countries_of_the_european_union_eu_and_eea](http://england.shelter.org.uk/get_advice/eu_nationals/countries_of_the_european_union_eu_and_eea)
Annex 2: Databases included in the original search

**Proquest** (16 databases searched)
- ASSIA
- Bioone
- British humanities, entertainment and industry abstracts
- ERIC
- IBSS
- LISA
- Linguistic and Language behaviour
- LLBA
- MLA
- National criminal justice reference services
- PILOTS
- ProQuest dissertations and Theses: UK and Ireland
- ProQuest dissertations and Theses: A and I
- Social services abstracts
- Sociological abstracts
- Worldwide political abstracts

**EBSCOHOST**: INCLUDES DATABASES PsychInfo; CINAHL; Psychology and Behaviour; Health Source; Psyarticles.